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Abstract 
My original contribution to knowledge is the assessment of two ballistics analysis systems using the 
same bullets and cartridge cases to assess interoperability potential. The results are discussed in the 
context of policing issues representing a multidisciplinary approach to combating gun crime.  
Microscopic comparison of bullets and cartridge cases allows inferences to be made that objects 
bear marks from the same weapon. Parts of this process have been automated. Digital images of 
objects are stored in a database and correlations undertaken to find potential matches. An expert 
will decide on the most probable match based upon a range of potential candidates.  
All evidence should be utilised to the fullest extent, including data from ballistics systems. The 
success rate of the most widely used system has been quoted at between 50% and 95% suggesting 
that links to other crimes remain undiscovered. There are different ballistics systems available but 
research has only been conducted on one.  
There is no interoperability between systems. Data cannot be shared between different systems. An 
essential pre-requisite to any work on interoperability, is an understanding of the different systems 
and the data produced. The research aims were to design a methodology to enable the assessment 
of systems and to produce ammunition that can be used repeatedly as required. The aim was to 
conduct an experiment with two of the currently available systems. 
The results show variance between systems and their accuracy needs improvement.  An error rate 
has been defined and applied to each system. The results suggest that complete interoperability of 
systems will only be possible with the full cooperation of the manufacturers. A limited form of 
interoperability focussing on data sharing may be possible. The results have implications for experts 
using the systems and suggest that a matching standard should be developed to make forensic 
ballistics analysis an objective discipline. 
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1.1 - Introduction 
Gun crime presents a major challenge to law enforcement and the consequential investigations often 
involve forensic science. This may be through the analysis of DNA and fingerprint evidence in 
addition to the analysis of bullets, cartridge cases and recovered firearms. Forensic ballistics involves 
the comparison of bullets and cartridge cases to ascertain if the same weapon was responsible for 
firing the objects in question. During gun manufacturing, a tool is used to machine lands and grooves 
into the barrels. This ensures a stable trajectory of the bullet when the weapon is fired. Wear 
inflicted on the machining tool every time a new barrel is cut, results in the rifling of each barrel 
being slightly different. During firing, these unique marks are transferred to the bullet. The same 
principle applies to the components of the weapon that make contact with the cartridge case. 
Unique impressions are transferred and can be used to infer matches between ballistics exhibits. 
Whilst these distinguishing characteristics can also be used to differentiate between individual 
weapons, they can also be used to determine the manufacturer of a particular weapon. One example 
is the rectangular firing pin impression typically found on cartridge cases fired from Glock pistols. 
These features are known as class characteristics as opposed to individual characteristics which 
identify a particular weapon.  
Forensic ballistics is different to other areas of forensic science such as DNA testing and fingerprint 
analysis. DNA and fingerprints remain constant. Two DNA profiles from the same person taken years 
apart will be the same. Every time a gun is fired, the physical contact between the gun components 
and the ammunition results in wear. This changes the distinguishing marks. Two bullets or cartridge 
cases fired from the same gun will bear marks that are the same and depending on the number of 
times the weapon has been fired, will also bear marks that are different. This introduces complexity 
into the discipline which has resulted in an element of subjectivity when declaring matches between 
objects. Consequently, there are no standards in place to declare a match between bullets or 
cartridge cases. Expert testimony is based upon the skills and experience of the examiner rather than 
a statistical or probability based assessment of the evidence. The chances of a coincidental match 
between two questioned DNA profiles have been questioned, studied and published to a high degree 
of certainty. The same has not happened in the forensic ballistics discipline. 
The physical examination of bullets and cartridge cases is conducted using an optical comparison 
microscope. Evidence based on this microscopic comparison is presented in court. Attempts have 
been made to automate parts of this process. Technology is now in place in many laboratories that 
allows a digital image of a bullet or cartridge case to be acquired, distinguishing marks extracted in 
the form of a digital signature and stored in a database. This allows comparisons to be carried out 
15 
 
between many ballistics exhibits - a task that would be time consuming and arguably impossible for a 
human to undertake.  These systems typically return a list of probable matches ranked in order of 
similarity. An expert will then have to examine the objects on the correlation list and make a decision 
as to the most probable match. The list may contain many objects. Different laboratories will 
examine the top five, top ten or top twenty.  
There are different suppliers of these systems. However, there is no interoperability between 
different systems resulting in a situation where different countries using different systems cannot 
exchange data. This produces many difficulties for police investigating crimes involving firearms. It 
also results in a situation where a high level overview of the extent to which guns travel is difficult to 
obtain. 
The systems do not return definitive matches, instead returning a list of similar objects. Previous 
research conducted on the most widely used system has found differing accuracy rates depending on 
many variables such as database size and ammunition type. Furthermore there has been no 
published research conducted on other systems available despite these systems beginning to gain 
prominence in the market. There has also been no published research examining potential 
interoperability between the systems currently available. This Thesis aims to address this through the 
design of a methodology specifically designed to enable the assessment of different systems using 
the same sample of bullets and cartridge cases. This will enable the extraction and examination of 
the resultant data to inform the debate on interoperable systems.  
Whilst the experimental aspect of this Thesis concerns the automated systems that are used for the 
purposes of forensic ballistics analysis, the results and the application of these systems have been 
discussed in the context of wider policing issues representing a multidisciplinary approach. A 
problem facing police investigating gun crime is the lack of information that is sometimes available. 
This can be related to a single crime where victims and witnesses are reluctant to come forward. 
Equally, there can be a lack of information regarding the number of crimes being committed overall. 
Official statistics provide the number of recorded crimes but do not include unreported crimes. 
Consequently, it is difficult to quantify the true number of crimes involving firearms. This has led to 
alternative research methods being employed which have provided valuable information. These have 
included the assessment of medical information relating to gunshot related hospital admissions and 
interviews with offenders.  
Whilst there are elements of forensic ballistics that are common between different jurisdictions, the 
nature and characteristics of gun crime and the individuals that commit these crimes can vary 
dramatically. Gun crime in countries outside the UK is not only different in terms of quantification, 
16 
 
but also, in underlying differences in culture, history and legislation that affect the manifestation of 
gun crime. An example is the USA where legislation is different from the UK in that firearms are 
easier to acquire. A higher rate of gun crime than the UK is also observed. This contrasts greatly with 
Canada where compared to the USA, there is a smaller level of gun crime. Contrast this again with 
the Republic of Ireland which has a much higher number of murders committed with firearms than 
the UK despite the population differences. These contrasts demonstrate the fact that gun crime has 
many manifestations and consequently some interventions will be more appropriate in some 
situations than others. It is certainly true that a one size fits all approach cannot be applied.  
Attempts have been made to address gun crime by understanding the factors that cause individuals 
to carry and use guns. Gun crime has been linked to gangs and associated criminality and 
consequently research has been undertaken to understand the problem and implement 
interventions. A notable example is the application of evidence based policing principles to the guns 
and gangs problem in Boston. Operation Ceasefire was put into place as a result of a high number of 
gun deaths in Boston in the 1980s and 1990s. Multiple agencies were involved and tackled both the 
supply of firearms and the individuals carrying them. Later research assessing the significance of the 
interventions concluded that Operation Ceasefire reduced the number of monthly youth homicides 
by 63% over the initial two years of implementation (Braga at el, 2001). In the UK, perhaps the best 
example of specialist police interventions is Operation Trident in London. This is a dedicated 
operational command unit tasked with investigating shootings primarily amongst the young, black 
community in London. Like Operation Ceasefire in Boston, Trident utilises a multi-agency approach to 
tackling the supply and demand of firearms (Robert and Innes, 2009).  
A proposed solution to tackling gun crime is the implementation of a gun registration scheme. This 
would involve test firing all legally held weapons and entering the bullets and cartridge cases into a 
ballistics analysis system. Feasibility studies have been undertaken to assess the suitability of the 
technology to the task. The overall finding has been that the technology is not accurate enough to 
enable successful implementation of such a scheme. A prerequisite to such a scheme is a high level 
of accuracy. According to research conducted previously and also for this Thesis this is not present 
currently.  
As previously described, gun crime presents law enforcement agencies with unique problems. Crimes 
involving firearms are often difficult to prevent, detect and understand. Strategic interventions 
targeting the supply and trafficking of firearms are also difficult to understand due to a lack of data 
available concerning the extent to which guns travel. The data gaps could be addressed through 
interoperable ballistics analysis systems allowing routine cross referencing of ballistics evidence 
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between different countries. The major barrier to this is that current systems are not interoperable. 
Furthermore there has been no research conducted assessing the feasibility of interoperable 
systems. This Thesis aims to conduct a controlled experiment with two currently available systems to 
assess the data output in order to inform a debate on interoperable systems.  
It has been suggested that new technology is required to bring greater accuracy to the discipline as 
well as significant efficiencies in terms of operating the technology and procurement costs. 
Suggestions are made throughout the Thesis of the forms that innovation in this field may take with 
particular reference to 3D surface metrology technology that is routinely used in other engineering 
disciplines. Such technology allows a detailed surface topography of an object to be captured and 
overcomes some of the flaws of using two dimensional technology to capture a three dimensional 
object. Throughout the Thesis, a further aim is to discuss the results in the context of some of the 
policing issues raised in the literature review. As such, the Thesis is organised as follows: 
 Chapter One introduces some of the key issues and outlines the aims of the Thesis.  Chapter Two consists of a review of the literature. The Thesis is multidisciplinary in nature 
and as such the literature review contains research conducted in both the criminology field 
and also the forensic ballistics field. In the forensic ballistics field, particular attention has 
been paid to research conducted on automated systems.   Chapter Three presents the aims and objectives of the research. The gaps in the literature 
are identified and addressed.   Chapter Four presents the methodology of the Thesis. This includes the background to the 
experimental research, the steps that were taken prior to commencing the experimental 
research and the experimental design.  Chapter Five consists of the results and discussion.   Chapter Six concludes the Thesis, presenting a discussion of the results in the context of 
wider policing issues, the conclusions and implications of the research and suggestions for 
future research.  
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2.1 Gun Crime - Reporting, Levels and Trends 
2.1.1 - Gun Crime in the UK 
This section explores gun crime from the perspective of the United Kingdom. Particular attention is 
paid to assessing the incidence of crimes involving firearms. Official statistics are discussed alongside 
studies that have utilised other methods such as historically assessing medical records from hospital 
admissions and interviewing offenders convicted of crimes involving firearms. The impact of these 
crimes is also discussed. The incidence of gun crime is put into the ĐoŶteǆt of the UK͛s restrictive 
firearms legislation. The impact of this legislation is also discussed. 
Crimes that involve firearms are frequently in the media both in the UK and abroad (BBC, 2008, BBC, 
2009, BBC, 2010b,). The serious nature of these offences and the harm caused by them has resulted 
in extensive research being conducted investigating the causes and consequences of these offences 
and resultant interventions. These are discussed in detail in a later section of this Chapter. It is 
important to note that the term ͞guŶ Đƌiŵe͟ ĐaŶ haǀe ŵaŶǇ diffeƌeŶt defiŶitioŶs depeŶdiŶg oŶ the 
ĐoŶteǆt aŶd the laǁs of aŶǇ paƌtiĐulaƌ ĐouŶtƌǇ. IŶ EŶglaŶd aŶd Wales, the teƌŵ ͞guŶ Đƌiŵe͟ ŵeaŶs aŶ 
offence that involves a firearm being discharged, used as a weapon (as a blunt instrument) against a 
person, or used to threaten a person. In this definition, air weapons are considered as firearms. 
(Smith et al, 2010). Other criminal events are also included in the definitioŶ of ͞guŶ Đƌiŵe͟ used iŶ 
this Thesis, such as trafficking and the illegal distribution of firearms. In the United Kingdom the 
possession of firearms is strictly regulated resulting in the possession of a firearm being illegal in 
most circumstances (Warlow, 2007). In other countries such as the United States, firearms legislation 
is much more relaxed (Spritzer, 1998). 
Quantifying the extent of gun crime can be problematic because some offences will be unreported 
(Squires, 2008). However, the Home Office releases crime figures annually which can be used to 
assess the number of reported crimes involving firearms. The latest figures available show that in 
2008/09 gun crime accounted for only 0.3% of all recorded crimes in England and Wales (Smith et al, 
2010). This percentage may seem low but the actual number of crimes represented is over 14,000. 
There were 432 fatal or serious gun crime injuries in 2008/09 according to Home Office statistics 
presented by Smith et al (2010). It is important to note that this figure includes incidents where air 
weapons were used and where a firearm was used as a blunt instrument or to threaten a person. 
Excluding air weapons, the number of firearms offences in 2008/09 was 8,208 (Smith et al, 2010). 
Although parts of this Thesis are concerned with the forensic analysis of bullet and cartridge cases 
fired by weapons, it is still of importance to consider incidents where firearms are not fired as these 
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crimes can still generate valuable intelligence relevant to forensic ballistics such as descriptions of 
the weapon.  
Compared to the previous year (2007/08), offences involving firearms (all types) fell by 18%, 
excluding air weapons, firearms offences fell by 17%. These statistics represent the fifth consecutive 
annual fall. Offences involving firearms are still substantial in number and important to quantify 
given the impact and harm caused by these types of offences (Smith et al, 2010). It is also important 
to note that a gun does not have to be fired or used as a weapon to cause harm. The threat posed by 
a firearm can be extremely distressing and used to enable a crime such as robbery. Smith (2003) 
examined a sample of over 2,000 personal robberies and found that 3% of all personal robberies 
involved the use of a firearm.  
It is important to recognise that the term gun crime does not define a crime type. Crime types 
involving firearms are varied. Hales, Lewis and Silverstone (2006) reported that in 2004/05, 44% of 
crimes involving firearms were criminal damage offences, 35% of offences were violence against the 
person and 16% were robberies. These figures include crimes where air weapons were used. 
Excluding the use of air weapons, the figures are revised to 53% being violence against the person, 
33% robberies, 6% criminal damage and 3% burglaries.  These percentages are illustrated in Figure 2-
1. 
Figure 2-1: Types of Offences Committed using Firearms 2004/05 
 
Source: (Hales, Lewis and Silverstone, 2006). 
44% 
35% 
16% 
5% 6% 
53% 
33% 
8% 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Criminal
Damage
Violence against
the Person
Robberies Other Offences
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 
Crime  Type 
Types of Offences committed using Firearms 2004/05 
All Firearms
Including Air
Weapons
All Firearms
Excluding Air
Weapons
21 
 
Recent figures published by the Home Office (Smith et al, 2010) show that in 2008/09 the types of 
crimes committed using non-air weapons were violence against the person accounting for 45%, 
robbery accounting for 44% and criminal damage accounting for 6%. Criminal offences involving air 
weapons were distributed as follows; criminal damage accounting for 77% of offences and violence 
against the person accounting for 19% of offences and robberies accounting for 0.6% of offences. 
These percentages are presented in Figure 2-2. There are no combined percentages available in this 
particular study for the year 2008/09 (Smith et al, 2010). The statistics presented by Smith et al 
(2010) and Hales, Lewis and Silverstone (2006) refer to crimes in England and Wales. It is entirely 
possible that the manifestation of crimes involving firearms differs in other countries (Krug et al, 
1998).  
Figure 2-2: Types of Offences Committed using Firearms and Air Weapons 2008/09 
 
Source: (Smith et al, 2010) 
The geographical distribution of gun crime is interesting to study and has implications for resource 
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much higher and serious injuries may become fatal (Cutts, Bridle and Bleetman, 2006).  A Home 
Office study looking at crimes committed in 2004/05 suggested that 24% of all crimes involving any 
type of firearm resulted in injury to the person (Hales, Lewis and Silverstone, 2006). In 2008/09, 17% 
of crimes involving firearms resulted in an injury to a person. (Smith et al, 2010). This appears to 
suggest a decline in the number of firearms incidents resulting in injury but the harm caused by 
firearms incidents is still high. 
2.1.2 Incidence of Gun Crime in the UK – Research other than Official Statistics 
Whilst official statistics are useful, they are affected by the fact that many crimes involving firearms 
are not reported. This creates problems including a gap in intelligence and the potential for the levels 
of gun crime to be underestimated. Consequently, interventions may be scaled back because the 
problem is perceived to be small.  Research methods that venture beyond the examination of official 
statistics can be helpful in addressing this problem. Examples are the examination of medical data 
and interviews with offenders. These additional data enable official statistics to be contextualised 
and an understanding to be gained of the comprehensiveness of official data. 
Persad et al (2005) examined the medical records of people admitted to a London hospital with 
gunshot wounds to ascertain if the number of people admitted to hospital correlated with police 
statistics. The authors were examining the incidence of injuries, any medical complications arising 
from them and the clinical experience in treating these injuries. They looked at 70 injuries inflicted 
on 61 individuals over a five year period between 1998 and 2002 and concluded that their data 
correlated well with police data. There had been a fourfold increase in injuries over the time period 
examined. A similar study was undertaken retrospectively by Crewdson et al (2009). The authors 
examined data collected at a pre-hospital care trauma service in relation to stabbings and shootings 
in London. The data covered a sixteen year period (1991 – 2006) and suggested there had been an 
11% increase in gunshot wounds sustained. The authors point out that this increase is not supported 
by data from other sources such as the British Crime Survey and the Metropolitan Police. Crewdson 
et al (2009) suggest that this is because this data include crimes where guns were used but no 
injuries were sustained. It may be that this has skewed the data and injuries caused by firearms have 
actually increased.  
Data gained from hospitals and medical treatment centres offers an interesting alternative source of 
data that can be compared with police and government data. In the UK doctors are now required to 
report all cases of gunshot wounds and stabbings to the police (Morris, 2009). Similar studies to that 
conducted by Pershad et al (2005) have been conducted in Estonia (Lepik and Poldsam, 2007), Italy 
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(Verzeletti et al, 2009), Sweden (Karlsson et al, 1993) and Germany (Karger et al, 2002).  These 
initiatives may help to fill in gaps in statistics created by unreported crime.  
Official police statistics and medical data are useful in quantifying the extent of gun crime in the UK. 
However, these statistics will not include the extent to which offenders possess and use firearms 
when no injuries have occurred. Bennett and Holloway (2004) attempted to fill this knowledge gap 
by interviewing arrestees. The research covered sixteen custody suites in England and Wales and 
took place over three years between 1999 -2002. It involved interviewing 1570 arrestees in relation 
to gun ownership. Unfortunately the authors do not state what offences the arrestees were detained 
for. However, Bennett and Holloway (2004) found that 20% of participants had possessed an illegal 
gun in their lifetime and that 60% of these guns were handguns. Of the 20% of participants that had 
possessed an illegal gun, 26% reported that they had carried a gun during the commission of an 
offence. Bennett and Holloway (2004) suggest that interventions that aim to reduce gun crime 
should target the criminals that are using and possessing illegal firearms but that interventions will 
not be effective unless all the characteristics that underlie gun possession in the criminal population 
are understood (Bennett and Holloway, 2004). Table 2-1 presents a summary of the main findings of 
research conducted examining gun crime in the United Kingdom. 
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Table 2-1: Summary of Main Findings Concerning Gun Crime in the UK 
Author(s) and 
Year 
Research Method 
and / or Data 
Source 
Main Findings 
Smith et al 
(2010) 
Recorded crime 
Statistics 
In 2008/09 Gun Crime accounted for 0.3% of all 
recorded crime in England and Wales representing 
over 14,000 crimes and 432 fatal or serious injuries. 
Excluding air weapons, the number of offences 
recorded was 8,208. 
Compared to the previous year, offences involving 
firearms fell by 18%. Excluding Air Weapons, 
firearms offences fell 17%.  
Gun crime is concentrated in London, Manchester 
and Birmingham. 
17% of crime in 2008/9 involving any type of firearm 
resulted in injury to the person. 
Hales, Lewis and 
Silverstone 
(2006) 
Recorded crime 
Statistics 
Offences committed using firearms are varied and 
there is a difference in offences committed using 
firearms and air weapons. 
24% of crimes in 2004/5 involving any type of 
firearm resulted in injury to the person. 
Persad et al 
(2005) 
Medical records of 
people admitted 
to hospital with 
gunshot wounds. 
The data correlated well with police statistics. 
There was a fourfold increase in injuries over the 
time period studied (1998 – 2002).  
Crewdson et al 
(2009) 
Data from a pre 
hospital trauma 
centre in London.  
There was an 11% increase in gunshot wounds over 
the sixteen year period studied (1991 – 2006). 
Bennett and 
Holloway (2004) 
Interviews with 
arrestees. 
20% of participants had possessed an illegal gun and 
60% of these guns were handguns. 
Out of this 20%, 26% had carried a gun during the 
commission of an offence. 
 
2.1.3 Gun Crime outside the UK 
Research into gun crime in the UK is useful and important. It is also important to recognise that 
different countries will have different manifestations of gun crime depending on many variables. 
These might be cultural, economic, population and legislative differences. For this reason, research 
conducted examining countries outside the UK is also considered. This section examines gun crime 
that occurs outside the United Kingdom. There are two types of research considered in this section. 
The first is comparative analysis of crimes involving firearms between different countries. The second 
considers gun crime from the perspective of a single country. The countries considered are Canada, 
Republic of Ireland and the West Indies as published research was available examining these 
countries in detail. 
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There is a great deal of variance in the nature and characteristics of gun crime outside the UK. This is 
due to a number of factors and the extent of the variance is well demonstrated by Krug et al (1998) 
who compared the rate of firearm deaths across 36 countries. Krug et al (1998) used the World Bank 
income classification system which is based on the Gross National Product of a country. Only 
countries classified in the high income or upper middle income groups were approached to 
participate. The rationale for this decision was that these countries were more likely to have data 
that would be of sufficient standard. Participating countries also had to have a population of over 
one million. Forty six countries met the inclusion criteria and 36 responded to the request for data. 
The study considered fatalities from a one year period and resulted in data being provided 
concerning 88,649 firearm deaths. The main finding was that the USA was unique in several ways. 
Firstly, the USA had the highest rate of deaths caused by firearms at 14.24 per 100,000 which is 5 to 
6 times higher than that in Europe
1
 which had a death rate of 2.17 per 100,000. This is illustrated in 
Figure 2-3. 
Figure 2-3: Deaths Caused by Firearms in the USA and Europe 
 
Source: (Krug et al 1998) 
The USA also had the highest rate of homicides and suicides committed using a firearm. The high 
mortality rate in the USA has led to much research and commentary concerning firearms deaths and 
the underlying reasons behind the high mortality rate. Spitzer (1998) suggested a number of factors 
that contribute to a gun culture in the United States including the fact that many Americans own 
guns for recreational and hunting purposes. There has also been a historical link between the role of 
                                                          
1
 In this research, the European countries that responded with data were:  Estonia, Northern Ireland, Finland, 
Switzerland, France, Norway, Austria, Portugal, Belgium, Slovenia, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Greece, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Spain, Netherlands, Scotland, England / Wales. 
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guns and maturity. Spitzer (1998) also argued that the constitutional right of American citizens to 
bear arms makes any restrictive regulation politically difficult. Amongst the countries considered by 
Krug et al (1998), there were four Western nations that had high firearm mortality rates. These were 
the USA, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. Firearm mortality was contrastingly low amongst the five 
Asian nations that took park. These were Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. 
Krug et al (1998) suggested that in order to explain the variance between countries, three factors 
should be taken into account. These are the homicide rate, the suicide rate and factors that influence 
the use of firearms – the usefulness of data on suicides in considered later in this section. Finally, 
Krug et al (1998) suggested that the low rates of firearms deaths in Asia showed that such deaths can 
be prevented and that it is not impossible for other nations to achieve a low firearm death rate.    
The data gathered by Krug et al (1998) provided a valuable comparative insight into gun crime in 
different countries. However, one of the disadvantages of the research conducted by Krug et al 
(1998) is that it only provided a snapshot of a single year in each country. To identify trends and 
patterns in the data it is useful to consider the official statistics produced by governments of 
different countries.  
One such example is the research conducted by Agozino et al (2009). The authors attempted to 
explain the problems caused by gun crime in the West Indies in the context of the interaction 
between guns, crime and social order. The authors examined data collected by the Trinidad and 
Tobago police on 1688 homicides over a six year period between 2000 and 2006. The data showed 
that the involvement of firearms in homicides rose steadily over the six years as did the actual 
homicide rate. This is shown in Figure 2-4. The year by year percentage increase is shown in Figure 2-
5. The data also suggested that homicides committed with a firearm were less likely to be solved 
than other homicides. Agozino et al (2009) suggested two reasons for these observed trends. Firstly, 
the weaponisation of society – this refers to the influx of small arms into a civilian society. The 
second factor was a rise in retaliation murders. Agozino et al (2009) suggested that these two factors 
were interlinked and that the availability of small arms or weaponisation facilitated retaliation 
murders.  
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Figure 2-4: Homicides and Homicides Involving Firearms in the West Indies 2000 -2006 
 
Source: Agozino et al (2009) 
Figure 2-5: Percentage of Homicides in the West Indies that Involved Firearms 2000 – 2006 
 
Source: Agozino et al (2009) 
119 
149 
172 
229 
260 
389 
370 
61 
83 
104 
146 
182 
272 269 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
H
o
m
ic
id
e
s 
Year 
Homicides and Homicides Involving Firearms in the West Indies  
2000 -  2006  
Number of
Homicides
Homicides due
to Firearms
51% 
55% 
60% 
64% 
70% 69% 73% 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 
Year 
Percentage of Homicides involving Firearms in the West Indies  
2000 - 2006 
Percentage of
Homicides
involving
Firearms
28 
 
Agozino et al (2009) suggested that the weaponisation of societies has accompanied imperialism and 
the problems posed by gun crime in the Caribbean must be understood in the wider context of 
colonialism. They suggested that prevention of firearm deaths in the Caribbean lies in focussing 
effort on reducing the weaponisation of the area. 
Contrast the situation in the Caribbean with that in Canada. Sheptycki (2009) considered Canadian 
crime statistics such as those reported by Dauvergne and De Socio (2008), the coverage given to 
firearm offences in Canada by the media and firearm legislation. Sheptycki (2009) examined crime 
statistics which showed a declining crime rate and homicide rate. Despite this, Canadians still 
reported a higher fear of crime than their American counterparts. Sheptycki (2009) attributed this to 
ways in which the Canadian media reported crime. They tended to keep a story in the headlines 
longer and report non-local events. These factors in combination magnified the perceived threat of 
crimes involving guns (Sheptycki, 2009). Offences involving firearms are actually very rare in Canada 
and are mainly committed by a small minority of criminals involved in other criminal activities. 
Despite this evidence, Sheptycki (2009) reported a Canadian perception of a problem with gun crime. 
Figure 2-6 shows the number of firearm related homicides for 2000 – 2006 in Canada and Figure 2-7 
shows firearm related homicides as a percentage of all homicides. 
Figure 2-6: Firearm Related Homicides in Canada 2000 – 2006 
 
Source: Dauvergne and De Socio (2008) 
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Figure 2-7: Percentage of Homicides that are Firearm Related 2000 – 2006 
 
Source: Dauvergne and De Socio (2008) 
Campbell (2010) described the nature and extent of gun crime in the Republic of Ireland. The main 
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rate of these offences. Agozino et al (2009) also reported that homicides involving firearms were less 
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decline in detection rates. These figures are illustrated in Figure 2-8. Despite the fact that the West 
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finding –crimes involving firearms appear to be difficult to solve. This could be for a number of 
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partially attributed to the partial weaponisation of Ireland as a result of sectarian violence. The 
difference between England and Wales and Ireland is especially important to consider given the 
difference in the population size.  
Figure 2-8: Number of Homicides in Ireland and Detection Rates 1998 - 2008 
 
Source: (Campbell, 2010) 
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given the link between homicide, suicide and firearms suggested by other authors such as Shaw et al, 
(2005) and the statistical insights suicide figures can provide (Krug et al, 1998). The research on 
suicides presented here is in the context of different manifestations of gun crime in different 
countries and the overall death rate. A further discussion of suicides is presented in the next section 
of the literature review addressing factors relevant to individual people and their involvement in gun 
crime. 
Research conducted that examines deaths caused by firearms shows that there is a complex set of 
issues that underlie the manifestation of gun crime in different countries. These include the historical 
and cultural context of a country as well as legislation and economic circumstances specific to that 
country. Research to date suggests that these factors should be taken into account when planning 
interventions to reduce gun crime. However such research does not address the underlying reasons 
as to why individuals become involved in crime and why guns are used. Gun crime has been 
discussed in the context of gang involvement extensively in the literature by Vaughan et al (1996), 
Bullock and Tilley (2002), Decker and Curry (2002), Marshall, Webb and Tilley (2005), Hales et al 
(2006), Hayden et al (2008) and Hallsworth and Silverstone (2009). The next section presents 
theories on gang involvement and discusses why individuals become involved in gangs and 
associated criminal activity. Theories of gang involvement are discussed along with more recent 
research that aims to provide evidence to support the theories discussed.  
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2.2 - Gun Crime: Types of Offender 
2.2.1 Guns, Gangs and Drugs 
As already discussed, crimes involving the use of firearms occur worldwide (Krug et al, 1998). The 
exact nature and extent of the problems caused by crimes involving firearms varies dramatically 
between countries and sometimes within countries. Influencing factors include geography, 
demographics, social conditions and legal issues (Agozino et al, 2009; Sheptycki, 2009; Campbell, 
2010). All play a part in defining the nature of gun crime in any given country. The use of guns has 
been associated with gang culture and the illegal drugs market. The extent to which the use of 
firearms, gangs and drugs are entwined is difficult to unravel. It is likely that there is a great deal of 
overlap between offenders that use firearms, offenders that are in gangs and offenders that sell 
drugs.  
In the United Kingdom, the use of firearms has often been linked to gang culture and associated 
criminality (Bullock and Tilley, 2002; Bullock and Tilley, 2008; Robert and Innes, 2009) and as a result 
research has been undertaken to ascertain if this is actually the case. Until relatively recently 
(Hayden et al, 2008; Hallsworth and Silverstone, 2009) there was a lack of research available that 
focussed on UK gangs (Marshall, Webb and Tilley, 2005). Instead, research conducted on gangs in 
America had been used despite obvious cultural differences. However, there is a definitional 
difficulty that arises when discussing gang related issues (Marshall, Webb and Tilley, 2005; Hales et 
al, 2006). A discussion on what constitutes a gang is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, a gang 
is ĐoŶsideƌed iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of ͞;looselǇͿ oƌgaŶised crime structures, such as drug dealing networks. 
Significantly, these collectives or gangs provide a focal point for violence, including long running 
feuds that dƌaǁ iŶ gaŶg ŵeŵďeƌs aŶd theiƌ faŵilies.͟ ;Hales et al, ϮϬϬϲ: ϭϯͿ. A detailed discussion on 
the link between guns and gangs is presented later in this chapter. 
Recent research on various aspects of gang involvement provides plenty of areas for discussion. Prior 
to considering recent arguments it is prudent to discuss theories of criminality which attempt to 
explain why people get involved in criminal activity in the first place. Many of these theories have 
been applied to gang membership and offer a good insight as to the underlying reasons behind gang 
related criminality. This section describes theories that attempt to explain why people turn to crime. 
These theories are subsequently applied to gang involvement and the illegal use of firearms. 
2.2.2 Theories of Crime and Gang Involvement  
Wood and Alleyne (2010) present an overview of different theories of crime and the relationship 
between these theories and gang involvement. They explained that gang research started in earnest 
with the work conducted by Thrasher (1927). This research concerned adolescent boys in Chicago 
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and explored the reasons for their involvement in gangs and argued that economic deprivation led to 
social disorganisation. This in turn led to young boys becoming involved in gangs. Thrasher (1927) 
theorised that economic disadvantage led to normal social organisations such as school and church 
becoming less able to satisfy and therefore unable to control the population. This work also argued 
that one of the drivers behind the failure of existing social structures to satisfy the population was 
the fact that many people living in these deprived areas were immigrants. These people were unable 
to help their children adapt to their new surroundings because of a lack of understanding of the local 
culture.  Thirdly, it was suggested that gangs could offer children and young people more excitement 
than existing social structures.  
Shaw and McKay (1931) deǀeloped Thƌasheƌ͛s ;ϭϵϮϳͿ ƌeseaƌĐh aŶd aƌgued that eĐoŶoŵiĐallǇ aŶd 
socially deprived areas encouraged criminal activity which transferred to young people living in those 
areas. They argued that adults having low levels of authority over children resulted in children being 
involved with gangs, as gangs offered a social support system in a disorganised community. Shaw and 
McKay (1931) also suggested that criminality can be passed through generations causing long term 
involvement in gangs in certain areas.  
A disadvantage of the research conducted by Thrasher (1927) and Shaw and McKay (1931) is the 
suggestion that criminality is associated with low socioeconomic class. Other researchers have 
argued that crime is committed by all kinds of people and is not restricted to working class people. 
Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill (1992) explained how it was recognised that associating with 
other people that are accustomed to criminal behaviour and consider this behaviour normal, can 
cause these attitudes to be passed on. This is the essence of the differential association theory and 
supports the argument that criminal behaviour is a learned behaviour and that the behaviour is 
learned from people that are important to the individual. It is also important to note that the ways in 
which criminal behaviours are learned are not different to the ways other behaviours are learnt. This 
theory also argues that engaging in criminal behaviour is a result of exposure to such activity and that 
there will be a tipping point where there is more exposure to criminal activity and attitudes and this 
will then lead to the commission of more crime. The relevance is that the small social groups that 
provide these social norms are often gangs.  
Strain theory developed by Merton (1938) argued that society sets goals for individuals but only a 
limited number of people can actually achieve them. This leads to problems because many people 
cannot achieve these aims and people then adapt to these expectations by committing crime 
ďeĐause the laǁful aǀeŶue to aĐhieǀe soĐietǇ͛s ideal is Ŷot aǀailaďle to theŵ. CoheŶ ;ϭϵϱϱͿ took this 
theory a step further and applied it to gang membership suggesting that the strain for gang members 
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is status frustration where goals are achieved through instant gratification and violence. Cohen 
(1955) also argued that young people may realise they do not have access to the economic means or 
soĐial stƌuĐtuƌes Ŷeeded to pƌogƌess aŶd aĐhieǀe soĐietǇ͛s Ŷoƌŵ. They will, therefore, turn to gangs 
because this approach offers a chance to achieve a certain status. Theory of differential opportunity 
is similar to strain theory but adds the additional argument that people must have the opportunity to 
learn illegal behaviour. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that middle class children simply do not 
have access to such illegal behaviours and therefore do not have the opportunity to learn them.  
Although all of the theories offer different insights and explanations for criminal behaviour, there are 
some factors which stand out as important. These are social deprivation, failure to achieve goals and 
exposure to criminal activity. A summary of the theories discussed is presented in Table 2-2. The next 
section looks at recent research conducted into gangs to ascertain if any of the arguments relating to 
theories of crime are relevant. 
 
As previously discussed, until recently there was a lack of UK focussed research on gangs (Marshall, 
Webb and Tilley, 2005). However research examining the prevalence of gun crime has resulted in 
more research because of findings such as that from a study conducted by Bullock and Tilley (2002). 
They estimated that 60% of shootings in Manchester were gang related. Because this percentage was 
so high, more research has been funded and conducted to address the gang problem in the UK. 
Hayden et al (2008) looked at the wider social context of gang members and crimes committed using 
firearms. In this research, eighty young men convicted of firearms offences in England and Wales 
were interviewed with the aim of exploring their backgrounds to ultimately prevent crimes involving 
firearms. Hayden et al (2008) found that the vast majority of offenders they interviewed were 
characterised by deprived family and educational backgrounds. They were more likely to have been 
excluded from school and had poor work histories. A link was also found with living and growing up 
in socially deprived areas with few opportunities. Hayden et al (2008) also found that there was no 
clear distinction between victims and offenders. Half of the interviewees had been threatened with a 
gun and 36% had been shot themselves. Hayden et al (2008) pointed out that the criminal lifestyle 
can appear as lucrative and legitimate to young people living in deprived communities and that 
prevention strategies should take this into account and provide realistic alternatives. Hayden et al 
(2008) provided further evidence of a correlation between gun crime, young men and social 
deprivation. 
Hallsworth and Silverstone (2009) conducted interviews with offenders and practitioners and also 
ƌeǀieǁed ƌeleǀaŶt liteƌatuƌe. TheǇ ĐoŶĐlude that teƌŵs suĐh as ͞guŶ Đultuƌe͟ oƌ ͞gaŶg Đultuƌe͟ aƌe 
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too general to be helpful in reducing crimes committed with firearms. Instead they suggested that 
the use of guns can be split into two broad categories. The first concerned the use of guns by 
professional criminals. This group are proficient in the use and disposal of firearms and use them 
sparingly. The second category consists mainly of young men from deprived backgrounds committing 
crimes frequently to make money. They suggested that these offeŶdeƌs aƌe folloǁiŶg a ͞stƌeet Đode͟ 
and whilst not carrying firearms routinely, they will resort to using them to resolve disputes. The 
findings of Hallsworth and Silverstone (2009) also suggested that social deprivation is an important 
contributing factor to the prevalence of gun crime and this has also been found in other research 
such as that conducted by Shaw et al (2005) and Hayden et al (2008). 
The association between guns and drugs is often made in the media (Press Association, 2010; 
Manchester Evening News, 2010). These news stories reinforce the perception that gangs, guns and 
drugs are interlinked. It is interesting to examine research that has been conducted to establish if this 
association is merited. A study conducted by Hales et al (2006) which involved interviewing eighty 
offenders that had been convicted of crimes involving firearms, strongly supports this argument. The 
authors stated that the ͞illegal dƌugs ŵaƌkets ƌepƌeseŶt the siŶgle ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt theŵe iŶ ƌelatioŶ 
to the use of illegal fiƌeaƌŵs͟ ;Hales et al, ϮϬϬϲ: ϲϱͿ. This studǇ ideŶtified fouƌ paƌtiĐulaƌ eǀeŶt tǇpes 
where firearms and the illegal drugs market interact. Firstly, the robbery of drug dealers often 
involves firearms. The underlying explanation for these crimes is that these people deal in goods that 
have a high value (cash and the drugs themselves) and they are highly unlikely to report the 
robberies to the police as this would involve implicating themselves in drug dealing activity. The 
second manifestation of the interaction between firearms and drugs identified by Hales et al (2006) 
is territorial disputes. A typical scenario might be a crime involving firearms committed against 
people drug dealing on another dealers͛ ͞patĐh͟. The thiƌd tǇpe of usage of fiƌeaƌŵs ĐoŶĐeƌŶs 
protection from robberies and from attacks that may occur. The fourth type of usage is referred to as 
͞saŶĐtioŶiŶg͟ foƌ eǆaŵple, ƌeĐoǀeƌiŶg deďts, oƌ eŶhaŶĐiŶg a feaƌsoŵe ƌeputatioŶ of the dƌug dealeƌ. 
The underlying explanation for the link between drugs and guns offered by Hales et al (2006) is that 
the usual criminal justice avenues are not available to people involved in the drugs as they are 
themselves involved in illegal activity so they use guns in the ways previously described. Interestingly, 
Hales et al (2006) found that half of the offenders interviewed belonged to a gang but importantly 
many of the interviewees insisted that they were not part of a gang but that outsiders might perceive 
them as being part of a gang. This finding again supports the link between crimes involving firearms 
and gangs and drugs. 
The findings of Hales et al (2006) do appear elsewhere in the literature. One such example is research 
conducted by McKeganey and Norrie (2000) who examined the link between weapon carrying (all 
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types of weapons) and the use of illegal drugs in Scotland. This study used self-report methods, and 
found that weapon carrying was strongly associated with taking illegal drugs in Scotland. 
Unfortunately the results presented by McKeganey and Norrie (2000) did not provide specific details 
on firearms but the link between drugs and weapons is nevertheless relevant. Other research has 
revealed a link between excessive alcohol consumption and firearms. Hemenway and Richardson 
(1997) found that people who owned semi-automatic or automatic weapons were more likely to 
eŶgage iŶ ďiŶge dƌiŶkiŶg, a fiŶdiŶg theǇ desĐƌiďe as ͞distuƌďiŶg͟ ;HeŵeŶǁaǇ aŶd ‘iĐhaƌdsoŶ, ϭϵϵϳ: 
287). Illegal drugs and alcohol reduce inhibitions and make a person more likely to perceive neutral 
situations as threatening. The addition of firearms to this context arguably makes the use of them- 
intentionally or accidentally –more likely. Krug et al (1998) suggested that three factors influenced 
the firearm mortality rate with one of them being the availability of firearms. The link with drugs and 
alcohol is important because such substances lower inhibitions and if firearms are readily available, 
arguably a firearm related fatality is more likely. 
Although carried out in New York, research conducted by Vaughan et al (1996) lends some support to 
the argument made by Thrasher (1927) which linked gang membership and immigrant families. 
Vaughan et al (1996) examined weapon carrying amongst predominantly Hispanic youths in New 
York which, at the time of research, was the fastest growing immigrant group. It was found that 21% 
of people carried a weapon and of these individuals, 28% carried a gun. It was also found that 41% of 
all respondents knew someone that had been shot. Although Vaughan et al (1996) did not speculate 
on causal factors they conceded that their research provided an important insight into the group 
studied. It also showed that, in this particular group, participants͛ exposure to weapons and guns was 
particularly high. However, this research should be treated with caution as it is likely that underlying 
factors such as deprivation and poverty were linked to criminal activity. 
The research presented in this section examines human factors that contribute to gun crime such as 
general criminality, gang membership and involvement in illegal drugs. However, it has been 
suggested that there is a link between the availability of firearms in a given population and the rate 
of deaths whether homicides, suicides or accidental deaths. Data on suicides whilst initially seeming 
irrelevant, on closer inspection can provide valuable information. Research has suggested a link 
between murder and suicide both in terms of observed trends and the demographic committing 
murder and suicide and the demographic who are victims of murder and suicide. The previous 
section briefly discussed suicides from the perspective of the overall death rate in a particular 
country. The discussion of suicides here is in a different context, from the perspective of an individual 
whether as a victim or perpetrator of murder or suicide and the factors that contribute to this link. 
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Shaw et al (2005) examined the murder rate in Britain between 1981 and 2000 and found that young 
men were most likely to be involved in murders both as offenders and victims correlating with the 
demographic group most likely to commit suicide. A correlation was also found between social 
inequality and murder rates. The authors concluded that, ͞as ƌates of suicide and homicide of young 
ŵeŶ haǀe ďoth ƌiseŶ, this suggests that theǇ Đaƌe iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ little aďout theŵselǀes oƌ otheƌs.͟ 
(Shaw et al, 2005: 53.) This supported the findings of Hayden et al (2008) who also found a link 
between people committing crimes involving firearms and social deprivation. Sorenson and Berk 
(1999) also replicated this finding in Los Angeles. They examined data on homicide suspects and 
suicide victims and found that males and people under the age of twenty one were the most likely 
group to kill themselves or someone else using a firearm. 
A correlation between murder and suicide has important implications for the prevention of such 
offences especially where firearms are involved. A correlation between murder and suicide suggests 
that reducing the availability of firearms may actually decrease both murders and suicide committed 
with firearms. Other research has also hinted at a correlation between the availability of firearms and 
the rate of suicides (Krug et al, 1998; Andres and Hempstead, 2011). 
 The next section addresses the problems discussed so far and focuses on strategies to reduce gun 
crime.  
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2.3 - Gun Crime Reduction Strategies 
This section aims to discuss the ways in which gun crime can be reduced using the findings from 
research conducted in this area. One of main ways that government have attempted to reduce and 
prevent crimes involving firearms is through legislation restricting or banning outright access to 
firearms. 
2.3.1 Firearms Legislation in the UK 
The United Kingdom has some of the most restrictive and complicated laws in the world legislating 
on the ownership and possession of firearms and ammunition (Warlow, 2007). Illustrative of this is 
the fact that there are 55 offences that can be committed with a firearm before it is pointed at 
anyone or discharged (Squires, 2008). Firearms legislation in the UK can be traced back to 1870 when 
it became necessary to hold a licence iŶ oƌdeƌ to ĐaƌƌǇ a fiƌeaƌŵ outside oŶe͛s hoŵe. The Pistol AĐt of 
1903 followed which denied firearm ownership to drunk or insane people. This Act also introduced 
the requirement of a licence for short barrelled weapons (handguns). The number of firearms in the 
UK increased after the First World War as soldiers returned home with their battlefield weapons. 
This led to more legislation being introduced in the form of the 1920 Firearms Act. This introduced a 
registration system and allowed the police to deny a licence to any unsuitable persons. The Firearms 
Act in 1937 almost fully banned automatic weapons. In 1967 the Criminal Justice Act consolidated 
existing gun laws and allowed the Home Office to set fees for shotgun licences.  
There have been two serious events in the UK where multiple murders were committed using legally 
held ǁeapoŶs. These aƌe ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ ƌefeƌƌed to as the ͞HuŶgeƌfoƌd MassaĐƌe͟ ;GuaƌdiaŶ, ϭϵϴϳͿ 
ǁhiĐh oĐĐuƌƌed iŶ ϭϵϴϳ aŶd the ͞DuŶďlaŶe MassaĐƌe͟ ;GuaƌdiaŶ, ϭϵϵϲͿ which occurred in 1996. As 
both of these events involved legally registered firearms, they both led to major changes in UK 
firearms legislation.  Following the Hungerford Massacre in 1987, further legislation was introduced 
(the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1987) that banned semi-automatic and pump-action rifles; weapons 
that fire explosive ammunition and elevated pump action and self-loading rifles. Registration for 
shotguns was made mandatory and they were required to be kept in safe storage. The Dunblane 
Massacre led to the Firearms (Amendment) (No 2) Act 1997 which banned all handguns above .22 
calibres. The Violent Crime Reduction Act (VCRA) 2006 introduced more restrictions particularly 
concerning imitation weapons. This Act made it an offence to manufacture, import or sell realistic 
imitation guns, it doubled the maximum sentence for carrying an imitation gun to twelve months and 
made it a crime to fire an air weapon beyond the boundary of a premises. It also raised the age limit 
for buying or possessing an air weapon from 17 to 18. However, the implementation of this act has 
been somewhat problematic due to loopholes in the law that still enable the purchase of imitation 
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weapons. There was also concern as to how well the VCRA was communicated to the agencies 
responsible for implementing it (Wheal and Tilley, 2009). Further mass shooting events have 
occurred in the UK. In June 2010 Derrick Bird shot twelve people and then killed himself in Cumbria 
with legally held firearms (BBC, 2010a). In July 2010 Raoul Moat shot three people before killing 
himself (BBC, 2010b). These events have reawakened the debate on gun control in the UK and a 
Home Affairs Select Committee has been convened to discuss the issues raised by these two events. 
2.3.2 Consequences of UK Legislation 
Warlow (2007) explained that after the Hungerford and particularly the Dunblane massacre in 1996 
stricter laws were introduced to control the ownership of guns in the UK. The recommendations 
from the Dunblane Inquiry did not recommend a full ban on handgun ownership but public and 
political opinion was so strong that legislation banning handguns was introduced (Cullen, 1996).  As 
part of this legislation, guidelines were agreed so that existing weapons that were legally owned 
could be deactivated and be therefore kept legally. De-activating a firearm involves modification so it 
can no longer fire ammunition usually by removing key parts. However, as a result of these laws and 
the increasing number of deactivated weapons available, a new criminal trade emerged in 
reactivating firearms. Firearms can be reactivated by replacing the components that have been 
either removed or deliberately damaged as part of the deactivation process. Warlow (2007) outlined 
how the use of reactivated firearms quickly became problematic across the United Kingdom. As the 
number of reactivated firearms increased so did the quality of the reactivation processes utilised by 
criminals. It is now that case that a large number of reactivated firearms are in circulation in the UK 
(Warlow, 2007). The problem outlined by Warlow (2007) shows that specific factors such as 
legislation can affect the distribution of firearms and the resulting forensic processes. Warlow (2007) 
demonstrated that an understanding of the exact nature and characteristics of gun crime is essential 
to ensure that interventions such as the introduction of new legislation are targeted correctly and do 
not have unintended consequences such as displacing or creating a new manifestation of the 
problem. Warlow (2007) also highlighted the fact that continued assessment of the impact of any 
interventions is critical to enable judgements to be made on the effectiveness of the policy.  
2.3.3 Supply, Distribution and Trafficking of Firearms 
The trade in illegal firearms has become a global problem for law enforcement agencies. Within the 
European Union, illegal firearms are often intended for criminal use in member states rather than 
passing through member states to be used in countries outside the European Union. Spapens (2007) 
suggested that the offenders involved in the purchase of these illegal weapons are mostly criminals 
but also include domestic terrorists organisations operating in Northern Ireland and the Basque 
regions. Spapens (2007) described how defining the extent of arms trafficking in Europe is difficult 
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due to a lack of data. However it does appear that the vast majority of arms deals are in fact legal 
with only 5% of arms sales being illegal. The weapons that are illegally trafficked or sold have often 
been legally produced and legally sold. The ways in which legal firearms cross into illegally possessed 
weapons are diverse but include weapons being illegally supplied directly from the factory, exports 
being faked, converting imitation firearms and air weapons, theft of legally owned weapons and 
corruption of people that are legally entitled to own firearms. The exact manifestation of the journey 
from legal to illegal weapons depends on many factors such as the legislation in place in any 
particular country and the demand for firearms. Figure 2-9 shows a model of Firearms Trafficking 
proposed by Spapens (2007). 
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Figure 2-9: Model of Firearms Trafficking 
 
Source: Spapens (2007) 
Further research on the supply and trafficking of weapons has been conducted by Wintemute et al 
(2004) who examined guns taken from young people in California, USA. It was concluded that the 
route of weapons from the point of manufacture to use in a crime is not random and can be 
modelled in order to target effective interventions. A substantial study was undertaken involving 
2121 guns recovered from 1717 people younger than twenty-five in 1999.  The findings of 
Wintemute et al (2004) generally support the suggestion put forward by Spapens (2007) that corrupt 
individuals are aiding the trafficking of legal weapons. Out of 3500 retailers in California, just ten 
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accounted for 13.1% of weapons in the study. This showed that ͞a ŵiŶoƌitǇ of ƌetaileƌs aƌe 
dispropoƌtioŶatelǇ liŶked to Đƌiŵe guŶs͟ WiŶteŵute et al ;ϮϬϬϰ: ϳϰϭͿ. IŶ ϮϬϬϬ, the Buƌeau of AlĐohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms in the United States suggested that nationwide across the USA, 1.2% of 
retailers were linked to 57% of guns used in crimes (ATF, 2000, as cited in Wintemute et al, 2004). 
The findings in both of these studies show how legal firearms are used for illegal purposes.  
Wintemute et al (2004) also found that handguns purchased and used by the same person had a 
relatively short time to crime. This refers to the length of time between purchase of a firearm and 
recovery of it. Handguns recovered in this capacity had a time to crime of just 69 days compared to 
the median of the whole sample standing at 6.4 years suggesting that a person purchasing a gun to 
use personally, is likely to use it in a relatively short period after use. Wintemute et al (2004) also 
suggested that a time to crime of less than three years suggests deliberate gun trafficking – a statistic 
that is useful to note and apply elsewhere. It is important that a note of caution be applied to the 
findings of Wintemute et al (2004) as the legislation regarding firearms in the USA and indeed 
California is dramatically different to any legislation in place in Europe. Nevertheless, the findings 
presented provide useful evidence that patterns in firearms supply are present and can be detected. 
Spapens (2007) suggested that weapons smuggling within Europe happens on a relatively small scale 
with smugglers only carrying a small number of weapons at any given time. However, shipments do 
occur regularly. This means that over time, a large number of weapons are smuggled between 
countries creating significant problems. Weapon trafficking also appears to be linked with the 
demand for firearms in any particular country. 
In addition to the trafficking of legally produced guns, the supply and utilisation of illegally produced 
or converted weapons is also problematic. Yilmaz et al (2009) described an example of handmade 
weapons produced in Turkey, as a result of the demand for firearms in a particular region of Turkey 
and the difficulty in obtaining a licence legally there. Yilmaz et al (2009) also noted that the Black Sea 
region of Turkey has the highest percentage of deaths attributable to firearms in Turkey at 23%. The 
firearms examined and reported in this technical report were made to imitate weapons 
manufactured by Browning, Luger and Beretta amongst others. Yilmaz et al (2009) concluded that 
despite these weapons being unsafe to fire, the relative inexpensiveness of the components resulted 
in the widespread use of such weapons. 
Once a weapon has been smuggled into a country whether legally or illegally produced, the next step 
is the sale of that weapon to the customer. Spapens (2007) stated that the distribution network for 
firearms is small and fragmented with a single firearms dealer having contacts with multiple criminal 
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gangs. This represents the conclusion of the trafficking process and marks the beginning of firearms 
use in criminal events.  
2.3.4 Targeting Illegally Sourced Firearms and Weapon Registration 
Solutions have been suggested to deal with the problem of illegally sourced firearms. A logical way to 
tackle the problem is to target the firearms that start their life as legally produced weapons. Spapens 
(2007) suggested that all legally produced weapons need to be registered so their origin can be 
traced in the event that they are used illegally. Spapens (2007) also suggested that there needs to be 
a thorough understanding of the ways in which weapons are trafficked. This may include the types of 
weapons being trafficked, their origin and the trafficking routes utilised. Other measures include the 
educating of police officers and forensic experts to recognise firearms correctly. This would enable an 
understanding of the possible route the firearm may have taken and any modifications that have 
been made. This may provide vital intelligence. This information must then be shared between 
countries. 
There are different ways that firearms can be registered and traced and different methods that can 
be utilised. Arms manufacturers keep a detailed record of all firearms that they produce. This 
information includes the serial number of the weapon and technical details about its construction. 
Manufacturers also keep records of their customers. This information can be used to trace weapons 
providing the number has not been deliberately removed. Interpol has one such scheme (Interpol, 
2010). The problem is that much of the information used to trace firearms becomes redundant once 
the weapon passes into illegal hands. 
One suggestion is that the ballistics information of every weapon is stored at the point of 
manufacture for future reference. It has been suggested that every weapon should be test fired to 
provide a bullet and cartridge case that can then be acquired by a ballistics analysis system
2
. This is 
known as a reference ballistics imaging database (RBID) as opposed to an Open Case File (OCF) with 
bullets and cartridge cases relating to criminal cases. There has been an increasing movement in the 
United States advocating this approach in response to events such as the Washington Sniper Attacks 
in Washington DC 2002 (Woellert, 2002). Reports have also been commissioned by government 
departments discussing the issues that such a database would have to overcome (Lockyer, 2003; 
Cork et al, 2008). As a direct result, feasibility studies have been undertaken. A detailed discussion of 
                                                          
2
 A discussion on ballistics analysis systems is conducted in Section 2.5 of this Chapter. A ballistics analysis 
system typically comprises hardware used to capture a digital representation (typically a high resolution digital 
image) of a bullet or cartridge case. This digital representation is then stored in a database and correlations 
carried out to suggest a list of potential matches to the object in question. These matches must be confirmed 
by a ballistics expert. Acquisition refers to the process of capturing the digital image of the object and storing it 
in the database. 
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technology used to implement these databases and the methods utilised to examine them, is 
conducted in section 2.5 of this Chapter but the conclusions of certain pieces of research are 
discussed here due to the fact that they are concerned with strategic approaches to reducing gun 
crime. 
Tulleners (2001) examined the feasibility of a reference ballistics imaging database. The research was 
independently reviewed (De Kinder, 2002b) following rebuttals from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 
and Firearms (ATF) and Forensic Technology Inc (FTI), manufacturers of the system that was assessed 
(Cork et al, 2008). The work of Tulleners (2001) and De Kinder (2002b) informed the report written 
by Lockyer (2003). It was concluded that a reference ballistics imaging database was not feasible at 
the time. The reasons given were firstly that according to the independent review conducted by De 
Kinder (2002b), only 5% of weapons used in crimes have been legally obtained so such a database 
would not cover these weapons. Secondly, the cost of installing these systems on a large 
countrywide scale would be prohibitively expensive. Thirdly, De Kinder (2002b) suggested that the 
technology at the time of writing (2002) was not of sufficient quality to make correlations and 
searches accurate enough.  
Kopel and Burnett (2003) examined the use of ballistics analysis systems to register weapons. Their 
conclusions supported those of Tulleners (2001) and De Kinder (2002b). Kopel and Burnett (2003) 
made the point that many firearms have been modified in ways that would render the ballistic 
signature of the weapon misleading and worthless in the context presented here. It is possible and 
common in some cases (for example amongst sports competitors) to routinely change the barrel, 
firing pin and ejector
3
. Criminals also deliberately modify components of firearms to make ballistics 
examinations difficult. Kopel and Burnett (2003) conducted their report on the feasibility of 
implementing such a database in the United States. They also point out the additional problem of 
registering the vast number of legally held weapons in the United States. There are 200 million 
firearms in circulation in the United States and registering all of these onto such a database would 
involve considerable time and expense. De Kinder (2002a) suggested that one compromise would be 
to test fire legally held weapons and then transfer these test fires to the open case file in the event of 
loss or theft. It may be the case that there are ways that future technology can assist with this 
problem. 
The next section examines how policing strategies can affect the success of investigations where 
crimes involving firearms have been committed. 
                                                          
3
 An explanation of the different components of firearms and their significance for identifying bullets and 
cartridge cases fired from the same gun is conducted in Section 2.5 of this Chapter. 
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2.4 - Investigating Gun Crime I – Investigative Process 
2.4.1 Specialist Police Operations – Operation Trident 
There are many approaches to tackling crimes involving firearms. These include policing initiatives, 
policy changes and the utilisation of technology, but are quite difficult to assess for efficacy 
(Sherman, 2001; Squires, 2008). Smith et al (2010) showed that the majority of crimes involving 
firearms in the UK are committed in London, Manchester and Birmingham. This has led to specific 
police interventions being put in place to target these areas. Crimes involving firearms in London are 
generally investigated by a specialist operational command unit (OCU) known as Operation Trident. 
This operation was set up to tackle the specific problem of shootings, murders and injuries 
committed by and against the young, black community in London. According to statistics presented 
by Operation Trident, 75% of shootings that occur in London involve the victim and suspect coming 
from the black community. Operation Trident involves other agencies and initiatives to tackle gun 
crime as well as dedicated policing (Metropolitan Police, 2010).  
The impact of Operation Trident and the implications of such an approach to tackling firearms 
offences in the UK have been studied and discussed at length by Roberts and Innes (2009). The 
authors describe how Operation Trident follows a suppress and manage strategy to tackle gun crime 
and not only aims to improve the way in which shootings are investigated but also to improve the 
detection rate of such offences. The remit of Operation Trident has also widened to include strategic 
interventions that aim to disrupt the supply of weapons. The impact of Operation Trident can be 
considered in different ways. Firstly detections and convictions have improved through the 
implementation of Operation Trident. However, if the number of firearms incidents, number of 
attempted murders and the number of actual murders is considered a different picture emerges 
(Roberts and Innes, 2009). For the period 2000 – 2005 the murder rate in the black community 
actually remained relatively constant suggesting that despite improved detection rates, the actual 
level of offending had not changed. This has led to Operation Trident widening to include social 
interventions such as media campaigns and educating young children about gun crime to try and 
steer them away from becoming involved in criminal activity (Roberts and Innes, 2009). 
Roberts and Innes (2009) suggested that while the approach taken to tackling gun crime such as that 
by Operation Trident has advantages it also has other effects that need to be understood. Operation 
Trident has created a specific level of expertise about dealing with a particular type of crime. Roberts 
and Innes (2009) rightly pointed out that the eventual use of firearms is driven by a complex set of 
issues and distinct events in the lives of individuals. A concern is expressed that there is not a 
thorough understanding of these issues and that because community and emergency tasks are 
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handled by less specialised teams, the ability to gather vital intelligence is being lost. In this research 
Roberts and Innes (2009) presented the example of Operation Trident as symptomatic of a wider 
shift in the roles of police officers in the UK .They argued that there is no longer a generalist police 
constable that is engaged with the community and is in a position to gain useful intelligence. Instead 
policing tasks are split into specialist units with officers specialising in that particular domain. Roberts 
and Innes (2009) argued that while improvements have been made to detection rates and the way in 
which gun crime is investigated, the increased specialisation that is occurring in the police is resulting 
in intelligence gaps. They also suggested that further research should be conducted to assess the 
effects of such organisational restructures. In addition, gun crime events that are gang related are 
often difficult to investigate because witnesses are reluctant to come forward to testify and there is 
reluctance on behalf of the victim to report the full circumstances of a crime to the police. This has 
led to suggestions that witness protection schemes should be improved (Squires, 2009).  
2.4.2 Specialist Police Operations – Operation Ceasefire 
Krug et al (1998) concluded that the United States had the highest rate of gun fatalities. Many 
interventions have been implemented in the USA. One of the most successful was Operation 
Ceasefire. This started in Boston as a result of exceptionally high gun deaths amongst young people 
iŶ the ϭϵϴϬ͛s aŶd ϭϵϵϬ͛s and is an example of an evidence based policing approach described by 
BulloĐk aŶd TilleǇ ;ϮϬϬϵ: ϯϴϭͿ as ͞the appliĐatioŶ of ŵeasuƌes oŶ the ďasis of ƌoďust eǀideŶĐe of theiƌ 
effeĐtiǀeŶess͟. Kennedy, Braga and Piehl (2001) explained how the homicide rate for youths in 
Boston rose 418% between 1984 and 1994 and the rise was mainly attributed to the drugs market 
and related gang activity. Operation Ceasefire was a problem orientated policing approach, that 
involved a partnership between academics and practitioners and focussed on two specific areas. The 
first was illegal firearms trafficking (supply) and the second was the fear created by the illegal drugs 
market that resulted in many young people carrying guns for protection (demand). Kennedy, Braga 
and Piehl (2001) explained how a working group was formed comprised of local agencies and 
community leaders that recognised the problems facing Boston. The first action to tackle gun 
trafficking was to build a case against and prosecute a known gun dealer supplying new weapons. 
This action alone resulted in shootings being almost totally stopped temporarily because the main 
supply of new firearms that had never been used before was halted. The second focal point of 
Operation Ceasefire was to reduce the fear amongst youths that resulted in gun carrying. To achieve 
this, research was carried out to find out the exact nature of the problem in Boston and 
characteristics of the people involved in the murders. The finding was that the vast majority of both 
victims and offenders had extensive criminal backgrounds. The number of gangs and the areas where 
they were operating was estimated. Kennedy, Braga and Piehl (2001) found that there were 1,300 
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offenders operating in 61 different gangs and that 60% of homicides were gang related but not 
because of drug markets or turf wars. Instead most of the homicides were caused by disputes, 
sometimes relatively trivial, between gangs.  
Alongside the work being carried out to disrupt the supply of guns, interventions specific to gangs 
were carried out. If there was a dispute between two gangs that was causing violence, those gangs 
would be focussed on. Many gang members were on probation for other offences so they were 
prosecuted for this. Also many gang members were committing minor offences such as driving 
without a licence or insurance. These offences were also focussed upon and it soon became apparent 
that the gangs would not be left alone until the violence stopped. This message was communicated 
effectively by the police to key gang members. Once this approach was shown to work, it was 
implemented as policy. Kennedy, Braga and Piehl (2001) concluded that the problem orientated 
policing approach that focussed on supply and demand was at least partly successful in reducing gun 
violence. They acknowledged a crucial element was the involvement of local practitioners and the 
creation of a working group that understood the exact aims and objectives of the operation.  
Braga et al (2001) examined the impact of Operation Ceasefire on gun crime in Boston using police 
data and found a 65% decrease in the monthly number of youth homicides and a 32% decrease in 
the monthly number of calls to police reporting shots fired. Braga et al (2001) conducted statistical 
analyses and concluded that the Operation Ceasefire interventions were significantly associated with 
these reductions. Braga et al (2001) concluded that the activities carried out by Operation Ceasefire 
were successful because they introduced a strong deterrent and that interventions were specifically 
targeted at those gangs engaged in violence at a particular time rather than targeting all gangs. The 
approach to tackling gun crime in Boston has been recognised as oŶe of ͞the ďest eǆaŵples [of 
pƌoďleŵ oƌieŶted poliĐiŶg] ǁe haǀe so faƌ͟ ;TilleǇ ϮϬϭϬ: ϭϵϮͿ. Braga et al (2001) argued that this 
focussed approach can be transferred to other cities where there is a problem with guns and gang 
violence. The Operation Ceasefire approach has been transferred to Los Angeles with some success 
(Gonzales, Henke and Hart, 2005). Aspects of the approach have also been transferred to 
Manchester in the UK (Bullock and Tilley, 2008). 
The review of the literature has focussed on the criminological issues surrounding gun crime. The 
prevalence of crimes involving firearms in the UK and other countries has been discussed. Factors 
that iŶflueŶĐe aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt iŶ guŶ Đƌiŵe haǀe also ďeeŶ disĐussed aloŶg ǁith 
preventative strategies from legislative and policing perspectives. Forensic science plays an 
increasingly important role in the investigation of many crimes. The investigation of crimes involving 
firearms often involves forensic examination of bullets, cartridge cases and weapons. The next 
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section of the Thesis discusses the forensic examination of such exhibits and the processes and 
technologies used in the laboratory. 
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2.5 - Investigating Gun Crime II – Forensic Ballistics Analysis and Implications 
for Technology  
Crimes involving firearms often produce bullets, cartridge cases and weapons that upon examination 
can provide intelligence or evidence. This can be vital to the successful detection and prosecution of 
gun crimes. It is critical that the evidence gathering process and the techniques utilised yield as much 
intelligence and evidence as possible. This section discusses issues relevant to the forensic 
examination of ballistics exhibits. 
The exact origin of forensic ballistics examinations is unknown (Heard, 2008). However, there is a 
large quantity of literature that has been published in the past sixty years that attempts to explain 
the scientific principles upon which ballistics examinations are based (Nichols, 1997; Nichols 2003; 
Nichols, 2007). The scientific principles of ballistics analysis have been challenged (Schwarz, 2004; 
Schwarz 2007; Edwards, Gatsonis and Kafadar, 2009) as have the scientific principles behind other 
disciplines of forensic science (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579, 
589). One of the reasons behind this debate is the fact that forensic ballistics is a complex discipline 
and statements about the absolute certainty of matches cannot be made (Bunch, 2000). The analysis 
of bullets and cartridge cases with the aim of matching exhibits together is inherently subjective and 
this has led to continued debate around the scientific process and standards that could or should be 
developed to make the process more rigorous (Bunch, 2000; Song et al 2009;  Chumbley, et al, 2010; 
Saks, 2010). The impact of this debate on evidence presented has also been discussed (Kaasa et al, 
2007). An overview of the general principles is presented in this Chapter. 
2.5.1 Matching Bullets 
Striations that are imprinted onto bullets as they are fired through the barrel of a gun are left 
because of the rifling that is cut using a boring tool into the barrel inner surface. The rifling in the 
barrel consists of grooves in a spiral or helical form on the inside of the barrel. The rifling causes the 
bullet to spin stabilising the trajectory of the bullet to ensure the gun is fired with the required 
accuracy. Heard (2008) explained how the rifling consists of lands and grooves. Grooves are 
depressions in the barrel cut away by the boring tool used to rifle the barrel. Lands are the sections 
of the barrel that are not machined directly by the boring tool which generates the rifling. The length 
of the barrel needed to complete one spiral is called the twist and the degree of twist is critical in 
stabilising the bullet. Rifling can be left twist or right twist and the number of grooves cut into the 
barrel can vary between one and twenty four. The number of grooves and the angle are indicative of 
a particular manufacturer. The characteristics are known as class characteristics. Detailed forensic 
examination of bullets is concerned with the striations left on the bullet as a result of the physical 
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interaction of the soft bullet with the harder rifling of the barrel. In particular, the imperfections in 
the rifling that result from the boring process are imprinted onto the bullet surface. It is these 
imperfections said to be unique to each weapon that are used for identifications. These are known as 
individual characteristics and are different to class characteristics
4
. Figure 2-11 shows a section of a 
bullet and the striations can be clearly seen. 
Figure 2-10: a) Rifling in Gun Barrels b) Barrel Boring Tool giving Square Rifling Grooves 
 
                                                          
4
 Class characteristics whether concerning bullets and cartridge cases refer to the characteristic markings 
imprinted by a particular make and / or model of weapon. They can be used to determine the type of weapon 
that fired the bullet or cartridge case. Class characteristics can be used to narrow down the number of 
potential weapons that may have fired the bullet or cartridge case. Individual characteristics refer to the 
markings that identify the specific weapon that fired the bullet or cartridge case.  
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Figure 2-11: A Section of a Bullet Showing Striations across a Single Groove 
 
Class characteristics can identify the make and model of the weapon used to fire a bullet. Examples 
of class characteristics are the number of lands and grooves, the angle of twist and the direction of 
the twist. There are many databases in operation that record details of these class characteristics and 
enable searches to be performed by ballistics examiners who can identify the family of weapons that 
a gun is likely to have come from. 
Barrels can be rifled using a variety of different tools and methods and these all have an impact on 
the nature and quality of striations imprinted on bullets. Rifling also consists of different shapes and 
again these shapes have an impact on the quality of marks left of bullets. Heard (2008) stated that 
the majority of modern rifling is either square or polygonal. Polygonal rifling has no sharp edges and 
as a consequence can result in difficulties in matching bullets fired from polygonal rifled weapons.  
2.5.2 Matching Cartridge Cases 
The main components of a firearm that create impressions on a cartridge cases are the firing pin, the 
breech face, the ejector and the extractor. The firing impression is caused by the firing pin striking 
the cartridge case and igniting the primer. As the weapon is fired, the cartridge case strikes the back 
of the weapon (the breech face) and causes an imprint of the breech face to be left on the relatively 
softer cartridge case head. Figure 2-12 shows a cartridge case head and Figure 2-13 shows a cartridge 
case head with the firing pin and breech face marked. The extractor marks and ejector marks are 
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caused by the mechanism in the weapon that removes the cartridge case from the chamber. These 
are typically only found in automatic, semi-automatic and self-loading weapons. Revolvers require a 
person to manually open the weapon and remove the spent cartridge cases. As was the case with 
bullets, markings on cartridge cases will consists of class characteristics and individual characteristics. 
An example of a class characteristic is a rectangular firing pin impression which is only found on 
ammunition fired from a Glock weapon (Figure 2-14). Individual characteristics are caused by 
imperfections in the manufacturing process of components of firearms and it is commonly accepted 
that these can be used to match two or more objects together. 
Figure 2-12: Cartridge Case Head 
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Figure 2-13: Cartridge Case Head with Breech Face Impression (Left) and Firing Pin Impression 
(Right) 
 
 
Figure 2-14: A Cartridge Case Head Showing the Class Characteristic of a Rectangular Firing Pin only 
Produced by Glock Weapons 
 
 
54 
 
2.5.3 Ballistics Analysis in the Past – Comparison Microscopy 
The comparison optical microscope is still the instrument of choice for laboratories conducting 
ballistics examinations. Evidence presented in court will be in the form of an examination conducted 
using optical microscopy. The procedure for matching bullets and cartridge cases using microscopy 
will vary between countries but a general overview is presented by Heard (2008). The first issue that 
must be overcome is accidental agreement – the striations that match but only by chance. To 
overcome this, a known non-matching bullet will be compared with the case bullet to see if there are 
any accidental matching striations that should be discounted. The merits of this step in the 
procedure are arguable as this known non-matching object has no relevance to the test fire. After 
this, a series of test fires will be obtained from the suspect weapon and attempts made to match the 
striations to the case bullet. If an examiner finds a potential match, it will be confirmed by another 
examiner. The above process also applies to cartridge cases. 
It is important to note that different variables will impact the quality of marks imprinted on cartridge 
cases and bullets. In addition, the marks imprinted will change every time the weapon is fired. The 
variability in striations on bullets and cartridge cases can vary from small to large depending on the 
number of times the weapon has been fired between the firing of the suspect object
5
 and the object 
it is being compared with. De Kinder (2002a) identified factors such as the metal type used for the 
chamber (hardness) and breech face (hardness) and the metal type of the bullets fired through a 
barrel (hardness) as being particularly influential in affecting the striations imprinted on bullets. With 
regards to cartridge cases, the firing pin impressions, ejector and extractor marks are likely to vary 
over time. This variability obviously impacts the success or failure of microscopic examinations. De 
Kinder (2002a) suggested that relatively soft lead bullets deposit metal in the barrel and after around 
fifty firings, the striations on the bullet will have changed so much that identification becomes 
impossible. Other environmental factors such as the decomposition of a body can also affect the 
quality of marks left on bullets (Smith et al, 1993).  
2.5.4 Declaring a Match – Confirmation Bias 
The issue of confirmation bias is frequently studied in Psychology but research in the forensic 
ballistics discipline is less prevalent. Confirmation bias occurs when evidence is gathered and 
analysed to fit an existing hypothesis or belief and is especially dangerous in law enforcement 
because it can lead to vital pieces of evidence being overlooked or their importance exaggerated. 
When comparing ballistic objects such as cartridge cases and bullets, confirmation bias has the 
potential to threaten the objectivity of the examiner and affect the outcome of a criminal case. 
                                                          
5
 ͞OďjeĐt͟ is used to ƌefeƌ to a Đaƌtƌidge Đase oƌ a ďullet. The teƌŵ is used ǁheŶ a poiŶt is ďeiŶg ŵade that 
applies to both bullets and cartridge cases. It is important to note that bullets and cartridge cases are always 
stored in different databases and a bullet will never be correlated against a cartridge case and vice versa. 
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Risinger et al (2002) explained four ways in which confirmation bias can be manifested. Firstly, more 
information than is necessary can be provided to the examiner. Secondly, examiners may talk to each 
other about the case in question undermining independent evaluation of the work. Thirdly, 
information that is received after the examination may prompt the examiner to repeat the 
examination and alter the conclusions drawn. Finally, the police or another stakeholder in the case 
may not be satisfied with the conclusions drawn and may request a re-examination.  At the same 
time they may communicate their expectations of the re-examination biasing an examiner. 
Kerstholt et al (2010) conducted experimental research to ascertain the vulnerability of firearms 
examiners to confirmation bias. Six firearms examiners were given sets of bullets accompanied by 
information that might bias them towards a particular conclusion or accompanied by neutral 
information. This information took the form of a report that usually accompanies evidence when 
submitted to the laboratory. The biased information consisted of a description of the crime that 
stated that only one suspect and one gun were involved yet two bullets were recovered from the 
victim – suggesting that the bullets should match. The second, neutral information consisted of a 
description of the crime that stated that two bullets were recovered, two suspects were seen and 
two guns were fired meaning that there was no expectation of whether or not the bullets should or 
should not match. Kerstholt et al (2010) found that the examiners did not appear to be affected by 
confirmation bias and that the information contained in the report did not affect the conclusions of 
the examiners.  There are a number of explanations for this result. Firstly, and the most obvious is 
that confirmation bias did not exist amongst this group of firearms examiners. Another possible 
explanation is the small sample size (only six examiners) meant that any observed effects would need 
to be large to result in a statistically significant difference. The examiners were also aware that they 
were participating in an experiment and that the case was not real.  
Assuming that confirmation bias was not present amongst this group, Kerstholt et al (2010) 
suggested reasons why this is not the case. It was suggested that forensic examiners are actually 
quite critical and sceptical of any information about the case that is presented to them and therefore 
disregard it when undertaking an examination. Burns (2001) suggested that examiners are aware 
that they may be accused of being biased and suggests three concepts to tackle this. Firstly, 
answering questions regarding the examination and related processes honestly. Secondly, being very 
conscientious of how an examiner presents evidence in court to ensure it is understood by the jury 
and thirdly always keeping an open mind and letting the evidence speak for itself. While these 
concepts may be somewhat vague in practise they do demonstrate that examiners have some 
awareness of the issue of bias. 
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Although the findings of Kerstholt et al (2010) are interesting and somewhat reassuring, there are 
some methodological issues which may account for the findings. Firstly, there was not a control 
condition. Recall that there was biased and neutral information presented to the examiners. A 
control condition could have been included that would have involved presenting the bullets to the 
examiners without any information whatsoever. Secondly, this study was conducted in the 
Netherlands. The findings should be applied with caution to other examiners in other countries 
because there may be elements in the training methods utilised by the Netherlands Forensic Institute 
that are country specific and do not apply in other countries. 
2.5.5 Ballistics Analysis Present – Ballistics Analysis Systems Manufactured by Forensic Technology 
Computer aided methods have been developed and are being increasingly used to assist with the 
task of conducting ballistics examinations and matching ballistics exhibits to weapons. Ballistics 
analysis systems typically work by acquiring a digital image of the bullet or cartridge case, utilising 
algorithms to extract a digital signature of the key features of the bullet or cartridge case from the 
image and then submitting the image and digital signature to a database. Correlation algorithms are 
then run across the database and the user of a ballistics analysis system is presented with a ranked 
list of potential matches. A ballistics expert will then examine these potential matches in the hope of 
finding a match. These systems are designed to link crimes together that otherwise would not be 
linked but are often used in other ways such as an audit tool
6
 for bullets and cartridge cases. It has 
also been suggested that this technology could be used to capture and store digital signatures from 
legally held weapons. This is known as a reference ballistics imaging database rather than an open 
case file where bullets and cartridge cases relating to crimes are stored.  
Research conducted on ballistics analysis systems
7
 appears to be split into two categories. The first 
concerns the performance of the systems given the parameters of a test set of ammunition 
(Tulleners 2001; De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut 2004; George 2004a; George 2004b; Nennsteil 
and Rahm 2006a; Nennsteil and Rahm 2006b). The second category consists of research into the 
                                                          
6
 Use as an audit tool refers to the practise of using a ballistics analysis system to acquire and store digital 
images of bullets and cartridges. The primary focus is on the storage and retrieval of the bullets and cartridge 
cases through case reference numbers and exhibit reference numbers. The correlation capability is perhaps of 
secondary importance in this context. 
 
7
 For the purposes of this Thesis a ͞ďallistiĐs aŶalǇsis sǇsteŵ͟ is defiŶed as the haƌdǁaƌe aŶd dataďase Ŷeeded 
to acquire and correlate a sample of bullets or cartridge cases. The exact configurations of ballistics analysis 
systems do vary. For example, some laboratories will use a single standalone system consisting of an 
acquisition station to acquire cartridge cases and bullets and the database where images and representations 
of these objects are stored. Others will have a networked system where multiple acquisition stations all 
ĐoŶŶeĐt to a siŶgle dataďase. IŶ this Thesis uŶless desĐƌiďed otheƌǁise, a ͞ďallistiĐs aŶalǇsis sǇsteŵ͟ ƌefeƌs to a 
standalone system. 
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usability of the ballistics analysis systems and working practises that affect performance (Chan, 2000; 
Argaman, Shoshani and Hocherman, 2001; Koffman and Silverwater, 2001).  
Ballistics analysis systems began to be developed in the early 1990s by a company called Forensic 
Technology Inc (FTI) which now has a large market share. Ninety five percent of all ballistics analysis 
systems globally are manufactured by FTI. These products are the Integrated Ballistics Identification 
System (subseƋueŶtlǇ ƌefeƌƌed to as ͞IBI“͟Ϳ suite of pƌoduĐts. The ŵost ƌeĐeŶt ǀeƌsioŶ of the 
technology is the IBIS Trax 3D (BulletTRAX and BrassTRAX 3D) systems. The previous incarnation of 
the technology is called IBIS Heritage. Other companies have developed competing products and 
some of these systems are installed in countries around the world. Due to the high cost of these 
systems and the procurement rules in place for public sector organisations, a number of studies have 
been conducted to assess the functionality, performance and cost effectiveness of these systems.  A 
review into ballistics analysis systems with particular reference to the IBIS Heritage system in the USA 
was conducted in 2008 by the National Academy of Science (Cork et al, 2008). The research 
described here is also summarised in that report. The conclusions of that report are described at the 
end of this section. 
This section discusses previous work that has been conducted assessing and comparing ballistics 
analysis systems. The different systems in operation have strengths and weaknesses and there are 
many different types of methodology that can be implemented. These methodologies have to take 
into account the many variables that are present in forensic ballistics. The main variable that affects 
performance of a system is whether it is acquiring and correlating a cartridge case or a bullet. The 
nature of the two types of object and the impressions imprinted on them are radically different. 
Consequently different data acquisition and correlation techniques are utilised. The ability of 
ballistics identification technologies to acquire and correlate cartridge cases has been examined at a 
greater frequency and in more detail than the ability of these systems to acquire and correlate 
bullets. Brinck (2008) suggests that this is because cartridge cases, whilst being three dimensional 
objects, have characteristic markings that are easier to acquire and identify from a two dimensional 
digital image. Bullets however are truly three dimensional as are the markings that identify the 
weapon that fired them.  
The performance of ballistics analysis systems has also been assessed for the purposes of gun 
registration. It has been proposed that every gun that is legally sold should be test fired and the 
cartridge cases and bullets entered into a system such as IBIS Heritage. This would enable the 
database to be checked when necessary. Such a database would be considerably large therefore 
research has been conducted to assess the feasibility of such as scheme (Tulleners, 2001; De Kinder, 
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2002a; De Kinder, 2002b; De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut, 2004; Cork et al, 2008).  A prerequisite 
to the application of such as registration scheme would be a guaranteed, extremely high success rate 
in correlation matching. 
In 2001 a feasibility study was commissioned by the California Department of Justice to evaluate the 
ability of the IBIS Heritage system to underpin a reference ballistics imaging database. The review 
was conducted by Tulleners (2001) and took the form of a technical evaluation of IBIS Heritage. As 
part of the review, eight performance tests were devised. The most relevant to this Thesis is 
͞PeƌfoƌŵaŶĐe Test ϭ͟ ;TulleŶeƌs, ϮϬϬϭ: ϴ-1). This involved a background sample8 of 792 cartridge 
cases fired from Smith and Weston 4006 pistols. The ammunition calibre was .40 and of Federal type. 
Fifty cartridge cases also of type Federal were selected to be correlated against the database. IBIS 
Heritage provides different correlation lists for the breech face algorithm and firing pin algorithm and 
the results showed that for the breech face algorithm, IBIS Heritage correlated 38% of the test 
cartridge cases in the top ten positions. For the firing pin algorithm, the percentage of matches 
correlated in the top ten was slightly higher at 42%
9
. Tulleners (2001) also investigated the effect of 
different ammunition types, correlating a test set of 72 cartridge cases of different ammunition type 
against the 792 Federal cartridge cases. The results showed that IBIS Heritage correlated the 
matching cartridge cases in the top ten on 18% of occasions for both the firing Pin and breech face 
algorithms. Tulleners (2001: 1-1) concluded that the application of IBIS Heritage to capture cartridge 
Đases foƌ all legallǇ held ǁeapoŶs ǁas Ŷot suitaďle as ͞the Ŷuŵďeƌ of Đaƌtƌidge Đases ǁill ďe so laƌge 
as to be impractical and will likely create complications so great they cannot be effectively 
addƌessed͟. 
The technical review conducted by Tulleners (2001) was followed by De Kinder (2002b) in the form of 
an independent review because of rebuttals of the original research issued by FTI and the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). The criticisms of Tulleners (2001) by the ATF concerned the 
choice of Federal ammunition. The ATF argued that the ammunition type was too hard, skewed the 
results and that Remington-Peters ammunition should have been used instead. De Kinder (2002b) 
rejected this argument citing the fact that Remington-Peters ammunition is actually harder than 
                                                          
8
 A ďaĐkgƌouŶd saŵple ƌefeƌs to the oďjeĐts iŶ the dataďase that Đƌeate the ͞Ŷoise͟. A sǇsteŵ peƌfoƌŵiŶg 
correlations would have to search against and discount all of the objects in the background sample. The test 
sample usually consists of pairs or set of objects. The matching object or objects to the questioned object will 
be mixed in with the background database. The system will search against the background set (non-matching 
objects) and the matches to distinguish the true matching objects. 
 
9
 Results of this Ŷatuƌe ĐaŶ also ďe ƌefeƌƌed to as the ͞suĐĐess ƌate͟. “uĐĐess ƌate foƌ the puƌposes of this Thesis 
is defined as the percentage of occasions where an object was correlated on a correlation list of a specified 
length.  
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Federal ammunition. FTI objected to the fact that eight out of the 50 test Federal cartridge cases 
could not be matched manually by one of their firearms examiners. They sought to have these eight 
cartridge cases removed from the sample which would have improved the percentage success rates 
reported by Tulleners (2001). De Kinder (2002b) also rejected this argument describing it as 
͞uŶaĐĐeptaďle͟ ;De KiŶdeƌ, ϮϬϬϮď: ϰͿ, stating that the use of ballistics imaging technology should not 
be restricted to cartridge cases that can be matched by a human examiner.  
De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004) subsequently conducted a study to examine the feasibility 
of a reference ballistics imaging database. The study was conducted with a large sample of objects 
comprising of cartridge cases generated by firing 600 Sig Sauer pistols. Each pistol was fired twice 
with Remington ammunition. One of these cartridge cases was entered into the database. Each pistol 
was then fired an additional five times with five different brands of ammunition. Cartridge cases 
from the second set of test fires were then randomly selected to be correlated against the database. 
Tests were performed correlating cartridge cases of the same ammunition type and of different 
ammunition types. Thirty two Remington test fires were selected and correlated against the 
database which contained ammunition from the 600 guns. For the breech face algorithm, 53.12% of 
samples were correlated in the top ten. For the firing pin algorithm the percentage found in the top 
ten was 43.75%.  For both algorithms combined, 71.8% of cartridge cases were found in the top ten 
on the correlation list. To test the functionality of IBIS Heritage with different brands of ammunition, 
160 samples equally distributed amongst the five ammunition types, were selected from the second 
round of test fires. The results showed that the success of IBIS Heritage varied between 6% and 
37.5% of the known matches appearing in the top ten on the correlation list depending on the 
specific ammunition type. The overall success rate (top ten) for the breech face algorithm was 10%. 
The percentage success rate overall (top ten) for the firing pin algorithm was 14.38%. The combined 
overall success rate for the breech face and firing pin algorithms was 21%. The performance of the 
database and correlation results were also assessed as the database increased in size. This 
demonstrated that the range of ranking positions of known matches in the database increased as the 
database size increased. 
De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004: 215) conclude that implementing a database for the 
puƌpose of guŶ ƌegistƌatioŶ is ͞uŶsuitaďle foƌ laǁ eŶfoƌĐeŵeŶt͟ aŶd that suĐh a dataďase has 
͞iŶheƌeŶt failiŶgs͟. The ƌeasoŶs giǀeŶ aƌe fiƌstlǇ the faĐt that peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe deĐƌeases sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ 
when different brands of ammunition are used. Secondly, the authors highlight the fact that the 
success rates quoted in their research were achieved with a database containing images from only 
600 pistols. If such a database was to be implemented the number of weapons stored in it would be 
significantly greater in the region of millions. Thirdly, De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004) also 
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observed that the performance of the IBIS Heritage system decreased as the database grew larger 
providing the rationale for their recommendation. As a reference ballistics imaging database is 
deemed unsuitable, it is suggested that alternative methods for firearm registration are considered. 
An example would be micro-stamping firearms during the manufacturing process. This involves micro 
engraving distinguishing marks or a serial number onto a suitable area of the weapon that can be 
used for identification later if necessary. This was also recommended by Cork et al (2008). 
George (2004a) also evaluated the performance of IBIS Heritage when correlating cartridge cases and 
used 500 Smith and Weston 0.40 calibre pistols to generate the background sample of cartridge 
cases using Federal and Remington ammunition. George (2004a) concluded that when correlating 
Federal ammunition with Federal ammunition the success rate (top ten) was 72%. When correlating 
Remington with Remington the success rate was 48% and when correlating different brands of 
ammunition (Remington to Federal or vice versa) the success rate dropped to 11%. This supports the 
findings of Tulleners (2001) and De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004). Using these results George 
(2004a: 288Ϳ ĐoŶĐludes that ͞the eƋuipŵeŶt fails to aĐhieǀe the eǆpeĐtatioŶs pƌoŵoted ďǇ FoƌeŶsiĐ 
TeĐhŶologǇ͟. Whilst it is Ŷoted that the peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe of IBI“ Heƌitage deĐƌeases ǁheŶ diffeƌeŶt 
ammunition is correlated, George (2004a: 288) states: ͞CƌiŵiŶals do Ŷot feel oďligated to use the 
aŵŵuŶitioŶ ouƌ laďoƌatoƌǇ eƋuipŵeŶt ŵaǇ pƌefeƌ͟. This led to folloǁ up ƌeseaƌĐh utilisiŶg Đaƌtƌidge 
cases of different ammunition types. George (2004b) extended the database to contain 850 cartridge 
cases generated by firing 540 Smith and Weston 0.40 calibre pistols. The ammunition brands in this 
study were Federal, Winchester and Remington. George (2004b) selected twenty five weapons as the 
test sample and performed correlations with three cartridge cases per weapon (one for each brand). 
Each weapon had in total six cartridge cases in the database. The correlation list positions of the 
other five matching cartridge cases were recorded and the success rate was 25%.  George (2004b) 
considered the application of the IBIS Heritage technology to a reference ballistics imaging database 
aŶd ĐoŶĐuƌƌed ǁith TulleŶeƌs ;ϮϬϬϭͿ aŶd De KiŶdeƌ, TulleŶeƌs aŶd Thieďaut ;ϮϬϬϰͿ that ͞ŵoƌe ǁoƌk 
Ŷeeds to ďe doŶe ďefoƌe BallistiĐs FiŶgeƌpƌiŶtiŶg ĐaŶ ďe ĐoŶsideƌed feasiďle͟ ;Geoƌge, ϮϬϬϰb: 295).  
Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) examined the IBIS Heritage system in detail. They considered the 
variables that affect the success and failure rate and the results generated. They then applied the 
variables to prior research conducted by Tulleners (2001), De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004) 
and George (2004b). “uĐĐess iŶ this papeƌ is defiŶed as ͞the pƌoďaďilitǇ that aŶ eǆistiŶg ŵatĐh Đould 
aĐtuallǇ ďe fouŶd ďǇ the Đoƌƌelatoƌ͟ ;NeŶŶsteil aŶd ‘ahŵ, ϮϬϬϲa: ϭϴͿ. If the suĐĐess ƌate is 
determined by the system finding a match then this term also has to be defined. As previously noted 
IBIS Heritage produces a correlation list of possible matches and a firearms examiner then has to 
examine the list and then the objects to declare a match. Therefore the appearance of the object on 
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the correlation list of predetermined length determines the success rate. The error rate or failure is 
defined as a known match appearing outside the correlation list of a particular length. 
Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) defined five variables that affect the success and failure rate of the IBIS 
Heritage system. The first is the type of mark on the object. Different markings on the same object 
can be evaluated by the IBIS Heritage system independently. The different types of marks on 
cartridge cases are the breech face (BF), firing pin (FP) and ejector mark (EM). An explanation of 
these marks was explained at the start of this section. On bullets the mark types are the max phase 
(MP). This is the highest score generated during the correlation of all the land impressions. The peak 
phase (PP) is the highest score generated from the comparison of the individual land impressions 
within the max phase. The third mark type for bullets is the max lea (ML). This is the highest score 
generated from the comparison of individual land impressions. 
The second variable defined by Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) is the quality of the marks available on 
the object. The type of ammunition and the age of the firearm are just two variables that can affect 
the quality of marks on cartridge cases and bullets. The third variable defined by Nennsteil and Rahm 
(2006a) is the size of the database. This variable refers to the number of objects that will be 
compared to the object in question. The IBIS Heritage system only compares objects that are of the 
same calibre. For example, a database might contain 1000 objects. The object in question is 9mm 
and the database contains 500 9mm objects. Therefore the database size in this case, as defined by 
Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) would be 500. 
The fourth variable is the number of signatures from a particular mark type to be examined, that 
have come from the same source (firearm). This number depends on the number of times a gun has 
been test fired or the number of objects recovered at a crime scene. For example, a gun that is test 
fired twice would produce two cartridge cases, resulting in two signatures from the same source. The 
number of objects entered onto the IBIS Heritage system varies between countries. Argaman, 
Shoshani and Hocherman (2001) suggested that although most operators only enter one cartridge 
case per weapon, Israel enter two and find that despite the increased workload, results are better. 
Argaman, Shoshani and Hocherman (2001) suggested that the two cartridge cases should be as 
different as possible. 
The fifth variable described by Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) is the number of objects on the 
correlation list that will be examined by the operator or ballistics expert. There are no standards in 
place to determine the length of the correlation list. The number of potential matches returned by 
the system and examined, varies between countries and laboratories. The IBIS Heritage training 
manual suggests that the list should be ten objects in length whilst other researchers such as 
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Silverwater and Koffman (2000) have suggested that the correlation list should only contain five 
objects. Other researchers such as Brinck (2008) have considered the top twenty positions. Clearly 
when assessing the performance of a system, the correlation list length is directly related to the 
measure of success. The chance of a system finding a match is directly related to the length of the 
correlation list. The definition of correlation list is also interchangeable because the IBIS Heritage 
system produce different correlation lists for the different identifying marks on a cartridge case head. 
For example, a list is produced for the firing pin impression and another is produced for the breech 
face impression. 
Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) discussed each variable in detail and the implications for the results that 
are generated by IBIS Heritage. The quality of marks on a ballistics object appeared to affect the 
success of correlation.  The recommendation made was that test fires should be conducted using the 
same brand of ammunition as the evidential object seized at the crime scene. This supports the 
findings of De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004). Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) also found that 
IBIS Heritage performed best when all available markings were taken into account rather than just a 
single type of mark. It was also stated that multiple test fires should be uploaded into the database 
and wherever possible multiple evidential samples supporting the experiences of Argaman, Shoshani 
and Hocherman (2001). In terms of the correlation list generated, the authors suggested that this 
should contain between five and ten objects. They suggested that increasing the correlation list 
length (and the resultant workload of the examiner) does not produce a worthwhile increase in 
performance.  
Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) found that the success rate of IBIS Heritage decreased as the database 
size increased. This supports the findings of earlier research conducted by De Kinder, Tulleners and 
Thiebaut (2004). This is not surprising as the number of correlations performed increases as the 
number of objects in the database increases. Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) suggested that it is 
practical to try and keep the database size small to increase the performance of IBIS Heritage. This 
however may become problematic as the number of objects seized from crime scenes cannot be 
controlled and it has been suggested that test fires using different types of ammunition should be 
uploaded (Argaman, Shoshani and Hocherman, 2001). This fact was recognised as contradictory by 
Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a). If there are a large amount of open cases that need to be checked 
against a particular object, then the checks should be able to be performed. Perhaps an implication 
of the research of Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) is that the onus is on the ballistics examiners to lobby 
the technology manufacturers to improve and optimise correlation algorithms. It was also suggested 
that after a period of time, certain exhibits should be removed from the database. This may prove 
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problematic as removing these items may actually obscure links between crimes and result in crimes 
remaining undetected. 
The authors, (Nennsteil and Rahm, 2006a) followed up their research by assessing the performance 
of IBIS Heritage using a realistically created database (Nennsteil and Rahm, 2006b). They noted that 
previous work had not assessed the performance of IBIS Heritage with a database of objects that 
would represent a real open case file. Nennsteil and Rahm (2006b) suggested that a realistic dataset 
representing an open case file should contain ballistics objects of different ammunition types from 
weapons of different calibres, makes and models. Using the parameters defined in their earlier work, 
Nennsteil and Rahm (2006b) quoted a success rate of 75% - 95% for cartridge cases and 50% - 75% 
for bullets showing that IBIS Heritage was less effective for bullet comparisons (Nennsteil and Rahm, 
2006b). Table 2-2, Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 summarise the success rates of research that has been 
conducted examining the performance of IBIS Heritage when correlating cartridge cases. 
Table 2-2: Breech Face Algorithm Success Rates (Top 10) 
Author (s) Ammunition Success Rate  
(Top 10) 
Tulleners (2001)  Same ammunition 38% 
Tulleners (2001) Different ammunition 18% 
De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004) Same ammunition 53.12% 
De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004) Different ammunition 10% 
 
Table 2-3: Firing Pin Algorithm Success Rates (Top 10) 
Author Ammunition Success Rate 
(Top 10) 
Tulleners (2001)  Same ammunition 42% 
Tulleners (2001) Different ammunition 18% 
De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004) Same ammunition 43.75% 
De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004) Different ammunition 14.38% 
 
Table 2-4: Combined Algorithm Success Rates (Top 10) 
Author Ammunition Success Rate 
(Top 10)  
De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004)  Same ammunition 71.8% 
De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004) Different ammunition 21% 
George (2004a) Same ammunition (Federal) 72% 
George (2004a) Same ammunition (Remington) 48% 
George (2004a)  Different ammunition 11% 
George (2004b) Different ammunition 25% 
Nennsteil and Rahm (2006b) Ammunition not specified 75%-95% 
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Research by Tulleners (2001), De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004) and George (2004a) and 
George (2004b) has evaluated the performance of IBIS Heritage when correlating cartridge cases. 
Brinck (2008) examined bullet performance comparing the IBIS Heritage system with the latest 
version of the IBIS technology called BulletTRAX-3D. Brinck (2008) used bullets fired through ten 
consecutively manufactured barrels and examined each systems capabilities with bullets only. The 
individual differences in striations imprinted on bullets are caused by the barrel manufacturing 
process. Because consecutively manufactured barrels are produced consecutively, theoretically the 
differences between them should be smaller. There should be minimal differences in the wear of the 
components used to manufacture the barrels and consequently the differences in the imprinted 
striations on bullets should be minimal.  
The aim of Brinck (2008) was to identify the abilities of each ballistics analysis system to correctly 
identify a match and to examine the correlation list to see where the object of interest appeared and 
what other objects were suggested by the system as being of interest. The study aimed to ascertain if 
the 3D ballistics analysis system (BulletTRAX 3D) was better at identifying bullets than the preceding 
two dimensional technology (IBIS Heritage). Brinck (2008) pointed out that this issue is of crucial 
importance to any laboratory wishing to procure new equipment.  
The model of firearm used by Brinck (2008) to act as a test sample was a P10-45 semi-automatic 
pistol ǁith the tƌade Ŷaŵe ͞Waƌthog͟. This ǁeapoŶ is a ϰϱ Đaliďƌe pistol aŶd the ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs of it 
are that is has six lands and grooves and a left hand twist. The land and groove widths are 0.07 and 
Ϭ.ϭϱϳ iŶĐhes ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ ;BƌiŶĐk, ϮϬϬϴͿ. The saŵple used iŶ BƌiŶĐk͛s ƌeseaƌĐh Đaŵe diƌeĐtlǇ fƌoŵ the 
manufacturer with the assurances that each component was manufactured consecutively. Ideally, 
this process would have been witnessed by the researcher to ensure the components had been 
manufactured consecutively but realistically this was probably not possible.  The ten weapons were 
test fired into a water tank and the bullets recovered.  Copper bullets and lead bullets were both 
used because the quality of markings left on fired bullets is dependent on ammunition type. A pair of 
each ammunition type was selected from the test fires to be the experimental sample. The samples 
were examined by a firearms expert prior to being acquired by each IBIS system.  
The bullets were acquired by the same operator who was experienced and had been trained by the 
manufacturer of the technology. This is a crucial decision by Brinck because the quality of the 
acquisition of a bullet to each IBIS system can be affected by the operator. The operator has to make 
decisions about the markings on bullets and the best settings such as focus and lighting that will 
result in a good quality representation being acquired. One copper bullet and one lead bullet were 
acquired as reference samples. The second copper bullets and lead bullets were then acquired as 
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known match samples so that each IBIS system could attempt to make the link between the 
reference samples and the known match pairs. 
The background database in this study was provided by the manufacturers of the technology and 
consisted of 475 bullets of the same calibre as the test sample. The bullets were acquired on IBIS 
Heritage and then the same bullets were acquired on BulletTRAX 3D. Brinck (2008) does not state 
whether the same operator acquired the background samples. To maintain absolute consistency, it 
would have been ideal if the same examiner had at least uploaded the background samples on both 
IBIS systems. It is probable that these samples were uploaded by an employee of the manufacturer. 
It is unfortunate that the quality or circumstances of the acquisition of the background sample is not 
known. 
The correlation procedure was performed until the known match sample was found. IBIS (Heritage 
and BulletTRAX 3D) produces a list of the most probable matches in the database. Brinck (2008) 
considered any known match falling outside the top twenty to be an unsuccessful correlation 
reflecting the practise carried out in some ballistics laboratories when using the IBIS systems for 
casework. Previous research conducted by Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) and Silverwater and Koffman 
(2000) suggested that the correlation list should only contain ten objects and five objects respectively 
meaning that the chance of finding a match in Brinck (2008) was higher simply because the 
correlation list was longer.  
The same operator that uploaded the samples carried out the examinations of possible matches 
maintaining consistency. The examiner looked at these correlation lists to ascertain the position of 
the known match. IBIS Heritage and BulletTRAX 3D produce different correlation scores that reflect 
similarities on different areas of the bullet. Brinck (2008) only considered the max phase score (IBIS 
Heritage and BulletTRAX) and the peak 3D score (BulletTRAX 3D). Brinck (2008: 678) defined these 
two variables as, ͞max phase is the highest score of the bullet-to bullet correlation, where the phase 
refers to the alignment of the laŶd eŶgƌaǀed aƌeas ;LEAsͿ ďetǁeeŶ tǁo ďullets.͟ Peak 3D was defined 
as ͞the highest 3D LEA-to-LEA score between the two bullets͟ (Brinck, 2008: 678).  Brinck (2008) 
stated that these two scores are generally regarded as the most important scores because max phase 
is the only score that takes the entire bullet into account and Peak 3D is the only 3D score. The 
choice of Peak 3D is interesting because the IBIS Heritage system is not a 3D system. 
For copper bullets, IBIS Heritage correlated 100% of the reference samples to the known match 
within the top ten matches. Ninety percent of these matches were in the number one position.  
BulletTRAX 3D correlated 100% of the reference samples to their known match in the top ten and all 
in the number one position. The results for lead bullets showed that IBIS Heritage correlated 30% of 
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the reference samples to their known match in the top twenty. This essentially meant that 70% of 
correlations were unsuccessful as they appeared outside the top twenty. BulletTRAX 3D was more 
successful. One hundred percent of reference samples were correlated to the known match within 
the top positions. 70% were in the top position with the remaining 30% either in second or third 
place. In all but one of the instances where the lead bullet was in second or third place, the copper 
bullet from the same weapon was above it. 
Results were also considered when attempting to match lead bullets to the known match sample 
copper bullet. Using the Max Phase score on IBIS Heritage matching copper bullets to lead bullets, 
only 20% of the reference samples were correlated to the known match within the top twenty. 
Correlations performed the other way around (lead bullets correlated with copper bullets) resulted in 
better performance. Sixty per cent of reference samples correlated to the known match within the 
top twenty. On all occasions a bullet fired from a different weapon was located higher in the 
correlation list. BulletTRAX 3D performed better than IBIS Heritage. For copper to lead comparisons, 
100% of reference samples were correlated within the top twenty positions. For lead to copper 
comparisons 90% of reference samples were correlated against their known match within the top 
ten. The main result that Brinck (2008) describes is that BulletTrax 3D was more successful at 
identifying bullets fired from consecutively manufactured barrels than IBIS Heritage.  
A study carried out by Roberge and Beauchamp (2006) also examined the capabilities of BulletTRAX 
3D to identify bullets fired through consecutively manufactured barrels. This study involved 
consecutively manufactured Hi-Point barrels. Hi-Point barrels have grooves in the barrels that are 
created by compressing rather than removing the excess material. This results in a shallower barrel 
groove which in turn means that the barrel is smoother leaving less distinguishable marks. Each shot 
that is fired causes some of the metal tailings to break off. This process changes the striation marks 
on the bullets. Roberge and Beauchamp (2006) used bullets fired from ten consecutively 
manufactured Hi-Point barrels. Twenty pairs of 9mm Luger bullets were used along with one pair of 
9mm Luger bullets. The twenty pairs of bullets all had the same class characteristics and the single 
pair of 9mm Luger bullets had different class characteristics than the set of twenty. The first ten pairs 
of bullets were numbered 1 to 10 and each was connected to ten known, different barrels. The 
remaining eleven pairs of bullets were labelled A to K. The purpose of the test was to match each 
numbered pair to a unique lettered pair. Forensic Technology Inc, the manufacturer of BulletTrax 3D 
undertook this experiment. The results of this experiment are difficult to ǀeƌifǇ siŶĐe the authoƌs͛ 
state: ͞The aĐtual ƌesults ĐaŶŶot ďe ƌeǀealed heƌe to eŶsuƌe ĐoŶfideŶtialitǇ of the oƌigiŶal keǇ.͟  
(Roberge and Beauchamp, 2006:172). Hoǁeǀeƌ, theǇ also state that ͞the accuracy of the re-lettered 
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key has been confirmed with a perfect score of 10/10 by Evan Thompson in a private 
communiĐatioŶ͟ (Roberge and Beauchamp, 2006:172). 
The fact that this study was carried out by the manufacturer of the technology means that the 
credibility of the findings is somewhat undermined. There is a potential conflict of interest because 
any negative results would affect the reputation of the technology. For this reason, the findings 
should be treated with caution. Table 2-5 summarises the success rate percentages from previous 
research conducted with bullets. 
Table 2-5: Bullet Success Rate Percentages from Previous Research 
Author Ammunition Success Rate 
(Top 10)  
Brinck (2008) IBIS Heritage Copper jacketed bullets 100% 
Brinck (2008) IBIS BulletTRAX 3D Copper jacketed bullets 100% 
Brinck (2008) IBIS Heritage  Lead jacketed bullets 30% 
Brinck (2008) IBIS BulletTRAX 3D Lead jacketed bullets 100% 
Nennsteil and Rahm (2006b) Not specified 50-75% 
 
Experiences using ballistics analysis systems have been reported by firearms examiners working in 
the field. Giverts (2004) described the problem posed by polygonally rifled barrels. Glock, Heckler & 
Koch and Israeli Military Industries (IMI) are three examples of manufacturers that produce weapons 
with polygonally rifled barrels. Polygonal rifled barrels produce markings on bullets that are difficult 
to examine. This is because the land and groove impressions have a rounded appearance instead of a 
rectangular profile that is found with traditional rifling (Heard, 2008). Giverts (2004) described how 
during the bullet acquisition process the operator has to define the top and bottom of a land 
engraved area and the angle of the striations. The system then performs correlations based on these 
areas. The top and bottom of the land engraved areas are very difficult to define on bullets that have 
been fired by polygonally rifled barrels. Giverts (2004) suggested that slight modifications can be 
made to improve the acquisition of bullets fired from polygonally rifled barrels when using IBIS 
Heritage. The experiences reported by Giverts (2004) highlight the importance of assessing the 
functionality of systems in varied conditions and disseminating the results to other practitioners.   
The National Academy of Sciences report (Cork et al, 2008) reviewed previous conducted research 
(Tulleners, 2001; De Kinder, 2002b; De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut, 2004; George, 2004a; George, 
2004b). The conclusion reached was that in relation to implementing a reference ballistics imaging 
database, the IBIS Heritage technology was unsuitable for three reasons. The first related to the fact 
that IBIS Heritage is based on two dimensional images and as such was not accurate enough to 
successfully generate matches given the fact that the database size would be considerably large. 
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“eĐoŶdlǇ, Coƌk et al ;ϮϬϬϴͿ ĐoŶĐluded that theƌe ǁas ͞uŶ-derived measure of similarity between and 
ǁithiŶ guŶ tǇpes͟ (Cork et al, 2008: 4) meaning that the number of suggested matches would be too 
great to be useful because of this inherent similarity. Thirdly, Cork et al (2008) identified the fact that 
variables such as ammunition type can cause errors in identifications and this would cause problems 
in practice. They described how the reference ballistics imaging database could be controlled and 
only contain one type of ammunition but there is no way to control the ammunition used in crimes. 
Cork et al (2008) also made a number of suggestions as to how technology in this field could be 
iŵpƌoǀed iŶĐludiŶg hiŶtiŶg at iŶteƌopeƌaďle sǇsteŵs. TheǇ state that ͞ƌeŵoǀiŶg stƌiĐt depeŶdeŶĐe oŶ 
a sole-source provider and ensuring government ownership of and access to result data – should be 
applied to all work related to the improvement in ballistics evidence analysis͟ (Cork et al, 2008: 7-8). 
It is also suggested that three-dimensional techniques are applied to ballistics analysis.    
Despite the problems with current technology described by Cork et al (2008), ballistics analysis 
systems can have a high impact on ballistics examinations when installed. Braga and Pierce (2004) 
assessed the impact that IBIS Heritage technology had on the Boston ballistics department which 
previously had no ballistics analysis system installed. Braga and Pierce (2004) analysed the number of 
matches identified between ballistics exhibits for a thirteen year period between 1990 and 2002. IBIS 
Heritage was introduced in June 1995 and the authors assessed the impact of the technology taking 
into account other variables such as the number of firearms examiners. They found that IBIS Heritage 
technology increased the productivity of the police department and that six times more matches 
were being found after installation. The research carried out by Braga and Pierce (2004) showed that 
ballistics analysis systems can be an effective tool in investigating gun crimes. This is especially true in 
situations where there has been no previous technology installation and the comparison is between 
human examiners and ballistics analysis systems.  
Table 2-6 Presents a summary of research conducted into ballistics analysis systems and shows the 
system that has been studied.  
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Table 2-6: Summary of Research Conducted into Ballistics Analysis Systems (Chronological Order) 
 
Authors and Year CC or 
Bullets 
Title System  
Chan (2000) CC The relationship between acquisition positions 
of cartridge cases and discrepancy in 
correlation scores on IBIS 
IBIS Heritage 
Silverwater and 
Koffman (2000) 
CC IBIS correlation results – improvements IBIS Heritage  
Argaman, Shoshani and 
Hocherman (2001) 
CC Utilisation of the IBIS in Israel IBIS Heritage 
Koffman and 
Silverwater (2001) 
CC IBIS correlation results – analysing 
methodology and reliability factor 
IBIS Heritage 
Tulleners (2001) CC Technical evaluation: Feasibility of a ballistics 
imaging database for all new handgun sales 
IBIS Heritage 
De Kinder (2002a) CC Ballistics fingerprinting databases  
De Kinder (2002b) CC Review AB1717 report. Technical evaluation: 
Feasibility of a ballistics imaging database for 
all new handgun sales. Independent review 
for California Department of Justice. 
IBIS Heritage 
De Kinder Tulleners 
and Thiebaut (2004) 
CC Referencing ballistic imaging database 
performance 
IBIS Heritage 
Braga and Pierce 
(2004) 
 Linking crime guns: The impact of ballistics 
analysis technology on the productivity of the 
Boston Police depaƌtŵeŶt͛s ballistics unit 
IBIS Heritage 
 
George (2004a) CC A validation of the Brasscatcher portion of the 
NIBIM/IBIS system. 
IBIS Heritage 
George (2004b) CC The validation of the Brasscatcher portion of 
the NIBIN/IBIS system part two: 
͞FiŶgeƌpƌiŶtiŶg fiƌeaƌŵs͟ ƌealitǇ oƌ faŶtasǇ. 
IBIS Heritage 
Giverts (2004) Bullets Using the IBIS for the examination of bullets 
fired from polygonally barrelled guns such as 
the Glock pistol. 
IBIS Heritage  
Nennsteil and Rahm 
(2006a) 
Both A parameter study regarding the IBIS 
correlator 
IBIS Heritage 
Nennsteil and Rahm 
(2006b) 
Both An experience report regarding the 
performance of the IBIS correlator 
IBIS Heritage 
Roberge and 
Beauchamp (2006) 
Bullets The use of BulletTRAX-3D in a study of 
consecutively manufactured barrels 
IBIS 
BulletTRAX 
3D 
Brinck (2008) Bullets Comparing the performance of IBIS and 
BulletTRAX -3D technology using bullets fired 
through 10 consecutively rifled barrels 
IBIS Heritage 
and  
IBIS 
BulletTRAX 
3D 
Cork et al (2008) Both Ballistics imaging: Committee to assess the 
feasibility, accuracy and technical capability of 
a national ballistics database. 
IBIS Heritage  
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2.5.6 Ballistics Analysis Systems Present – Manufacturers other than Forensic Technology 
Research to date has focussed on ballistics analysis systems provided by a single manufacturer 
(Tulleners, 2001; De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut, 2004; George, 2004a; George 2004b; Brinck, 
2008; Nennsteil and Rahm, 2006a; Nennstiel and Rahm 2006b; Braga and Pierce, 2004). This research 
relates to the Integrated Ballistics Identification System (IBIS) suite of products manufactured by 
Forensic Technology Inc based in Montreal, Canada. This technology has the largest market share of 
any company. There are other technologies that are available and are now starting to gain 
prominence in the market. These systems are the Evofinder system produced by Scannbi Technology 
based in St Petersburg, Russia (Evofinder, 2011), the Arsenal system manufactured by Papillon 
Systems also based in Russia (Papillon Systems, 2011), the ALIAS system by Pyramidal Technologies 
based in Barbados (Barrett, Tajbakhsh and Warren, 2011) the Balscan system by Laboratory Imaging 
in the Czech Republic (Laboratory Imagery s.r.o, 2011) and the Poisk system manufactured by SBC 
Company in Russia (SBC Company, 2011). In all likelihood other systems will emerge in future.  When 
research commenced in October 2008 there were no published studies that examined technologies 
that were available other than IBIS products.  The report on ballistics imaging produced by Cork et al 
(2008) for the NatioŶal AĐadeŵǇ of “ĐieŶĐes stated the folloǁiŶg, ͞thƌough IBI“, FTI is esseŶtiallǇ the 
oŶlǇ pƌoǀideƌ of ďallistiĐs iŵagiŶg teĐhŶologǇ͟ ;Coƌk et al, ϮϬϬϴ:ϵϯͿ. The ƌepoƌt pƌoĐeeds to eǆaŵiŶe 
IBIS Heritage in detail but importantly FTI is not the only provider of technology and was not the only 
provider in 2008. Papillon Systems have had operational systems in Kazakhstan since 1998, in Russia 
since 2000 and Poland since 2001 (Papillon Systems, 2008). Evofinder in its present form has also 
been in existence since 2006 although the development of this system can be traced back to 1994 
(Evofinder, 2011).  
2.5.7 Ballistics Analysis in the Future – New Technology and Alternative Techniques 
Current technology is primarily based on digital imaging with the notable exception of IBIS 
BulletTRAX 3D which is based on confocal microscopy. The main flaw with digital imaging is that 
three dimensional objects can only be captured in two dimensions meaning that there will always be 
an inevitable loss of data (Stout and Blunt, 2000). Other technologies and techniques have been 
suggested or developed and applied to forensic ballistics such as Xie et al, (2009), Chu et al, (2010), 
Banno, (2004), Geradts, (1994), Field, Kelley and McCabe, (1996) and Nor Azura, Choong-Yeun and 
Abdul Aziz, (2010). 
Xie et al (2009) described how bullets are intentionally made to be larger than the gun barrels that 
they are fired through. The spiral grooves that are cut into the barrel leave an impression on the 
bullet, make it spin and ensure that the flight of the bullet stays consistent. These striations are what 
ballistics analysis systems rely on to correlate different exhibits and produce potential matches. All 
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systems based on imaging rely on and are subject to issues that photography has traditionally faced. 
These include processing techniques, noise and the general lack of quality of the acquired images. 
Problems with orientation of the object, lighting and magnification can also affect correlations and 
make matches difficult. A new system proposed by Xie et al (2009) aims to make the process more 
deterministic by measuring the markings on an object and comparing these measurements directly 
without the need to rely on digital imagery. The system proposed by Xie et al (2009) is based on 
measuring the surface topography of an object and allows objects to be accurately positioned so that 
setting up the object to be scanned is easy for the user and comparisons with other objects are 
accurate and reliable. The scanning process starts 1mm from the bottom of the bullet, scans 100 
circles aligning the bullet axis with the sample spacing 0.05mm. Each circumference scan consists of 
9000 points. The bullet surface topography includes 100 x 9000 points – 900,000 in total (Xie et al, 
2009). The advantages of this approach are that the entire surface can be scanned allowing for one 
hundred percent of information about a bullet to be collected. Systems that rely on images will never 
be able to achieve this simply because these measurements are in the nano–scale and no existing 
ballistics imaging technology can capture this degree of intricacy. This means that correlations and 
comparisons undertaken based upon this data will be highly accurate and reliable and will be highly 
suited to declaring matches in an automated system.  
Another advantage to this approach is that it allows a detailed examination of ballistics components 
that have never before been able to be measured. Possibly the best example of this is the ability to 
measure the inside of a gun barrel. Imaging technologies cannot do this because the apparatus they 
use is too big to go inside a gun barrel. This will allow marks on a bullet to be compared to the gun 
barrel from which is was fired providing a higher level of accuracy than when comparing a test fired 
bullet with a recovered bullet. 
When a bullet is measured using the surface topography technique described by Xie et al (2009), all 
characteristics are measured resulting in a digital signature which is made up of class characteristics 
and individual characteristics. This signal cannot be used directly for comparison therefore the 
characteristics must firstly be separated. Individual features can be extracted in three steps. The first 
step is surface abstraction. This refers to the individual characteristics left on the bullet by the barrel 
of a guŶ. The tǁist aŶgle is also iŵpƌiŶted oŶ the ďullet aŶd aǀeƌagiŶg this data ĐaŶ ͞eŶhaŶĐe useful 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aŶd suppƌess distuƌďaŶĐes͟ ;Xie et al, ϮϬϬϵ: ϱϮϬͿ. This pƌojeĐtioŶ ƌesults iŶ a oŶe 
dimensional signal which represents a faithful reconstruction of the surface of the bullet which 
improves the efficiency of the comparison. The key calculation that must be correct is the twist 
angle.  
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The second stage is wavelet filtering. The one dimensional bullet surface representation described 
above is made up of class characteristics and individual characteristics. To match two exhibits, these 
characteristics need to be separated accurately. Wavelet filtering is a form of multi-scale analysis 
that allows for a high precision level in the time and frequency domain. A high-pass filter is applied to 
the digital signal and as a result, a profile is obtained that consists of the bullets individual 
characteristics only. The final step is comparing two objects, achieved by comparing two digital 
signals. Because the two digital signals represent complete sets of data, correlations and matches are 
highly accurate.  
Xie et al (2009) still suggested that a firearms examiner needs to confirm a match. However, future 
iterations of this technology may render this step unnecessary. Until this point is reached, Xie et al 
(2009) proposed a three dimensional visualisation tool that will help an examiner declare a match. 
The tool will allow an examiner to compare the microscopic marks side by side. There may also be an 
application for this tool in the courtroom to present evidence to the jury. Such a tool may avoid a 
situation similar to the case in America in 2003 where the ballistics expert was questioned. In this 
particular case, the defence lawyer asked the ballistics expert to explain how she had come to 
declare a match between two cartridge cases. The first cartridge case had been recovered from a gun 
that the defendant had admitted to firing, the second had been recovered from a murder. In this 
case, the gun was not recovered so could not be test fired. The ballistics examiner Karen Lipski 
explained that her conclusion was based on "a lot of experience and knowing what you're looking 
at." She was repeatedly asked to explain the correlation procedure but could not and suggested that 
the defence stop focussing on "the number thing." The defendant was acquitted (US News, 2003). A 
three dimensional visualisation tool would allow a jury clearly see the characteristics that have 
indicated a match. They should be clear given the accuracy of the measurement and the wavelet 
filtering technique that separates class characteristics and individual characteristics. Importantly, the 
accuracy of the surface topography technique removes uncertainty from ballistics examination and 
presents the facts as they are. Xie et al (2009: 522) claimed that the technique allows acquisition of 
͞Đoŵplete aŶd aĐĐuƌate͟ data fƌoŵ aŶ oďjeĐt. This ǁill lead to iŵpƌoǀed aĐĐuƌaĐǇ aŶd ǁill alloǁ 
significant steps to be taken towards the complete automation of bullet matching as opposed to 
correlations. It is also possible that this technology could be applied to weapon registration schemes 
such as the one assessed by De Kinder (2002b). The technology has already been successfully applied 
to other areas of tool mark analysis (Thomas et al, 2011).  
This section has focussed on the forensic processes involved in the generation of evidence and 
intelligence gathered from ballistics exhibits. A review of techniques, processes and technologies has 
been presented alongside a discussion of strengths and weaknesses of these techniques, processes 
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and technologies. New technologies have also been discussed along with the impact and 
improvement these technologies could have on the forensic ballistics process. The next section 
focuses on potential obstacles new technology might face before adoption and use on a widespread 
scale. Lessons learnt from other technologies such as Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) and Automatic 
Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) are discussed and applied to potential new technology in the 
ballistics field. 
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2.6 - Potential Barriers to Innovation 
The previous section highlighted research discussing the effectiveness of current ballistics analysis 
technology and also presented new technology that has been applied in this area (Xie et al, 2009; 
Chu et al, 2010; Banno, 2004; Geradts, 1994; Field, Kelley and McCabe, 1996; Nor Azura, Choong-
Yeun and Abdul Aziz; 2010). Innovation and research such as this leads to new technologies, systems 
and policy ideas that once developed have to be integrated into businesses and organisations such as 
police forces, law enforcement agencies and laboratories. Often, scientific developments, innovative 
products and new policies are in danger of failing because of resistance from end-users and 
implementers. This is a problem that improvements to current technology and any future ballistics 
technologies will have to overcome. This section examines ways in which similar technology 
implementations have overcome challenges relating to adoption and in particular looks at 
experiences with other technologies adopted for crime prevention purposes such as Closed Circuit 
Television (CCTV) and Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR). 
2.6.1 Technology Adoption 
Moore (1999) described the idea of a chasm that exists between getting new projects from an ideas 
stage through to a successful implementation. Moore (1999) outlined the Technology Adoption Life 
Cycle and the chasm directly linked to this. The technology adoption life cycle consists of five groups 
iŶto ǁhiĐh useƌs aƌe plaĐed. The fiƌst gƌoup ĐoŶsists of ͞IŶŶoǀatoƌs͟ aŶd these people aƌe likelǇ to 
appreciate technology and be the first to adopt new technology into their lifestyles. The second 
gƌoup ĐoŶsists of ͞EaƌlǇ Adopteƌs͟, ďest defiŶed as people ǁho fiŶd teĐhŶologǇ useful aŶd appƌeĐiate 
the ďeŶefits. The thiƌd gƌoup is the ͞EaƌlǇ MajoƌitǇ͟. Mooƌe (1999) described this group as having a 
͞stƌoŶg seŶse of pƌaĐtiĐalitǇ͟. TheǇ ǁill adopt a ǁait aŶd see appƌoaĐh to Ŷeǁ teĐhŶologǇ. Theƌe aƌe 
a lot of people in this group, Moore (1999) estimated that about one third of people in the adoption 
life cycle fall into this category. It is probable that this is where the vast majority of police forces will 
fall. The fouƌth gƌoup is the ͞Late MajoƌitǇ͟ aŶd these people ǁill ǁait uŶtil a teĐhŶologǇ is 
established before buying into it. In the current economic climate, there is the very real risk that 
police forces will wait for a technology to be established rather than spend money on what might be 
perceived by others, the media in particular, as a financial risk. Finally, the fifth group consists of the 
͞Laggaƌds͟. This gƌoup aƌe geŶerally not interested in technology and will not adopt it for a variety of 
reasons.  
The model described by Moore (1999) applies to commercial products and the general population. 
However, many of the principles apply to police forces which have to procure equipment. They have 
many of the same motivations relating to cost, value and ease of use that the general population 
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have. The implication of the model developed by Moore (1999) is that successful strategies can be 
developed to overcome some of the problems relating to technology adoption. It is interesting to 
consider how ANPR technology progressed from innovative new technology to being used on a wide 
scale. The process that was used to adopt ANPR on a wide scale in the UK effectively meant that the 
problems associated with the last three groups described by Moore (1999) (early majority, late 
majority and laggards) were overcome and the police forces in the UK became early adopters of 
ANPR technology. 
2.6.2 Lessons from the Successful Adoption of ANPR Technology  
Henderson et al (2004) explained how ANPR technology allows a vehicle registration number to be 
read automatically. When used with other data such as location or tax status of a vehicle it is 
powerful at detecting and preventing crime. Henderson et al (2004) explained how the potential of 
ANPR was recognised and a phased but targeted implementation approach was used.  In 2002 the 
Home Office equipped each police force with the necessary tools to use ANPR. However, the 
technology was used at first with dedicated intercept teams. The Home Office commissioned a six 
month pilot study with nine forces called Laser 1. Henderson et al (2004) detailed the number of cars 
stopped and the result of these stops. 39,188 vehicles were stopped, over 3,000 people arrested and 
45,000 further actions were taken. An independent evaluation concluded that ANPR was effective at 
disrupting criminal activity. Henderson et al (2004) explained how despite the initial positive results, 
the widespread installation and use of ANPR technology was delayed due to cost.  
A further feasibility study called Laser 2 was commissioned with the specific aim of assessing the cost 
relative to the income generated by fixed penalty notices. An assessment of the Laser 2 feasibility 
study indicated that ANPR was an effective policing tool. In the United Kingdom, ANPR technology 
was phased into everyday policing in a way that enabled some of the obstacles of technology 
adoption to be overcome. Moore (1999) described five groups of people and the ways in which they 
adopt technology and suggested that personal and economic reasons are the main factors behind 
the Technology Adoption model. While this model is perhaps more suited to commercial products, 
there will be police forces that fit into these categories and people within police forces that also fit 
into the categories. Often the economic reasons will dictate which group a police force as an 
organisation fits into but there will also be individuals within police organisations that have a 
surprising amount of control over which new technologies are implemented. However the approach 
taken by the Home Office with ANPR described by Henderson et al (2004) mitigated many of the 
problems described by Moore (1999). By commissioning feasibility studies, the Home Office removed 
some of the barriers to adoption. The feasibility of the technology was proven in a real world 
situation meaning that there was not a long gap between a technology being available and it͛s ǁoƌth 
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being proved. The lesson from ANPR implementation is that any new ballistics technology needs to 
be introduced and its effectiveness assessed at the same time. This allows a relatively fast 
assessment of worth and removal of doubts from organisations or individuals less inclined to 
innovate or adopt new technology. 
2.6.3 Lessons from the Successful Adoption of CCTV Technology 
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) is installed in many locations for private as well as for law 
enforcement purposes.  It is estimated that there are 4.2 million CCTV cameras in Britain (Norris and 
McCahill, 2006). Gill and Spriggs (2005) described a number of theories as to why CCTV works and 
these theories also explain why CCTV was adopted so quickly and widely. The first theory behind the 
law enforcement use of CCTV was that it represents a visible deterrent for potential criminals and 
raises the risk of them getting caught. Secondly, CCTV may make people feel safer so in turn more 
people use the aƌea aŶd aŶ offeŶdeƌ͛s ƌisk of ďeiŶg Đaught is agaiŶ ƌaised. ThiƌdlǇ, CCTV ĐaŶ help ǁith 
the deployment of police officers. Fourthly, the presence of CCTV may encourage the public to be 
more vigilant against crime and finally, interventions by the public might be encouraged by the 
presence of CCTV.  
However, successful adoption of CCTV was dependent on a number of variables and whilst the 
general perception might be that CCTV is used routinely, successfully and on a wide scale, new CCTV 
installations still have barriers to overcome to ensure successful adoption of the technology. Gill and 
Spriggs (2005) described five factors that influenced the effectiveness of CCTV and these factors can 
be applied to future innovations in the forensic ballistics field. The first factor was that a project has 
clear objectives and was not installed purely for the sake of having it there. Applied to ballistics, this 
would mean that any new schemes especially with regards to data sharing would have reasonable 
expectations attached to them as any new technology with unreasonable expectations will fail. Any 
new ballistics technologies would also have to be proven to be needed and effective such as was the 
case with ANPR (Henderson et al, 2004). Research carried out by Morris and Dillon (1996) suggested 
that meeting the requirements of the end users and having clear objectives was important in project 
adoption. If the benefits of a new system can be seen before implementation and in their intended 
context then the new technology will be adopted successfully. 
The second factor critical to successful adoption was that the use of CCTV was managed properly in 
terms of use by end users and also by a suitably qualified project manager. Gill and Spriggs (2005) 
explained how some CCTV schemes did not engage properly with the police and this resulted in the 
police being reluctant to use evidence provided by the cameras. The police were also reluctant to 
share intelligence with the operators meaning that some operators might not understand the 
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relevance of events they were monitoring. A similar problem might be faced by innovations in 
ballistics as any new system will have to be managed effectively in terms of the data that is inputted 
and shared. The police will also need to actively engage with new systems and share data to avoid a 
situation where no information is uploaded to a system. 
The third factor that influenced effectiveness was technical details relating to the installations of the 
cameras. This could be the camera positioning and the area covered and the number of cameras in a 
particular area. This factor related to understanding the technical capabilities of the technology being 
installed and ensuring it was used properly to fully maximise the benefits. In ballistics, this could be 
the correct use of ballistics analysis systems and understanding the best configuration of each system 
to get the best possible results. Such factors might be the best way to position an object or the best 
lighting angle. Technology adoption in the law enforcement arena will not be successful if the 
technology is not used as intended (Bean, 1999).   If a technology is not used properly and is 
producing poor results users will often blame the technology when it is the configuration of the 
technology that is to blame.  
The fourth factor described by Gill and Spriggs (2005) was the technical characteristics of CCTV 
cameras such as the type of camera and its functionality. These characteristics are directly related to 
the proper use of the technology. For example, certain functions would be more appropriate for 
deterring offenders (a large, visible, marked camera) than for providing evidence (good image 
quality). 
Calvin and Goh (2005) examined technology acceptance amongst 430 American police officers using 
a new laptop based system to access crime databases, write reports and dispatch officers to events. 
The main finding of this research was that information quality, ease of use; usefulness and the time 
taken for the technology to respond were the most important features. Calvin and Goh (2004) 
suggested that the acceptance of new technology can be improved by focusing on these factors and 
that procurement should focus on systems that are effective in these areas. In ballistics, it is not 
currently understood how ballistics analysis systems work and how they are different. This means 
that laboratories cannot choose the most appropriate technology for their circumstances. For 
example a laboratory with a large caseload may need a system that captures bullets and cartridge 
cases in the shortest possible time (a principle suggested by Calvin and Goh, 2005) and they may be 
prepared to pay extra for this. Another laboratory may not have a large caseload and may be content 
to procure a cheaper system that takes longer to acquire samples. Successful adoption relies upon 
these facts being known and consequentially informed decisions can be made. In ballistics this is not 
currently the case. 
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The fifth factor identified by Gill and Spriggs (2005) was the operation of the control room. Specific 
factors included the hours of monitoring and the communication between the police and the public 
that provided useful intelligence. The parallel to new ballistics technologies would be to ensure that 
the human processes surrounding new technology are taken into account and altered where 
necessary. Ammenwerth and Mahler (2006) examined IT adoption in a medical setting and showed 
that there is a clear interaction between individuals, the technology they are being asked to use and 
the tasks they are expected to perform. They suggested that when a new system is implemented, 
organisational changes often happen and these should be managed carefully. There is a clear parallel 
here with the law enforcement community. The physicians blamed the new system for their 
increased workload when in fact the real issue was the new task they were being asked to complete.  
The successful adoption of ANPR was aided by the scientific approach to assessing the feasibility of 
such a scheme and the effectiveness of the technology. This approach has also been applied to CCTV 
not only to ensure successful initial adoption but successful continuing utilisation of the technology. 
Notable research includes Waples and Gill (2006), Welsh and Farrington (2009), Farrington et al 
(2007) and Waples, Gill and Fisher (2009). These studies have all attempted to scientifically quantify 
the impact of CCTV on crime in a specific setting and as a result guidelines are issued to police forces 
to ensure successful implementation (Gill, Rose and Collins, 2005). Successful adoption of new 
ballistics technologies will also depend on rigorous scientific analysis of the effect of the technology 
on the prevention and detection of crime. 
CCTV has also faced other problems such as those described by Fay (1998). These include accusations 
that CCTV has been adopted for political reasons rather than for its efficacy. CCTV schemes have also 
faced angry reactions from people living in targeted communities (Guardian, 2010). Other problems 
faced by CCTV include the possible invasion of privacy and controlling access to the data and sharing 
of the data. 
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) and Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) are now widely 
used in the UK to prevent and detect crime and to provide intelligence. There has also been the 
suggestion that the perception of the effectiveness of technology such as CCTV and ANPR has led to a 
wider drop in overall crime rates (Farrell et al, 2010).  However, both technologies had to traverse 
the path from innovative new technologies to being adopted on a wide scale. There will inevitably be 
implementation issues that any new technology will have to face and overcome. These issues are not 
trivial and will require considerable time and effort. There will need to be an understanding of the 
different processes and existing systems that are involved in investigations that have a ballistics 
element. The main difference between the above points and ballistics analysis is that new and 
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existing technologies relating to forensic ballistics do not involve the capture, storage or exchange of 
personal data. This means that the security and data protection issues surrounding CCTV and ANPR 
data are not always applicable to ballistics. Furthermore, the interpretation of ballistics evidence 
such as bullets and cartridge cases requires a high level of expertise. The barriers to innovation facing 
ballistics are likely to concern implementation rather than legal issues relating to privacy, data 
protection and proportionality.  
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Chapter 3 – Aims and Objectives 
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3.1 - Areas for Innovation Identified by the Literature Review 
3.1.1 Gaps in Knowledge 
The review of the literature has revealed areas where innovative strategies and interventions could 
be implemented to improve current processes and technology with the aim of reducing crimes 
involving firearms, improving the forensic ballistic process and increasing the detection rate of these 
crimes. Statistics that report the extent of crimes involving firearms were presented by Smith et al 
(2010). However, a major weakness of relying on official statistics to quantify the nature and 
characteristics of any crime type is the fact that unreported crimes are not included in the analysis. 
This means that it is virtually impossible to provide a full, accurate assessment of the number of 
crimes involving firearms that have occurred in the United Kingdom. Consequently it is difficult to 
perform meaningful, complete analysis of these crimes.  Squires (2008) described the intelligence 
gap created by this problem. Crimes involving firearms that occur but are not reported, results in a 
situation where witnesses and victims cannot be interviewed, the circumstances of the crime cannot 
be documented and shared and exhibits cannot be examined to yield forensic evidence and 
intelligence. Furthermore, other crimes may be linked to the incident, but because of a lack of 
reporting, the link might not be made. The details of the crime and any evidence or intelligence 
generated, are also unavailable to be utilised by police officers investigating other potential linked 
offences.  
3.1.2 Unreported Crimes 
To address this issue, more innovative strategies are needed to understand the extent of unreported 
gun crime with a view to understanding the intelligence and evidence that can be gained. Pershad et 
al (2005) and Crewdson et al (2009) examined medical data relating to gunshot wounds to try and 
address this problem. It is possible that studies such as this could lead to full implementation of a 
reporting scheme whereby doctors are obliged to report admissions to hospital as a result of gunshot 
injuries. This is now the case in the UK (Morris, 2009). Careful management of such schemes by law 
enforcement agencies would not only enable more data to be collected in terms of the number of 
incidents occurring but could also encourage victims to officially report the crime of which they have 
been a victim. Another approach would be to examine the problem pragmatically with a view to 
obtaining intelligence from the incident even if a crime report is not made. Perhaps a procedure 
could be developed where a victim can provide intelligence about the crime to the police without 
making a formal report. Although not ideal, at least some intelligence and potential evidence may be 
able to be gained from the event rather than none at all.  
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The gap created by unreported crimes was also addressed by Bennett and Holloway (2004) who 
interviewed offenders with a view to understanding underlying factors that affect crimes involving 
firearms. Again, this study provided useful data that could be used to quantify gun crimes. Such an 
approach could also be used to generate intelligence around the circumstances of such crimes. 
Although requiring careful management as was the case with the medical data examined by Pershad 
et al (2005) and Crewdson et al (2009), such an approach could contribute to addressing the 
intelligence gap created by unreported crimes involving firearms.  
3.1.3 Using Data Effectively 
It should be pointed out that data generated through alternative methods such as those utilised by 
Pershad et al (2005), Crewdson et al (2009) and Bennett and Holloway (2004) are best exploited and 
used to prevent future crimes only if that data are used and shared effectively. Increased data 
sharing can lead to trends being uncovered and this may allow preventative strategies to be 
implemented. Effective data sharing in this context means it should be shared confidentially and 
coherently and with the correct agencies and people. Additionally, it is not just the act of data 
sharing that can make a difference but the actions that are taken as a result of the data being shared. 
There are different aspects of this problem that need to be overcome. The first is technical and 
relates to the interoperability of systems whether they are crime reporting systems or forensic 
systems. However, the value of technical innovation can be undermined if there are not the 
appropriate legal frameworks and policies in place for the exchange of data. This causes a cyclical 
problem as often the feasibility of an approach is required to be demonstrated before the 
appropriate legal changes can be implemented. However, if such an approach is not possible because 
of legal issues it is very difficult to demonstrate feasibility. This can be addressed in a variety of ways. 
To demonstrate the feasibility of sharing crime data, prototype systems can be built using dummy 
data. If real data are to be used, then strategies can be put in place to manage the prototype 
development and any generated information or intelligence.  
There is a wealth of information that could be utilised from unreported crimes. However, it could 
also be argued that more innovative strategies are needed to take advantage of all the evidence and 
intelligence opportunities presented by those crimes that are reported and where forensic evidence 
is available. This is especially true with regards to potential forensic evidence that can be obtained 
from bullets, cartridge cases and recovered firearms. Although crimes involving firearms (including 
air weapons) only accounted for 0.3% of all recorded crime in 2008/09 (Smith el al, 2010), when they 
do occur they generate strong media coverage and the impact on the victims and community is likely 
to be high. Enhancing and improving forensic practises and increasing the likelihood of detections 
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could improve public confidence in police investigations of gun crime and perhaps address the 
reluctance of some witnesses to come forward.  
It is important to consider the use of automated ballistics analysis systems to investigate and uncover 
links with other crimes. These systems do not match objects but instead suggest potential matches 
to a ballistics expert. Research that considered the success rates of a series of experiments indicated 
that the success rate of the one of the most widely studied systems is around 75% - 95% for cartridge 
cases and 50% -75% for bullets (Nennstiel and Rahm, 2006b) depending on the circumstances of use. 
This immediately raises the possibility that there is evidence and intelligence concerning linked 
events present in the databases of law enforcement agencies that has not been discovered. One of 
the implications of the work conducted by Nennsteil and Rahm (2006b) is that there is definite room 
for improvement in the abilities of ballistics analysis technologies to discover previously unknown 
links to other crimes.  
3.1.4 Ballistics Analysis Systems 
As previously discussed, there is an intelligence gap created by crimes involving firearms that are not 
reported to the police. It is therefore vital that evidence and intelligence generated by those crimes 
that are reported, once discovered and analysed, is used effectively. This includes forensic ballistics 
data generated by automated systems. Also, as previously stated, data sharing is one tactic that can 
be employed to address this problem but that the lack of interoperability between systems produces 
a barrier to effective data sharing. There is currently no interoperability between different ballistics 
analysis systems. For example, Germany, Switzerland and Belgium all use the Evofinder system 
produced by ScannBi Technology while the United Kingdom uses the IBIS Trax 3D system produced 
by Forensic Technology Inc. This produces a very practical difficultly of the United Kingdom not being 
able to share data generated by the IBIS Trax 3D system with other countries not using IBIS despite 
the fact that there are documented examples of firearms being trafficked to the UK from continental 
Europe (BBC, 2003, Guardian, 2007). It stands to reason that firearms that have originated outside 
the UK may have been used prior to their arrival in the UK and that evidence linking these crimes 
may be available in databases which cannot be queried in an automated, routine manner. The lack of 
interoperability between systems is the main factor that contributes to this problem. 
This Thesis is primarily concerned with the forensic evidence that can be gained from bullets and 
cartridge cases through the use of an automated ballistics analysis system. Bullets and cartridge 
cases can yield intelligence and evidence relating to the weapon that fired them through the 
distinguishing marks that are imprinted on them as the weapon is fired. Ballistics evidence however, 
is different to other disciplines of forensic science such as DNA and fingerprint identification. This is 
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because whilst fingerprints and DNA remain constant thƌoughout a peƌsoŶ͛s life, the ideŶtifǇiŶg 
marks of a gun imprinted onto a bullet or cartridge case change every time the weapon is fired 
because of the physical contact between components of the weapon and the ammunition and 
consequential wear of the contacting elements within the firearm. This can result in a situation 
where two bullets fired from the same weapon will bear marks that match but also potentially marks 
that do not. This has resulted in there being an element of subjectivity inherent to the discipline of 
firearms identification. Whilst not necessarily a negative aspect or a disadvantage of firearms 
identification, this subjectivity does need to be managed carefully, in terms of the way such evidence 
is presented in court and explained to the public and the ways in which examinations are conducted 
and conclusions drawn. While DNA and fingerprints evidence have been challenged, robustly 
defended and tested to the point of widespread acceptance, it can be argued that the same has not 
happened in the field of forensic ballistics. DNA match probabilities have been clearly defined, 
discussed and published (Foreman and Evett, 2001; Gill, 2002) - there is no statistical equivalent for 
match probabilities or error rates in firearms identification (Chumbley et al, 2010). 
Successful examination of ballistics items and reliable generation of evidence undoubtedly relies on 
the skills and experience of human examiners. Whilst attempts have been made to automate the 
process using computer technology, because of the element of subjectivity and the lack of standards 
in place for identification, there are no underlying principles which automated systems can or have 
been built upon. Neither are there identifying processes employed to reliably identify objects to a 
high or even a known degree of certainty. This has resulted in the manufacturers of such technology 
using their own techniques, algorithms, correlation procedures and match probabilities to produce 
these systems resulting in a situation where there is no interoperability between systems produced 
by different manufacturers. It may be the case that as a result of the lack of standards and lack of 
rigorous identification criteria, the development of technology in this field has been focussed on 
providing lists of potential matching candidates rather than actual matches. Ballistics analysis 
systems do not generate matches. Instead the ranked lists of objects that are similar to the object in 
question are examined by a ballistics expert to generate evidential matches. However, within each 
system, data capture techniques and comparison algorithms are utilised and repeated in a consistent 
manner. It is fair to suggest that careful examination of this technology and the results they yield 
could potentially contribute to the debate on matching standards and certainly to the debate on 
interoperability between systems. To date there is a lack of empirical evidence that addresses the 
feasibility of interoperable systems. As the systems that are currently available are assumed to work 
differently and produce different results, work needs to be undertaken to document these 
differences and the variance in the results produced.  
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This Thesis aims to plug this gap in our knowledge and capabilities by developing a methodology to 
enable this to happen. The key to enabling these differences to be mapped is a controlled 
experiment using the same data set for each technology. Each system should be employed to 
capture and correlate the same identical sample of bullets and cartridge cases. This ensures that any 
variance in the results is produced by variances in the functionality and capabilities of the systems 
rather than the sample of ammunition. Documenting these differences is the first step to being able 
to design solutions to overcome them and achieve interoperability.  
3.1.5 Gaps in Research Concerning Ballistics Analysis Systems 
There has never been a comparative analysis published of the different ballistics analysis 
technologies that are available using a standardised data set. This prevents laboratories from being 
able to make fully informed decisions as to which technology they procure. Previous research has 
concluded that it is difficult to compare the results of research even when the same system has been 
examined. Nennstiel and Rahm (2006a:18) state,  
͞EǆteŶsiǀe IBI“ iŶstruŵeŶt tests haǀe ďeeŶ ĐoŶduĐted iŶ the past ǁith differeŶt goals iŶ 
connection with these and other studies. Their results, standing alone, however, are difficult 
to compare with each other. A systematic summary is lacking to determine which parameters 
have an influence on the success or error rate, respectively, during the operation of the IBIS 
sǇsteŵ.͟ 
Due to the lack of academic, published research examining other systems, it is logical to suggest that 
the above statement can be applied to other technologies. It is also logical to suggest that the only 
way of enabling a comparison of results generated by different systems is to design a methodology 
with this purpose in mind and to use the same dataset for every system that is to be examined now 
or in future. All studies published to date have examined each system in isolation with the exception 
of Brinck (2008) who examined IBIS Heritage and the newer IBIS BulletTRAX 3D system. There has 
been no published research on the potential for interoperability between different systems currently 
in operation and the impact this could have on the investigation of gun crime. An essential 
prerequisite to any work on interoperability between systems is a thorough understanding of the 
ways in which the systems work including data acquisition and correlation procedures. A complete 
understanding can only be gained with the full cooperation of the manufacturers of these systems. 
However, careful examination of the results produced by each system will provide information on 
the inherent variance between the systems and will provoke a debate as to whether or not 
interoperability is possible. There are no data available currently that would allow the variance 
between systems to be recorded and analysed and, as such, there is a lack of evidence contributing 
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to the debate on interoperable systems. The focus of this Thesis is the ballistics analysis systems, the 
data they produce and innovations that could contribute to the police investigation of gun crime. 
Previous research in this field has been important in the design of the methodology and the targeting 
of the research aims. The methodology that will be outlined in Chapter four builds upon and extends 
prior research in this field and has also attempted to address some of the methodological issues 
present in prior research. 
As previously discussed, earlier research has focussed on technology from a single provider, namely 
Forensic Technology Inc. An example is the study conducted by Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) and 
published in the Journal of Forensic Sciences. In this research, the authors defined many of the 
variables that contribute to the success rate of the system. This study and others (Tulleners, 2001; De 
Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut, 2004) subsequently contributed to the debate as to whether or not a 
system such as IBIS Heritage could be used to collect the markings from legally held weapons (Cork et 
al, 2008) in a reference ballistics imaging database
10
. Despite the fact that the authors have 
attempted to describe multiple variables that affect the outcome, the study only examines the IBIS 
Heritage system.  
The research conducted by Argaman, Shoshani and Hocherman (2001) provided a good example of 
how the IBIS Heritage system was used in the field in real case work and contained useful 
information on procedures that proved particularly effective for the police in Israel. Whilst this 
research did provide useful information there are two main issues with the research. Firstly, the 
study only considered the IBIS Heritage system, not surprising given the fact that the only system 
installed in Israel was IBIS Heritage. The second issue is that there were no specific metrics provided 
with the findings about the size of the database examined, or the samples upon which conclusions 
were drawn. 
The research conducted by Brinck (2008) only examined IBIS. Although it should be noted that unlike 
other studies considered, Brinck (2008) did compare two technologies – the IBIS Heritage system and 
the BulletTRAX 3D system. There are therefore points relevant to the comparison of the systems that 
can be taken forward. An additional element of complexity is inherent in the research conducted by 
Brinck (2008). Specifically the fact that the comparisons between the systems were conducted on the 
basis of bullets fired from consecutively manufactured barrels. Bullets test fired and recovered using 
consecutively rifled barrels should be more difficult to distinguish between. This is because the 
                                                          
10
 A Reference Ballistics Imaging Database (RBID) refers to a database of cartridge case and / or bullet images 
acquired by an automated system. The purpose of a RBID is to acquire cartridge cases and bullets from legally 
held weapons so that bullets and cartridge cases recovered from crime scenes can be compared against bullets 
and cartridge cases from legally held weapons. 
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minute imperfections caused by the manufacturing process should be less obvious because the 
barrels have been produced consecutively. This should result in there being less chance that the 
manufacturing components have had chance to wear out so the differences between each barrel 
should be very small. 
A potential weakness of the research conducted by Brinck (2008) concerns the background sample of 
475 bullets that was provided by the manufacturer of the technology. It is therefore difficult to verify 
the background sample in terms of tracing the source weapons and ensuring the production of the 
test fires under controlled conditions. It is also highly unlikely that the manufacturers would allow 
the background sample to be used in further research with another technology provider. The 
research conducted by Brinck (2008) also only concerned bullet analysis.  
The research conducted by Roberge and Beauchamp (2006) also concerned the ability of BulletTRAX 
3D to identify bullets fired from consecutively manufactured barrels. One of the issues is the fact that 
the authors are employees of the manufacturers of the technology. There is the potential for 
commercial interest in a favourable result.  As was the case with Brinck (2008) because of the 
involvement of the technology manufacturer it is unlikely that the research could be replicated with 
another technology provider. 
De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004) assessed the feasibility of a reference ballistics imaging 
database (RBID). They concluded that such a database would be unsuitable for law enforcement use. 
However, the design and the explanation of the experiment conducted are thorough, meaning that a 
full assessment of the variables can be conducted and the results considered in the context of other 
research. The two main issues with the research conducted by De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut 
(2004) are firstly that only cartridge cases are considered and secondly, only one system was 
assessed and this was the IBIS Heritage system. The ammunition used for this experiment was 
generated from the weapons held by police officers and it is not known if this ammunition could be 
used with other systems. This research provides a model for further work examining automated 
systems but also highlights the need to preserve the test sample of ammunition so that different 
systems can be examined and the results are made immediately comparable. 
3.1.6 Examination of Ballistics Analysis Systems – Key Variables 
A discussion of work previously conducted in this field has identified a number of key variables that 
affect the operation and results produced by ballistics analysis systems. All need to be considered in 
the design of a controlled experiment. The test sample of cartridge cases or bullets that is used is 
perhaps one of the most important variables. The test sample of weapons that a researcher is 
attempting to identify in a database will vary depending on the make and model of firearm as well as 
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the make and type of ammunition. Ammunition fired by some weapons is relatively easy to 
distinguish between whilst ammunition fired from different weapons, notably Glock handguns, can 
be difficult to tell apart. Ammunition type will also directly affect results. For example, lead bullets 
are softer and the markings and striations imprinted on them are of different quality than those 
imprinted on copper bullets. The effect of ammunition type has been noted by George (2004a and 
2004b) and De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004).  
The choice between a sample of different weapons or consecutively manufactured barrels is 
important when researching the capability of systems to acquire and correlate bullets. Another 
crucial variable is the background database used when attempting to correlate objects. Generally, 
the performance of each system should be considered relative to the database size. If a system can 
find the known match in the top ten on 95% of trials, then the interpretation of this result depends 
on the number of other objects in the database. A system achieving this result with 1000 objects in 
the database could be considered the better performer than a system achieving this result with 100 
objects in the database. This is because there are more variables in the database that the system has 
to consider and discount. Ballistics analysis systems do not match items directly. Rather they 
correlate them. Correlation procedures indicate the strength and direction of a relationship between 
variables rather than producing a definitive positive or negative result. The success and results of 
correlation algorithms and equations are dependent on the many variables involved. In the context 
of ballistics analysis systems, correlation does not imply a causal relationship instead implying that 
two objects are similar to each other. It should also be noted that the correlation scores generated 
by ballistics analysis systems are not traditional correlation coefficients and have no statistical 
meaning. Instead they are scores generated by the proprietary algorithms of each system. It has 
been argued that the term correlation is misleading and the term comparison should instead be used 
(Cork et al, 2008). 
The type of weapon that generates the test sample
11
 of cartridge cases and bullets is important 
because some weapons produce marks that are easy to identify and other weapons produce marks 
that are extremely difficult to identify. Another important point relating to the type of weapon is 
availability and access to enough weapons to generate an experimental sample of sufficient size. It is 
for this reason that previous research has used ammunition in open case files or ammunition 
provided by the manufacturers of ballistics analysis systems. The disadvantage of using ammunition 
provided by the manufacturer is that it is unlikely the manufacturer would allow the use with a 
competing system.  
                                                          
11
 Sample is this context refers to the bullets and cartridge cases that are to be acquired by each system. 
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Some systems require significant input from the operator and some do not. This interaction may 
involve entering descriptive data about features of the weapon that fired the ammunition such as 
make and calibre. It may also include descriptive information about the ammunition and the 
classmarks on the bullets and cartridge cases. This may be the shape of the firing pin impression on a 
cartridge case or the number of lands or grooves on a bullet or the manufacturer of a cartridge case. 
Other types of operator interaction may be marking distinguishing features on the captured images 
of a bullet or a cartridge case. On a bullet this may be highlighting good quality striations to be used 
in the comparison process and on a cartridge case this could be marking the edge of the firing pin 
impression. It is important to note that some systems have different levels of required interaction 
and this interaction will affect the correlation results. The extent to which this interaction affects the 
results in not known but must be considered when drawing conclusions on the operation and 
performance of a system. It is therefore important that the operator of a particular system is 
considered carefully. Considerations might include the level of experience of the operator and the 
expertise they have using a particular system. Ideally a highly experienced operator would be 
selected to input the test ammunition to ensure the highest possible data quality. 
Another important variable is the geographical location of the research. It has been identified that a 
gap in the literature is the absence of standardised experiments that can be repeated as many times 
as is necessary with different technologies. Directly related to this is the sample that is to be used, 
where it is stored and the availability of the sample to any interested party that wishes to use it in 
future. Consequently the location in terms of the country where the research is carried out is an 
important variable. Generally there are two options: firstly the location is the same for all 
participants. An example might be a dedicated laboratory at a forensic department of a particular 
country that all participants have to travel to. A second option is a flexible location. This could involve 
the research being carried out at the headquarters of each manufacturer involving the repeated 
transportation of the test sample of ammunition. The benefit of a constant location is a greater 
element of control over extraneous variables that may arise. It is also less likely that samples will be 
lost
12
. The disadvantage is gaining consensus as to where the location may be and the added costs 
that may arise as a consequence. The companies that manufacture this equipment are based in 
different countries and transportation of the ballistics analysis systems to laboratories in different 
countries can be expensive. There are also associated travel costs relating to the operators of the 
systems being at that location for the duration of the research.  The main advantage of conducting 
                                                          
12
 Due to the difficulties of generating large samples of ammunition for test purposes including time, expense 
and safety issues, loss of a test sample of ammunition would be extremely disruptive to any experimental 
research. It would result in the experiment having to start again as using different samples would mean the 
results would not be comparable.  
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research at a manufacturers headquarters is that usually there is a system installed that can be used. 
The disadvantage is that the test sample of ammunition may be lost or damaged during 
transportation. Due to the dispersed locations of the manufacturers and the quantity of bullets and 
cartridge cases, the test sample would have to be checked into an aeroplane hold where there is 
potential for loss or damage. 
3.1.7 Gaps in the Literature – Multidisciplinary Research 
The literature review has demonstrated that there is a clear distinction between research conducted 
in the criminology field and the forensic ballistics field. Research conducted in the discipline of 
criminology has focussed on gun crime – quantifying the extent, characteristics and individuals that 
become involved. Research in the forensic ballistics field has tended to focus of technical issues such 
as matching standards, best practice and the performance of technology that can be used to 
automate parts of the process. There appears to be an absence of work that discusses the 
criminological implications of forensic ballistics work relating to gun crime. This Thesis aims to 
address this by placing the implications of the original research conducted, firmly in the context of 
wider policing issues specific to gun crime. There are some examples of multidisciplinary research 
that combine forensic ballistics with other disciplines. The example described below combines 
psychology principles to discuss some of the issues affecting forensic ballistics analysis. 
3.1.8 Multidisciplinary Research – Confirmation Bias 
Firearms examiners confidently state that procedures in place such as colleagues checking each 
otheƌ͛s͛ ǁoƌk ĐouŶteƌact any potential for bias but there is little published research that provides the 
evidence for this. It is important to distinguish between proficiency testing and experiments that 
examine bias. Proficiency testing usually involves a small sample of ammunition presented to an 
examiner consisting of matched pairs. The task of the examiner is to correctly identify the matches in 
the sample. For the potential for bias to be investigated, some form of ancillary information must be 
presented to the ballistics examiner and the effect of this information measured. While it may be the 
case that firearms examiners do counteract issues of bias, good scientific process demands that 
evidence is in place to support the argument. To date there are no published studies that examine 
the interaction between ballistics analysis systems and human firearms examiners in terms the 
potential for these systems to introduce bias into the identification procedure. 
Kerstholt et al (2010) examined the extent to which firearms examiners were vulnerable to 
confirmation bias when identifying matches. In this experiment, firearms examiners were given sets 
of bullets along with information that might bias them towards a particular conclusion or 
accompanied by neutral information. Kerstholt et al (2010) concluded that examiners were not 
affected by confirmation bias. However, there were methodological issues with the research which 
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means the results should be treated with caution. The sample size was small consisting of only six 
examiners and there was no control condition. A control condition would have involved presenting 
the bullets with an absence of information to enable the variables (the biasing information and the 
neutral information) to be compared to a condition where no information was presented. The 
research was also carried out in the Netherlands so there may have been procedures and policies in 
place in that particular country that affected the results. However, the approach taken by Kerstholt 
et al (2010) could be modified to address the issue of automated systems introducing bias into 
ballistics examinations. Risinger et al (2002) explained that one of the ways confirmation bias can be 
manifested is if more information than is necessary is provided to the examiner. This could be the 
case when information about potential matches from an automated system is presented to an 
examiner for confirmation. An approach to documenting the effect this may have on the conclusions 
drawn by an examiner could be to give a set of bullets to an examiner with the correlation list 
produced by an automated system with a variety of conditions. These could be where the matching 
object is in the top position, where the matching object is not in the top position and where there is 
no matching object in the provided sample. A control condition would be where a set of objects is 
provided to an examiner but without any information from an automated system. A further 
dimension to such research would be a comparison of the bias potential of different systems if the 
hypothesis that different systems produce different results is proven to be true. 
To examine the interaction between firearms examiners and the technology they utilise, arguably 
there needs to be prior work conducted examining the systems themselves both in terms of the ways 
in which they work, the ways they are used and the results that they generate. This Thesis attempts 
to address these points by designing a methodology to assess these questions with two systems that 
are commercially available. The methodology is also designed in such a way as to enable the research 
to be developed and extended to other systems in future should more systems become available or 
more manufacturers wish to undergo the procedure. The dataset and results that were used as part 
of the original research conducted as part of this Thesis could arguably be used for future research to 
add to the work by Kerstholt et al (2010) by forming the basis for an experiment examining the 
potential of ballistics analysis systems to introduce confirmation bias into the identification process. 
3.1.9 Opportunity for Innovation 
Current ballistics analysis technology is based on digital imaging and confocal microscopy.  Research 
to date has indicated that the technology is not sufficiently advanced to allow implementation of a 
reference ballistics imaging database (RBID) that would allow all newly manufactured guns to be test 
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fired and these test fires acquired
13
 by a system and stored in a database (Cork et al, 2008). In the 
case of ballistic analysis systems described in this Thesis, the underlying technology is based on 
digital imaging. There is an opportunity for new innovative technology to fill the gap created by some 
of the documented shortcomings of technology based on digital imaging (Cork et al, 2008). 
Technology based on digital imaging and also confocal microscopy means that the signature created 
within the barrel of a gun is impossible to acquire. Technology such as that described by Xie et al 
(2009) and Barrett, Tajbakhsh and Warren (2011) could be used to provide new systems that offer 
greater accuracy.  
3.1.10 Summary 
The literature review has clearly shown that there is a lack of research that has examined ballistics 
analysis systems other than the IBIS Heritage system. There is also a weakness is all previous research 
concerning the samples of ammunition used, in that the availability of the samples for further 
research is not known. This Thesis will attempt to address these two points by designing a 
methodology that can be applied to any ballistics analysis system regardless of the underlying 
technological principles employed. This Thesis will also aim to build a test set of ammunition 
specifically for the purposes of preservation and replication. This will ensure that the research 
conducted here can be replicated at any point in the future and that the results will immediately be 
comparable and relevant to research that has previously been conducted. This would represent an 
original contribution to knowledge. 
The literature review has also demonstrated that there is a lack of multidisciplinary research that 
examines the direct impact of forensic ballistics analysis on the police investigation of gun crime. This 
Thesis will firstly explain the ways in which ballistics analysis technology and the analysis of ballistics 
evidence can directly impact upon police investigations. Secondly, as the literature review has 
suggested, there are areas of forensic ballistics where innovation is needed and where current 
technology lags behind that in other areas in forensics. This will be considered, investigated and 
discussed. Thirdly, the importance of innovation in forensic ballistics and its critical importance in 
preventing and detecting crimes involving firearms will be discussed through the analysis of the 
experimental results. The multidisciplinary approach demonstrated in this Thesis also represents an 
original contribution to knowledge. The aims of the Thesis are presented in the next section of this 
chapter. 
                                                          
13
 Bullet acquisition or cartridge case acquisition refers to the high resolution images being captured by the 
system and then stored in database to enable correlations to be carried out.  
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3.2 – Aims 
The overall aim of this Thesis is: to conduct multidisciplinary research that examines ballistics 
analysis technology and the results that they produce in the context of data sharing and 
interoperability. The impact that these systems have on law enforcement agencies investigating 
gun crime will also be considered. Increasing data sharing and moving towards an evidence based 
debate on interoperable ballistics analysis systems would represent significant innovation in this 
field.  
In order to contextualise the research and to enable a discussion on the impact of innovation in the 
forensic ballistics field, this Thesis conducted a literature review to examine the issues that are 
intertwined with crimes involving firearms. This included the links between guns, gangs and drugs 
and the problems this can cause for law enforcement. The literature review also provided a review of 
research already conducted on examining ballistics analysis systems. The issue of confirmation bias 
amongst forensic practitioners was also discussed in the review together with literature relating to 
the nature and characteristics of gun crime. This enabled the research to be placed in a broader 
context. Although the research concerns matters that are directly related to ballistics analysis 
systems and associated forensic ballistic processes, this Thesis is multidisciplinary in nature as it 
discusses the implications of the research in a broader policing context. 
The review of the literature has revealed that there is a gap in reported literature with regards to an 
analysis of different ballistic analysis systems with the same set of ammunition. Therefore this Thesis 
aims to produce a standardised data set of test fired ammunition that can be used to assess ballistics 
analysis technologies and the resultant data. A methodology will also be developed to enable the 
assessment of the data produced by ballistics analysis technologies. An experiment will also be 
carried out using this data set and methodology to enable the results to contribute to the debate on 
interoperable systems and innovation. 
As previously stated, this research is multidisciplinary. The results will be discussed in the context of 
issues directly relevant to policing.  These issues include: the contribution ballistics analysis systems 
could make to close the gap created by unreported crimes; the additional intelligence the systems 
could yield; the contribution of the results to inform police procurement decisions; the potential for 
a weapon registration scheme and the contribution that these systems could make to specialist 
policing operations in tackling gun crime. 
The gaps in the literature are summarised below, followed by the research objectives of the Thesis. 
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3.2.1 Summary of Gaps in the Literature 
The principal research identified through the literature review can be summarised as follows: 
 There is a clear problem that is created by the fact that some crimes involving firearms are 
not reported;  The evidence obtained from those crimes that are reported should be utilised as effectively 
as possible;  Percentage success rates of one particular ballistics analysis technology used to automate 
parts of the process was quoted at 50% - 95% raising the possibility of links between crimes 
remaining undiscovered despite the presence of the evidence;  Recovered evidence can be utilised by sharing the data as widely as possible to improve the 
possibilities of links to other offences being uncovered;   There is no interoperability between ballistics analysis systems making data sharing between 
systems impossible;  An essential pre-requisite to interoperability is a thorough understanding of the ways in 
which the different systems work and the data and results they produce;  Research to date has focussed on a single provider - Forensic Technology Inc;   There has been no published research examining the performance of other systems 
available;  There has been no published research examining multiple systems from different providers 
with the same set of ammunition. 
3.2.2 Research Objectives 
The principal research objects for the study are as follows: 
 To design a methodology to enable ballistics analysis systems to be compared and assessed;  To produce a test set of ammunition that can be preserved and used repeatedly as required;  To conduct an experiment with two of the currently available technologies;  To place the findings of the research in the broader context of police investigations of gun 
crime;  To use the results of the research to discuss the potential for innovation in the field of 
ballistics analysis systems;  To discuss the potential impact on the police investigation of gun crime that innovation in 
this field could have;  To identify the nature and characteristics of potential future innovation in this field. 
The next Chapter explains the Methodology employed to achieve the above research objectives. 
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 4.1 - Introduction to Methodology and Rationale for the Experimental Work 
This Chapter explains the experimental methodology that was used to complete the section of work 
using ballistics analysis systems and the decisions made during the process of developing the 
experimental design. This Chapter is divided into three Sections. Section 4.1 introduces the 
methodology and explains the rationale for the experimental work. This section also explores the 
reasons why research, such as that described in this Thesis has not been conducted before. Section 
4.2 describes the background work that was undertaken before the experiment was designed and 
started. Finally Section 4.3 describes the experimental design and variables involved in the 
experiment. 
4.1.1 Rationale for the Experiment 
The experimental design described in Section 4.3, aimed to draw upon and extend previous research 
that has been conducted in this field. The literature review demonstrated that previous research in 
this field has focused on just either one technology (Tulleners 2001; De Kinder, Tulleners and 
Thiebaut 2004; George 2004a; George 2004b; Nennsteil and Rahm 2006a; Nennsteil and Rahm, 
2006b), or on two technologies from the same manufacturer (Brinck, 2008). The clear implication of 
the literature review is that because there is no reported research comparing different systems from 
different manufacturers under controlled conditions, there is, therefore, a clear need to address this 
and to design an appropriate methodology to facilitate proper cross technology comparison. Despite 
the limitations of previous work, the research described in this Thesis should be viewed as inspired 
by and extending the research themes and ideas developed by researchers such as Tulleners (2001), 
De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004), George (2004a and 2004b), Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a 
and 2006b) and Brinck (2008). In addition to extending previous research, there are two fundamental 
reasons why research should be conducted to compare ballistics systems from different 
manufacturers and the data they produce. These are now discussed. 
4.1.2 Lack of Interoperability between Different Systems 
The first reason for conducting this research is that there is no interoperability between different 
ballistics analysis systems.  The images and text data captured by one system cannot be exchanged 
or correlated with those emanating from systems manufactured by a different provider. The 
literature review highlighted areas where innovative strategies could be applied to reduce gun crime. 
One of these is around increased sharing of forensic ballistics data. However as there is no 
interoperability between ballistics analysis systems, the data that can be shared is limited by the 
technology a user happens to have procured. An essential prerequisite to any work on 
interoperability is the creation of a controlled data set generated using the same sample of objects. 
This will allow the similarities and differences between the systems to be understood. Attempting to 
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compare the data from different systems using different objects will not allow this variance to be 
undeƌstood. This tǇpe of ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ aŶalǇsis ofteŶ teƌŵed ͞ƌouŶd ƌoďiŶ͟ testiŶg is ĐoŵŵoŶ iŶ the 
surface metrology field and measuring system manufacturers are usually willing to contribute (Blunt, 
Ohlsson and Rosen, 1994; Gao et al, 2008). 
Table 4-1 demonstrates the complex nature of interoperability between different systems when 
there are more than two systems involved. Different technologies use different measuring principles 
such as grey scale imaging or full confocal microscopy, and consequently the issue of interoperability 
is not simple to address. A key prerequisite for interoperability would be a common data format and 
at present this does not exist. It is known that data produced by a single technology can be shared 
and correlated with data produced by the same technology but from a different physical machine. 
However, what has never been established is the extent to which interoperability between different 
systems is possible. For example it may be the case that data from Technology A can be 
interoperable with data from Technology B but not with data from Technology C. Table 4-1 shows 
that interoperability between systems is a multifaceted problem and as such it is unlikely that total 
interoperability between every single system is possible, especially if differing measuring principles 
are used. Instead it is likely that interoperability will be possible between some systems but not 
others. In order to find out the extent to which this is possible a controlled experiment such as the 
one designed in this Thesis needs to be undertaken to understand the differences and similarities 
between each system.  
Table 4-1: The Multifaceted Nature of Interoperability between Ballistics Analysis Systems 
 Technology 
A 
Technology  
B 
Technology  
C 
Technology  
D 
Technology  
N 
Technology A  ?? ?? ?? ?? 
Technology B ??  ?? ?? ?? 
Technology C ?? ??  ?? ?? 
Technology D ?? ?? ??  ?? 
Technology N ?? ?? ?? ??  
 
Table 4-1 Key: A tick means that interoperability is possible between the systems in question. 
Question marks mean that the extent to which interoperability between the systems in question is 
possible is not known. 
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4.1.3 Progress Towards Interoperability 
In order for progress to be made towards interoperable ballistics analysis systems it is theorised that 
there are a number of underlying factors that need to be documented and understood. It would be 
unreasonable to expect systems to be able to be interoperable without a thorough understanding of 
key features. It is assumed that as each system is produced by different manufacturers, each system 
will, therefore, work differently and use different measuring principles. It is certainly true that these 
differences are not well understood and are not documented. If the assumption that the systems 
work differently is true, then it logically follows that the data produced by each system will also be 
different and in different formats, but again, the differences are not well understood and are not 
documented. Ballistics analysis systems do not produce definitive matches, instead producing a 
correlation list of suggested matches. If each system works differently and consequently produces 
different data, it is a logical assumption to make, that each system will produce different correlation 
lists even using the same sample of objects. A pre-requisite to interoperability therefore, is an 
understanding of the differences in the correlation lists and also an understanding of the correlation 
algorithms and principles upon which the lists are produced. Another essential pre-requisite to 
interoperability is a thorough understanding of the differences in the images captured by each 
technology and the meta-data that is captured by the system and whether it is entered by the user or 
generated by the system. Only when these key features have been studied and documented can a 
specification be drafted to enable progress towards interoperability. 
4.1.4 The Absence of an Evidence Base on the Performance of Different Systems 
The second main reason for designing this experiment and conducting this research was that at the 
time of writing there was no published peer reviewed research that has compared two systems from 
different manufacturers using the same controlled samples of bullets and cartridge cases. There is 
research, such as that conducted by Brinck (2008) that has compared two different systems from the 
same manufacturer. Whilst providing a valuable insight into the technology examined, the two 
different systems examined by Brinck (2008) will undoubtedly have common features and 
algorithms. It is probable that systems from different manufacturers will utilise different hardware, 
software and algorithms but the extent of these differences is not understood. There are good 
reasons why different systems have not been compared using the same data set, all of which are 
valid and these are explained in this Section.  
Research in this field is difficult to undertake. Previous research conducted in this field has not only 
focussed on a single technology or manufacturer but has also been conducted by the manufacturers 
themselves (Roberge and Beauchamp, 2006). Whilst providing interesting results, these tests have 
not been independently conducted. The fact that the manufacturer of the technology carried out the 
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study, immediately introduced the possibility of bias into the eǆpeƌiŵeŶt͛s desigŶ aŶd the ƌesults. AŶ 
independent study would be designed with the specific aim of eliminating bias and controlling the 
experimental conditions. The methodology presented in this Section 4.3 of this Chapter attempts to 
rectify this situation through a controlled experimental design that is aimed to facilitate high quality 
results with any technology produced by any ballistics analysis system manufacturer.  
Table 2-7 above provides a summary of research conducted to date in this field and shows the 
system the research was conducted using and whether it was bullet or cartridge case correlation 
capability that was examined. 
4.1.5 Why have Systems from Different Manufacturers not been compared using the Same Data 
Set? 
As explained above, a major reason for undertaking the research described in this Thesis is that there 
is no peer reviewed published research examining different systems from different manufacturers 
using the same data set. There are many reasons why this has not occurred before. Many of these 
reasons are logistical and are described below. 
4.1.6 Generating a Test Set of Ammunition 
One of the main reasons is that it is very difficult to generate a test set of ammunition that is large 
enough to use in such an experiment as the one described in Section 4.3 of this Chapter. The 
ǁeapoŶs that aƌe used to geŶeƌate the test fiƌed ďullets aŶd Đaƌtƌidge Đases also haǀe to ďe ͞safe͟ 
weapons. They cannot be weapons that are either in service or are part of an on-going criminal case. 
This prevents any ethical concerns over the repeated use and examination of bullets and cartridge 
cases fired from these weapons. Laboratories that routinely undertake ballistics analysis have 
reference collections of firearms that are used for research purposes and it is these weapons that 
should be used for research of this type. However these reference collections vary in size and 
content. The time and organisational demands of generating such a test set of ammunition are 
considerable and the majority of ballistics experts have casework as their priority. 
4.1.7 Location of Ballistics Analysis System Manufacturers 
The current market situation with regards to ballistics analysis technologies also presents a problem 
because the companies that manufacture this equipment are located in different countries around 
the world such as Canada, Russia, Czech Republic, Germany and Barbados. There are inherent 
difficulties in designing such an experiment because the decision would have to be made as to 
whether to take the test ammunition to the companies or to bring the companies to the test 
ammunition. Both approaches have potential problems but also advantages and either approach 
presents logistical challenges. The market has also been dominated in recent years by a single 
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supplier so it could be argued that there has not been the will on the part of the community to 
undertake such an experiment. However the expense of ballistics analysis systems combined with 
public sector spending cuts has resulted in increased will on the part of the ballistics community to 
examine technology from different providers. 
4.1.8 Difficulties using a System Installed in a Working Laboratory 
Conducting experiments using ballistics analysis systems also presents a problem for the users of the 
systems simply because these systems were purchased for the purpose of conducting real life 
casework. Taking a system and a human operator offline when casework needs to be done presents 
an ethical dilemma because no matter how interesting or valuable the research objectives, priority is 
always given to real cases. This situation means that any research using these systems is usually 
conducted when the users have spare time and resources and consequently takes longer. There are 
also considerations that have to be taken into account such as ensuring that the test samples for the 
research are partitioned and separated from the open case file. 
4.1.9 Time it takes to acquire a Large Test Set of Ammunition 
For the results of an experiment to be valid, a relatively large sample of ammunition needs to be 
used. This presents a problem because it takes a long time to acquire a sample of ammunition using 
just one ballistics analysis system. For example, if the average time to acquire a bullet is ten minutes 
and there are 400 bullets to acquire, this would take almost two full working weeks to complete. 
Obviously the time needed increases for every additional system that is to be compared. The systems 
cannot run the experiment in parallel because there is only one test set of ammunition. 
4.1.10 Financial Implications of Conducting such an Experiment 
An experiment such as the one described in this Thesis costs money. The materials needed such as 
the test fired weapons cost money and the time of experts also incurs a cost for the organisation that 
employs them. Furthermore there are costs that the manufacturers would have to incur. These could 
be time and labour costs for their members of staff involved in the experiment, or costs relating to 
the logistics of carrying out the experiment and transporting the relevant equipment. It is probable 
that in the past these costs have proved to be prohibitive to carrying out this kind of research.  
4.1.11 Difficulties Experimenting with Systems from Different Manufacturers  
Any experiment where there is a perceived element of competition is going to create difficulties 
regardless of how well intentioned the aims of the research. It is probable that in the past, 
companies have declined to participate in such research because of commercial sensitivities that 
would inevitably arise from the eventual results.   
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The author and collaborators have faced all of the problems described in this Section and a major 
part of the work for this Thesis and the development of the experimental design was concerned with 
finding ways to overcome these problems. The ways in which these problems were overcome are 
explained later in this Chapter in Section 4.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 
 
4.2 - Background to the Experimental Research 
This section describes the background work that was undertaken prior to designing and commencing 
the experimental research. 
4.2.1 Understanding Current Ballistics Technologies that are Available  
The first stage of the work was to understand the different technologies that are available. This was 
achieved through internet based research and a review of the available literature. As a result of this 
stage of work, it quickly became apparent that a comprehensive review was needed describing the 
technologies that are currently available in terms of functionality, data produced and the sites where 
they were installed. However, there was very little information available about the systems beyond 
the marketing material produced by each company. The systems and manufacturers and the base 
countries of the manufacturers are listed in Table 4-2. As of September 2011 Table 4-2 lists all known 
the systems that are available globally. 
Table 4-2: Ballistics Analysis System Manufacturers  
System Name Manufacturer and Country where Based 
Evofinder Scannbi Technology (Germany and Russia)  
Arsenal Papillon Systems (Russia) 
IBIS Heritage Forensic Technology Inc (Canada and Republic of Ireland) 
IBIS Trax Forensic Technology Inc (Canada and Republic of Ireland) 
Poisk SBC Company Limited (Russia) 
Condor SBC Company Limited (Russia) 
Alias Pyramidal Technologies Limited (Barbados) 
Balscan Laboratory Imaging (Czech Republic) 
 
As part of the research for this Thesis meetings have been held with each manufacturer either at the 
head office of each manufacturer or at relevant industry events. These meetings were held between 
March 2009 and May 2010 and were vitally important to the Thesis because they enabled a greater 
understanding of each particular technology and they also allowed the author to assess the level of 
potential co-operation that might eventually be realised. Table 4-3 lists the meetings that have been 
held. 
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Table 4-3: List of Meetings Conducted and Manufacturers Visited 
System and Manufacturer Location of Meeting Dates of Meeting 
Evofinder  
(ScannBi Technology)  
Wiesbaden, Germany 1st-3rd April 2009 
Balscan  
(Laboratory Imaging) 
Prague, Czech Republic 22
nd
-24
th
 April 
2009 
Arsenal  
(Papillon Systems) 
Miass, Russia 3
rd
-8
th
 May 2009 
IBIS Heritage and IBIS Trax 
(Forensic Technology Inc) 
Dublin, Republic of Ireland. 6
th
-7
th
 October 
2009 
Alias  
(Pyramidal Technologies) 
Wiesbaden, Germany (at the 2009 ENFSI 
firearms working group meeting.) 
20
th
-23
rd
 October 
2009 
Condor and Poisk  
(SBC Company) 
St Petersburg, Russia. 13
th
-18
th
 May 
2010. 
 
As a result of this stage of work encompassing internet based research, the literature review and 
visits to the manufacturers, there was a clear understanding of the ballistics analysis systems 
available and the companies that manufacture them. There was not however a thorough 
understanding of the functionality of the systems and the data produced by them.   
4.2.2 Background to and Evolution of the Experimental Design 
In May 2009, the author visited one of the technology manufacturers and as a result of this visit a 
decision was made to pursue the scientific assessment and comparison on technologies in order to 
explore the opportunities for interoperability. This decision was prompted by the fact that this 
manufacturer expressed frustration at the lack of published scientific research and suggested that 
comparisons of different technologies do take place within organisations for procurement purposes 
but that the results are kept confidential. This company also supported the idea of interoperability 
between systems and were willing to engage in research to further this aim.  They also agreed to 
provide a ballistics analysis system to the author for the purpose of this PhD research. At this stage in 
the PhD, the decision was made to assess this particular technology and the market leading 
technology manufactured by Forensic Technology. The design of the experimental research was at 
this stage to examine the functionality of each system when the same sample of bullets and cartridge 
cases had been acquired to demonstrate the differences between systems and to provoke a debate 
in the community about interoperability between systems. However, before the research could start 
there were a number of practicalities to address. 
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The first issue to overcome was that of access to the two systems that were going to be assessed. 
Access to one of the systems was less problematic as the author had access to a full system provided 
by the manufacturer and an offer was made to train the author in the use of the system. Access to 
the IBIS system was more problematic. The Forensic Science Service (FSS) in the United Kingdom had 
an IBIS Heritage system and in August 2009 the FSS was approached by the author and a meeting 
was held at Trident Court, Birmingham to discuss the research and potential collaboration. The FSS 
was also approached to perform the test firing of a selection of weapons. It quickly became apparent 
that collaborating with the FSS would have financial implications because the organisation expected 
to be reimbursed for the cost of aŶǇ iŶǀolǀed sĐieŶtist͛s tiŵe aŶd aĐĐess to the IBI“ sǇsteŵ ǁould ďe 
problematic as it was still being used for casework at the time. It also became clear that timescales 
would not be agreeable between the author and the FSS. After the meeting it was decided to pursue 
alternative avenues to conduct the research. 
In August 2009, the author travelled to Wiesbaden, Germany to meet Dr Walter Wenz - head of the 
Firearms Section at the German Federal Police (BKA) at that time. Dr Wenz was also at the time the 
Chairman of the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes Firearms Working Group (ENFSI 
FWG). The ENFSI Firearms Working Group is the group for ballistics experts in Europe and conducts 
research in many areas of ballistics science. The author presented the research idea to Dr Wenz and 
as a result was invited to the ENFSI Firearms Working Group Steering Group meeting in September 
2009 to present the research and to request collaboration. This group is responsible for policy 
matters and the organisation of the annual conference. As a result of this presentation, Dr Wenz with 
the backing of the ENFSI Firearms Working Group offered to collaborate with the research by 
coordinating the test firing of weapons. These test fires were to be performed by ENFSI laboratories 
across Europe and the bullets and cartridge cases sent to Dr Wenz in Germany. The advantage of this 
was that a large sample of bullets and cartridge cases could be generated. No single laboratory had 
sufficient weapons of the same type to be viable for the experiment but collaboration with ENFSI 
resulted in weapons from multiple laboratories being utilised. The second advantage to collaboration 
with ENFSI was the offer of a dedicated laboratory within the BKA Firearms Unit where the different 
technologies could be installed and the experiment performed. This collaboration also resulted in the 
aim of getting all of the manufacturers globally to participate rather than just one of the systems and 
Forensic Technology. The author was also invited to speak at the 2009 Annual ENFSI Firearms 
Working Group Conference held in October 2009.  
At the annual ENFSI Firearms Working Group conference in October 2009 a meeting was organised 
by the author. It was known prior to the event that all of the ballistics analysis technology 
manufacturers would be in attendance therefore it was decided that it would be ideal if a meeting 
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was held between the author, Dr Walter Wenz and the manufacturers. As far as it is known, this is 
the first time that such a meeting has ever taken place. The purpose of the meeting was to explain 
the proposed research to the manufacturers, address any concerns and prompt a debate on 
interoperability between systems. The meeting was also useful in gauging the extent of potential 
cooperation from the manufacturers.  
As previously noted the author was invited to speak at the conference and presented the 
methodology of the experiment to the forensic experts gathered at the conference for two purposes. 
Firstly to gain support for collecting a large sample of ammunition that could be used for the 
experiment. The details of this sample are discussed later in this chapter. The second purpose was to 
explain the proĐess, aiŵs aŶd oďjeĐtiǀes to the ŵaŶufaĐtuƌeƌs. The daǇ ďefoƌe the authoƌ͛s 
presentation, a separate meeting was held and all of the manufacturers were in attendance. In this 
meeting, the purpose of the experiment was explained and there was a discussion between the 
manufacturers of the aims and likely results. This meeting was critical because it allowed a sense of 
potential cooperation to be assessed. All of the manufacturers besides one indicated that they would 
at the very least support the research and at this point in time all except one indicated that they 
would participate. It was only after this meeting had taken place that the detail of the experimental 
design could be addressed.  
4.2.3 Result of Research at the End of 2009 
Despite the fact that at the end of 2009 no experimental research had been conducted there was still 
considerable research that had been undertaken. Each manufacturer has been visited and a good 
understanding of the technical principles that underlie each system was gained as well as the 
countries where each technology is installed. It is noteworthy that the author is likely to be one of 
very few people globally that has conducted such meetings with all of the ballistics analysis 
technology providers globally. This is an important outcome of the research. These meetings were 
crucial to the purpose and scope of the experimental design as well as the likely level of cooperation 
from the manufacturers, many of whom were concerned about the commercial impact of the 
proposed research. However at the end of 2009 the majority of the manufacturers were cooperative 
and clearly understood and supported the aims and objectives of the research. The next section 
describes the experimental design in detail and provides a systematic description of the decisions 
made in formulating the experimental design. 
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4.3 – Experimental Design 
4.3.1 Overview of Ballistics Analysis System Workflow 
This section presents the experimental design. Before the process and variables are discussed in 
detail, an overview of the ways in which ballistics analysis systems work and are used is presented to 
provide context. The workflow is described here and is illustrated in Figure 4-1. Usage of ballistics 
analysis systems will differ slightly depending on which system is being used. However, the following 
description covers the necessary steps that are common to the systems examined in this Thesis for 
both bullets and cartridge cases.  
Firstly the object is placed on the platform of the ballistics analysis system ready to be scanned. The 
oďjeĐt should ďe plaĐed aĐĐoƌdiŶg to the ŵaŶufaĐtuƌeƌs͛ iŶstƌuĐtioŶs to eŶsuƌe the ŵaǆiŵuŵ 
amount of the object surface can be captured. For bullets, some systems used a magnetic platform 
whilst others use an adhesive surface. Other systems may have a proprietary bullet or cartridge case 
holder into which the object is placed before being scanned by the system. Depending on the system 
being used, there will be some data input required. The make, model and calibre of the weapon that 
fired the bullet are usually entered along with details about the laboratory, operator and the criminal 
case. The date and time of the scanning is also recorded and is usually automatically generated by 
the system. Once all the details of the oďjeĐt haǀe ďeeŶ eŶteƌed aŶ iŶitial ͞ƋuiĐk sĐaŶ͟ is usuallǇ 
performed returning an image of the object to the operator. This allows the positioning, focus, 
lighting and orientation to be checked before the full acquisition process begins. If the operator is 
happy with the setup, the acquisition starts. The time taken to acquire a bullet can vary between 
systems and is dependent on many variables. Examples may be the size and calibre of the bullet and 
whether or not it is damaged or a fragment of a bullet. The same applies for cartridge cases and a 
variable that is common to both cartridge cases and bullets and affects acquisition time is the 
method employed to capture the image. For example, one system may capture multiple images using 
different lighting angles whilst another system may capture fewer images with fewer lighting angles. 
A further point of variance is the way in which the bullet images are stitched together as the bullet is 
rotated and images are captured of the different sections of the surface. This also affects acquisition 
time. The time taken to acquire an object can vary quite significantly. For example, the time taken for 
bullet acquisition for BulletTrax 3D is quoted at twenty minutes (Roberge and Beauchamp, 2006) 
whilst the acquisition time for Evofinder is quoted at three minutes (Evofinder, 2011).  
Once the object has been acquired by the system, the operator will be required to highlight 
distinguishing features on the bullet or cartridge case. Depending on the system, there will be some 
level of automation. For example, the lands and grooves may automatically be highlighted to the 
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user for bullets but the striations of interest will have to be selected by the user. For cartridge cases, 
the user may have to select and highlight the breech face impression and the firing pin impression. 
The key features the user may be required to highlight will be used in the correlation process so it is 
important that the operator can identify features of interest. Once key features have been marked 
the bullet or cartridge case image is encoded and entered into the database and correlations are 
carried out against other objects already stored in the database.  
The results of the correlations are provided to the user in the form of a correlation list. This list can 
be of varying lengths. The correlation lists will have a score associated with each potential match 
however these scores are not used to determine a successful match or not. A ballistics expert may 
look at the variance between scores assigned to objects on the same list to prioritise the examination 
of the images. Usually, the system will allow the expert to view the object in question and each 
potential match side by side using image processing techniques such as contrast and overlaying to 
ǀieǁ the iŵages iŶ diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇs. “oŵe sǇsteŵs haǀe a ͞ϯD͟ ǀieǁiŶg ŵode that alloǁs the oďjeĐt to 
ďe ͞flipped͟ to see the laŶds aŶd gƌooǀes iŶ ŵoƌe detail. 
If any of the objects on the correlation list look like they might be a potential match, the ballistics 
examiner will request the actual sample to complete an examination using a comparison microscope. 
The ballistics expert will then be in a position to declare a match between objects, declare no match 
between objects or declare an inconclusive result.  
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Figure 4-1: Ballistics Analysis System Workflow Diagram 
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4.3.2 High Level Overview of the Experimental Design 
As has been previously discussed, there has never been an experiment conducted with technologies 
from different providers using the same sample of ammunition. There is also no interoperability 
between ballistics analysis technologies. Data captured using one technology cannot currently be 
exchanged or correlated with data that has been captured using another type of technology. The 
experiment explained in this Thesis was ultimately designed in order to enable a progression toward 
interoperability and technology integration.  
The process involved: 
1. The creation of a controlled data set to be used with the different technologies and to 
provoke a discussion on forensic ballistics standards; 
2. The design of a methodology to enable the use of the same data set with different 
technologies; 
3. The undertaking of an experiment with different technologies to prove the feasibility of the 
methodology and highlight areas for further discussion. 
The process involved the input of the same sample of cartridge cases and bullets into two different 
ballistics analysis systems to enable a representation of the objects to be captured using the different 
systems. As described in Section two of this chapter, the original aim was to enable all technologies 
currently available to be assessed as part of this research. However just two of the systems available 
are included in the experiment that was undertaken. The reasons for this are explained later in this 
section. This process for assessing two technologies is shown in Figure 4-1. The focus was obtaining 
the different resulting data because a thorough assessment of the data produced by each system is 
an essential pre-requisite to any work on interoperability between systems.  
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Figure 4-2: High Level Overview of the Experimental Process 
 
The experimental part of the Thesis was concerned with an assessment of eaĐh teĐhŶologǇ͛s ǁoƌk 
flow, data capture, data generation and data output attributes. In order to design standards and 
techniques to achieve interoperability there needed to be a thorough understanding of the ways in 
which each system worked. This section of work also encompassed investigating and documenting 
the different techniques and scientific principles utilised by each system. Some are based upon digital 
imaging whilst others use different techniques such as confocal microscopy. The two systems 
examined for this Thesis are both based on digital imaging. Understanding the similarities and 
differences between each technique enabled an assessment to be made as to whether or not 
interoperability would be possible. As part of this process, a detailed understanding was gained of 
the strengths of each system. It was postulated that each system would operate differently therefore 
it was logical to assume that each system would have different strengths.  
Once the bullets and cartridge cases had been acquired by each system, data was outputted. This 
data consisted of images and metadata associated with an image. The images themselves were 
different as were the number of images that were captured. The methods used to capture the 
images were a differentiating factor as was the resulting metadata associated with each image.  
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The experimental design explained in detail here has been designed so that the experiment can be 
repeated as many times as necessary using the same set of ammunition. The test set of ammunition 
has also been preserved so that the test can be run in the years ahead should any new technologies 
emerge.  
4.3.3 Experimental Design 
This section describes the experimental design in detail and the design decisions that were made. It 
would have been ideal if every single manufacturer that produces ballistics analysis technology took 
part in the research. At the beginning of the research this was the aim. With this in mind, the 
manufacturers of each technology were approached. Visits were undertaken to the companies 
between April 2009 and May 2010 and a series of meetings were held in Wiesbaden, Germany in 
October 2009 to discuss the experimental approach and these meetings were followed up with a 
written request to participate and additional telephone calls as necessary.  
Eventually due to several difficulties, only two systems were able to be studied as subjects for this 
Thesis. At this point it should be noted that the market leaders Forensic Technology Inc, 
manufacturers of the IBIS systems did not take part. The author recognises that this was somewhat 
limiting to the overall study as much of the previous research work published makes use of the IBIS 
system but as an overall study the author considered the exercise both in terms of the experimental 
design and the results produced, as valid and useful to the forensic community. 
4.3.4 Location of Research 
It was proposed that a dedicated laboratory be used at the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) in Wiesbaden, 
Germany and that each company installed their ballistics analysis system in this laboratory for the 
necessary time it would take to acquire the bullets and cartridge cases for each respective system. A 
ballistics analysis system consisted of the machine used to acquire the bullets and cartridge cases and 
the computer attached to the scanner that stored the data, housed the database and carried out the 
correlations. This approach had numerous advantages. Each manufacturer was asked to provide a 
system because this would ensure all systems participating were in good working order. Many 
systems may have been available in laboratories around Europe but using them for the purposes of 
this experiment would have been impractical because it would have resulted in the systems being 
unavailable for real casework - a situation which was not acceptable given the large backlogs of work 
that exist in some laboratories. Use of an already installed system would also result in complications 
arising from the input of experimental data into a system containing live data.  All of these systems 
require regular maintenance and a criticism that could be directed at the experimental design is that 
the systems were not calibrated sufficiently. By placing the onus on the manufacturer to provide a 
system, the responsibility resided with them to provide the system in good working order.  
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The use of a dedicated laboratory was suggested for a number of reasons. The initial approach was 
to send the test fired bullets and cartridge cases to the manufacturers. However, previous work that 
has been carried out in the field of proficiency testing had encountered problems using this 
approach. Proficiency testing is when test fired objects are examined by ballistics experts to 
determine the matches and non matches in an experimental sample. Many studies have been halted 
or left incomplete because test fires have been sent to laboratories and returned damaged or have 
been lost. To avoid this problem, it was deemed more logical to bring the technology to the test fires 
especially given the considerable time and effort taken to generate the test data set. Using the 
laboratory in the BKA also meant that an independent ballistics examiner could oversee the 
acquisition process in person rather than relying on manufacturers reporting the findings 
unobserved. This allowed for a greater level of control in the process.    
However it was recognised that realistically the only way that the technology could be transported to 
the BKA laboratory was with the consent and active involvement of the manufacturers. There were 
many reasons as to why this was the case most notably the cost of transporting the equipment to a 
different country in all cases by air. It has been recognised, as a result of this work that there might 
be a situation where there is a requirement from expert users to undertake the test using a system 
from a manufacturer that declined to participate in the experiment by travelling to the BKA and 
undertaking the test. Alternatively, it is feasible that with careful consideration and planning the test 
sample could be transported from the BKA to the laboratory of a user that wishes to undertake the 
test on a system installed in a working laboratory. However for this happen the benefits of 
undertaking the test and having the results widely available would have to significantly out weight 
the risks.  
4.3.5 Operator of Each System 
Each manufacturer was asked to provide an operator because the level of experience required to 
operate each system can vary quite dramatically. By asking the manufacturers to provide a suitably 
qualified operator, the data output should theoretically have been to a high standard and user 
generated error limited. Early in the process of designing this experiment, consideration was given to 
using the same person to perform all the inputting of objects. However, it was and still is doubtful 
that a suitably qualified person exists anywhere in the World due to the number of systems in use in 
different counties. It is possible that a single person could learn to use each system but it was felt 
that this may lead to good quality data output on some systems and lesser quality input on other 
systems. Consideration was also given to the author inputting the data into each system but it was 
felt that the author should remain impartial throughout the entire process and that by remaining 
impartial the credibility of the results would be significantly strengthened. In order to control the 
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variables that may have affected this measure, it was decided to ask the manufacturers to provide an 
operator. The rationale is that these companies know how the technology works intimately and 
would therefore be able to provide an operator that could get the best possible results out of it.  
4.3.6 Obtaining Test Fired Ammunition 
In order for the research to be controlled and scientifically valid, a relatively large sample of objects 
(bullets and cartridge cases) was required from the same make and model of weapon. The author 
had spoken to a number of firearms experts who recommended the assessment of the systems using 
ammunition fired from 9mm calibre weapons. The reason for this was that the majority of previous 
research has been conducted using database of acquired 9mm ammunition. This caused an 
immediate problem because 9mm handguns are banned in the United Kingdom. In order for a 
sample of bullets and cartridge cases to be obtained, the police or a forensic laboratory with the 
authority to carry out test fires would have had to be approached. Even if such an organisation could 
be found it would have to have a sizable number of weapons in a safe reference collection that were 
of the same make and model. A safe reference collection refers to firearms that were not in 
circulation. This avoided any ethical issues with weapons that had been used for illegal purposes. The 
weapons could also not be weapons legally used by police officers for the same reasons. 
As previously detailed, in August 2009 a meeting was held in Wiesbaden, Germany with Dr Walter 
Wenz who was the then chairman of the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) 
Firearms Working Group (FWG). The extent of the research was explained and Dr Wenz offered to 
collaborate by coordinating the test firings of the sample weapons and also allowing ballistics experts 
to provide technical assistance. Dr Wenz also offered the use of laboratory facilities at the BKA.  
In September 2009, Dr Wenz wrote to members of ENFSI across Europe asking them to provide as 
many test fires of a particular type of weapon as possible. Some members of ENFSI provided test 
fires from multiple weapons and some provided test fires from a single weapon with the aim overall 
of obtaining test fires from 220 weapons. By the end of 2009 test fires had been obtained from 196 
weapons and it was felt that this was a sufficiently large sample. 
Taking this approach solved many issues. Each person that performed the test fires was a qualified 
forensic scientist who routinely carried out test fires for the purpose of identifying weapons used in 
actual crimes. The procedures that are in place in the laboratories where the test fires have taken 
place are of a very high standard and test fires performed by these examiners are often presented as 
evidence in court. This adds a high degree of reliability to the test fires that have been provided by 
the ballistics examiners. On a practical level, the provision of these test fired objects by ENFSI 
members has meant that the author has not had to either personally perform the test fires or be 
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present whilst they are being carried out meaning that many potentially problematic health, safety 
and ethical issues have been avoided. 
4.3.7 Test Firing Process and Bullet Recovery Method 
Bullets were recovered using the following two distinctive techniques: 
 Water tank  Cotton wool 
Test firings must be conducted in a controlled environment to eliminate as many extraneous 
variables as possible. There are differences between the ways in which test firings are carried out 
between countries. Recovering cartridge cases from test fired weapons is simple; they just have to be 
picked up and logged. Bullets however are more difficult to recover. 
Heard (2008) describes the different techniques that can be used to recover bullets. Cotton or waste 
wadding can be used but striations can be damaged by the material because it is quite abrasive. High 
grade, long fibre cotton wool can also be used and is effective at preserving striations on the bullets. 
The disadvantage to this technique is that the material has to be frequently replaced and is therefore 
expensive. The alternative method of recovering bullets is to use water tanks but these can also be 
problematic. Heard (2008) discusses, in detail, the problems inherent with the utilisation of water 
tanks. Using a horizontal water tank involves firing a bullet at an angle from one end of the tank. 
Once the bullet enters the water it begins to lose velocity and recovery can therefore be difficult. The 
formation of algae in the tank can make the water tank an unpleasant environment but this can be 
tackled by adding chemicals to the water but these chemicals must not affect the markings on the 
bullets in any way. Test fires must be carried out carefully using horizontal tanks because a shallow 
shooting angle can result in bullet ricochet and damage to the tank. Similarly a steep angle can also 
result in the bullet striking the tank and causing damage. 
The intricacies involved in controlling the test firing process are important when assessing match 
probabilities and the strength of the evidence. Often, evidence is presented in court as a match 
between an object recovered at a crime scene and an object recovered from a test fired weapon. As 
the method used to recover a test fired bullet can significantly affect the striations imprinted on a 
bullet, it is important to highlight the different methods of bullet recovery. 
The choice of which bullet recovery method to use is also significant depending on the circumstances 
a particular country or laboratory faces. For example, a laboratory performing relatively few test fires 
might not need to incur the expense of installing a water tank. Conversely, a laboratory performing 
many test fires might be economically justified in installing a water tank and the associated 
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reinforcements. In practice, a combination of all methods is used in court when this type of evidence 
is presented resulting in the need to highlight the benefits, disadvantages and risks associated with 
each method. 
Ideally, the method used to produce test fires would have been the same for all 196 weapons. 
However this was impractical because many of the laboratories had different equipment installed 
and a constraint on this would have resulted in a smaller number of weapons being available. It was 
therefore decided that it was acceptable to compromise on this point and leave the test firing 
method to the discretion of the forensic scientist performing the test fires. However, the methods 
chosen were designed not to produce any damage to the bullet striation marks. 
4.3.8 Choice of Weapon 
All test fires used as part of this experiment had to be from the same make and model of firearm. 
This is because of the way in which the systems operate and the ways in which distinguishing marks 
are identified on cartridge cases and bullets. There are two types of markings on bullets and cartridge 
cases: 
1) Individual markings – These marks can identify an object fired by a particular gun and 
another object fired by the same individual gun.  
2) Classmarks – These marks can identify the make and model of weapon that fired the object. 
Distinguishing marks such as firing pin impressions can be indicative of the make and model 
of the weapon that fired it. 
All of the ballistic systems work in a similar way to generate a shortlist of objects upon which 
correlations are to be carried out. 
1) An operator enters information about the object such as calibre and ammunition type. 
Information concerning Classmarks is also entered.  
2) The system uses this information to trim the database search and generate a shortlist of 
objects already stored in the database that are to be correlated against the object in 
question. 
3) A set of heuristics are applied in this process. For example a 9mm bullet will never be 
correlated with a 7.65mm bullet.  
For example, if an object in question is known to have been fired by a Beretta 92 which is a 9mm 
weapon, the shortlist generated by the ŵaĐhiŶe ǁill oŶlǇ ĐoŶtaiŶ Beƌetta ϵϮ͛s aŶd oďjeĐts ǁhiĐh 
haǀe ͞uŶkŶoǁŶ͟ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ. A Beƌetta ϵϮ ǁould Ŷot ďe Đoŵpaƌed to aŶǇ otheƌ ŵake aŶd ŵodel of 
firearm. The reason for this is that actual correlations of images and binary data about images are 
116 
 
computationally intensive and the more correlations performed, the longer it will take to generate a 
list of results. This rationale is based on the principle that if the make and model of weapon that fired 
two different objects is different then there is no possibility that the firearms are the same and the 
objects will therefore not be matched. 
The first step in this process whereby a shortlist is generated is carried out using simple Structured 
Query Language (SQL) queries that operate against whichever Relational Database the manufacturer 
has chosen to use. The second step of image correlation uses the proprietary methods of the 
manufacturer. 
Weapons of type Beretta 92 were chosen for this experiment for multiple reasons both technical and 
logistical. Logistically, these weapons were a sensible choice because they are widely distributed in 
reference collections around Europe. Therefore access to these weapons was relatively easy unlike 
other rarer firearms. Some firearms have markings that make the objects fired from them highly 
distinguishable and some firearms have markings that make identification of objects fired from them 
very difficult. The Beretta 92 contains a complex set of marks but the marks can be identified. The 
author was also informed by ballistiĐs eǆpeƌts that ͞hits͟ haǀe ďeeŶ geŶeƌated oŶ these sǇsteŵs 
when the weapon in question is a Beretta 92. A balance needed to be achieved between making the 
correlations easy for the systems to perform and yet difficult enough to identify differences between 
the systems. After consultation with ballistics examiners, it was decided that the Beretta 92 would be 
the weapon of choice. A form was completed for each test fired weapon that provided details on the 
year of manufacturer and the serial number. 
4.3.9 Ammunition Type 
9mm parabellum full metal jacket ammunition was used for test fires. Ballistics examiners in Europe 
were asked where possible to test fire the weapons using two out of the following five brands. 
 Fiocchi  Geco  S & B  CBC   PMC 
It would have been ideal if all the test fires were conducted using the same ammunition type. 
However in practice this was not possible as different laboratories had access to different types of 
ammunition. Instead it was decided to restrict the ammunition types to five commonly used 
ammunitions types. 
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4.3.10 Preparation of Ammunition 
All of the bullets were indexed. This involved the inscription of a randomly generated four digit 
number on each cartridge case and each bullet. This four digit number enabled the known matches 
and non matches to be identified. The key will be kept confidential to enable future use of this 
dataset in a controlled manner. All of the cartridge cases and bullets were cleaned using ultrasonic 
methods. Additionally, ammonia was used to remove the dye on the cartridge cases that the 
manufacturers had marked them with. The bullets and cartridge cases were placed in groups of three 
into the ultrasonic bath for two minutes. This process was carried out as per standard operating 
procedures in the BKA and ensured that distinguishing marks on the ammunition were not obscured 
by gunshot residue or other dirt. 
4.3.11 Sample Size and Construction 
The specific details of the bullet sample and the cartridge case sample follow this paragraph. The 
number of samples in each group for bullets and cartridge cases differed slightly. The sample was 
designed like this deliberately because when designing the experiment it was decided that a list of 40 
object index numbers would be presented to each company and they would then have to decide 
whether or not the objects had matches in the database. It was decided that it would be preferential 
to avoid splitting the sample into 20 known matches and 20 known non matches to try and avoid 
making the split obvious to the companies and to try and prevent the companies ͞guessing͟ 
matches. Instead the decision was made to vary the number of known matches and known non 
matches slightly to try and control the experiment further. However, once the cartridge cases and 
bullets had been acquired it was decided that examination of the correlation lists alone would 
provide sufficient data for analysis so the companies were not asked to declare matches. The sample 
size had already been decided upon and all objects had already been acquired by the time this 
decision was made. For both bullets and cartridge cases, it was decided to include objects in the test 
set of ammunition that had no match in the database (known non matches). The rationale was to 
examine how each system handled bullets and cartridge cases with no known match in the database. 
However, the known match sample provided sufficient data for analysis. When this decision was 
taken, the sample had already been determined and acquired by each system.  
4.3.12 Details of the Bullet Sample 
Each of the 196 weapons was test fired three times to produce three bullets. The test fires were then 
split into four groups. Group 1 consisted of the known match sample. Twenty-three weapons were 
chosen at random and three test fired bullets from these twenty three weapons formed the known 
match (KM) sample. All three bullets from these twenty three weapons were acquired by each 
technology resulting in the known match sample consisting of sixty nine bullets.  One of these bullets 
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from each of the twenty three weapons was chosen at random to be the test known match bullet 
that results would be reported for and the correlation list examined.  Group 2 consisted of the known 
non match sample. Seventeen weapons were chosen at random and one bullet from the seventeen 
chosen known non match weapons was acquired. Group 3 consisted of the background sample. Two 
bullets from each of the remaining 152 weapons were inputted onto each system. This resulted in a 
background sample of 304 bullets.  Finally, Group 4 consisted of spare weapons, for which the 
ammunition was not required for the experimental sample. The test fires from these four spare 
weapons were not included in the test database. Table 4-4 provides the details of the bullet test 
database and Figure 4-3 illustrates this.  
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Table 4-4: Bullet Test Database Metrics 
 Number 
of 
Weapons 
Included  
Bullets from  
each 
weapon 
Excluded  
bullets 
from  
each 
weapon 
Total  
Included 
Bullets 
Total 
Excluded 
Bullets 
Total 
Bullets 
Group 1 Known 
Matches 
23 x3 x0 69 0 69 
Group 2 Known 
Non Matches 
17 x1 x2 17 34 51 
Group 3 
Background 
Sample 
152 x2 x1 304 152 456 
Group 4 Spare 4 x0 x3 0 12 12 
Total  196   390 198 588 
 
Figure 4-3: The Bullet Test Database 
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4.3.13 Details of the Cartridge Case Sample 
Each of the 196 weapons was test fired three times to produce three cartridge cases. The test fires 
were then split into four groups. Group 1 consisted of the known match sample. Twenty two 
weapons were chosen at random and three test fired cartridge cases from these twenty two 
weapons formed the known match (KM) sample. All three cartridge cases from these twenty two 
weapons were acquired by each technology resulting in the known match sample consisting of sixty 
six cartridge cases.  One of the cartridge cases from each of the twenty two weapons was chosen at 
random to be the test known match cartridge case that results would be reported for and the 
correlation list examined.  Group 2 consisted of the known non match sample. Eighteen weapons 
were chosen at random and one cartridge case from the eighteen chosen known non match 
weapons was uploaded to the database. Group 3 consisted of the background sample. Two cartridge 
cases from each of the remaining 153 weapons were inputted onto each system. This resulted in a 
background sample of 306 cartridge cases.  Finally, Group 4 consisted of spare weapons. The test 
fires from these three spare weapons were not included in the test database. Table 4-5 provides the 
details of the cartridge case test database and Figure 4-4 illustrates this. 
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Table 4-5: Cartridge Case Test Database Metrics 
 Number 
of 
Weapons 
Included CC 
from each 
weapon 
Excluded CC 
from each 
weapon 
Total 
Included 
CC 
Total  
Excluded 
CC 
Total 
CC 
Group 1 Known 
Matches 
22 x3 x0 66 0 66 
Group 2 Known 
Non Matches 
18 x1 x2 18 36 54 
Group 3 
Background 
Sample 
153 x2 x1 306 153 459 
Group 4 Spare 3 x0 x3 0 9 9 
Total  196   390 198 588 
 
Figure 4-4: Illustration of Cartridge Case Test Database 
 
4.3.14 Delivery of Results 
Each company was asked to ensure that all 390 bullets were correlated against everything in the 
database and that all 390 cartridge cases were correlated against everything in the database. This 
resulted in each company producing correlation lists for 390 bullets and 390 cartridge cases. Once 
these correlation lists had been received, the correlation lists for the twenty three test bullets and 
twenty two test cartridge cases were examined by the author and this enabled the results to be 
analysed. 
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4.3.15 Application of the Results to Wider Policing Issues 
In addition to the experimental research already described, the results were interpreted in the 
context of some of the wider policing issues relating to gun crime. The literature review explained 
the nature of gun crime, the problems caused to the police by gun crime and the difficulties inherent 
in preventing and detecting gun crime offences. Part of the methodology of this Thesis was the 
interpretation of the experimental results in light of some of these issues. Once the results were 
analysed and discussed in isolation, they were discussed in the context of research that has 
previously been carried out with ballistics analysis systems. The results were then interpreted and 
discussed in the context of wider policing issues relating to gun crime. One of the gaps identified in 
the literature review was the lack of multidisciplinary research that addresses gun crime from 
different perspectives. It was described how there is a lack of research that combines work in the 
forensic ballistics arena with other work in the criminology domain. A discussion of the experimental 
research in this Thesis addresses this gap by applying the results gained to wider policing problems 
specific to gun crime with the aim of generating new knowledge and approaches. The impact and 
implications of the results both positive and negative, on the police investigation of gun crime were 
discussed.  
The results of the experimental work are presented in the next Chapter. 
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Chapter 5 – Results and Discussion 
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5.1 – Results 
5.1.1 Introduction 
Recent times have seen the increasing use of ballistics analysis systems to facilitate the investigations 
of crimes involving firearms. Alongside the use of the systems, research and development has 
occurred. This has taken the form of research concerning the functionality and performance of 
ballistics analysis systems or the examination of alternative techniques to examine bullets and 
cartridge cases. The work of Tulleners (2001), De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004), George 
(2004a and 2004b), Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a and 2006b) and Brinck (2008), has led to an 
understanding of the capabilities of the IBIS suite of products whilst work such as that of Braga and 
Pierce (2004) has also led to an understanding of the impact ballistics analysis systems can have on 
the experts that use them and police investigations. The work of Xie et al (2009) and Barrett 
Tajbakhsh and Warren (2011) has described how new techniques can be applied to forensic ballistics. 
The literature review highlighted problems specific to crimes involving firearms. These problems 
included the reluctance of victims and witnesses to talk to police and the fact that often there is very 
little evidence available. This results in a situation whereby if ballistics evidence is available in the 
form of a bullet, cartridge case or a recovered firearm it can be the only evidence available. As such it 
becomes a significant part of the police investigation. In the forensic ballistics arena, ballistics 
analysis systems play a major role which can potentially reveal previously unknown links to other 
crimes.  
When this Thesis commenced there had been no research conducted on systems other than the IBIS 
Heritage and IBISTRAX 3D systems despite the fact that alternative systems were and continue to be 
installed in many countries and laboratories. There was also no interoperability between systems. 
Data could not be exchanged between systems produced by different manufacturers. Furthermore, 
there had been no work conducted to examine the possibility of interoperable systems or to lay the 
groundwork for any progress to be made towards interoperable systems. It is argued throughout this 
Thesis that the only way to progress towards interoperable systems is to gain a thorough 
understanding of the ways in which the different systems work and the data that is produced both in 
terms of the images and the accompanying data about the objects. With this phase of work 
complete, an assessment can at least be made considering the feasibility of interoperability and the 
extent to which it may be possible. With this is mind, the work in this Thesis focused on the design of 
an experiment to enable the same sample of bullets and cartridge cases to be inputted into two 
different systems to enable the similarities and differences between the systems and data to be 
observed and documented for the purposes of informing a debate on the potential for interoperable 
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systems. The contributions to knowledge of the Thesis have been the production of a test set of 
ammunition, the design of a methodology and the application of the test set and methodology to 
examine two different systems.  This Chapter presents the results of the experimental research and 
discusses the results in the context of previous work. This is both in terms of forensic ballistics and 
wider policing issues relevant to gun crime. 
5.1.2 Structure of the Results Chapter 
The previous Chapter explained the rationale of designing and undertaking experimental research 
with automated ballistics analysis systems. The previous Chapter also explained in detail the 
experimental design. This Chapter describes the results that were obtained from the experimental 
research. The current section (5.1) serves as an introduction, placing the results in context and 
explaining some of the key points and principles which underpin the results. Section 5.2 describes 
the bullet results and section 5.3 describes the cartridge case results. A discussion is conducted in 
section 5.4 on the definition of an error rate for ballistics analysis systems using the current results.  
5.1.3 Explanation of Key Points 
On completion of the experiment, each company that participated delivered the results which 
consisted of the correlation lists and scores for each of the 390 bullets and 390 cartridge cases. The 
results were delivered as either an excel file or a CSV
14
 file. Each bullet and cartridge case was 
inscribed with a four digit index number that allowed the matches and non matches to be clearly 
identified but also allowed the sample to be randomised. The results consisted of a correlation list for 
each of the 390 bullets and 390 cartridge cases and each correlation list could be identified and 
attributed to a bullet or cartridge case by the four digit index number. The correlation lists for the 
predetermined test objects (23 bullets and 22 cartridge cases) were then examined to ascertain 
where the two known matches were ranked. 
Each system correlates a questioned object with the other objects in the database and generates a 
correlation score for the comparison of the two objects. This score is then used to generate a 
correlation list where objects are ranked for similarity based on the correlation scores. For example 
consider test bullet A. This bullet is correlated separately with bullets B, C and D in the database.  
When bullet A is compared and correlated with each bullet the following scores are generated: 
 Bullet A compared to Bullet B = 0.567  Bullet A compared to Bullet C = 0.678  Bullet A compared to Bullet D = 0.234 
                                                          
14
 CSV stands for comma separated value. This is a text based file that can be imported into Excel.  
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Therefore, the correlation list for bullet A would be generated using the above scores to rank the 
bullets in order of similarity to bullet A and would be as follows: 
Table 5-1: Bullet A Correlation List (Example) 
Correlation List Position Object Score 
1 C 0.678 
2 B 0.567 
3 D 0.234 
 
Once bullet A has been compared to the other bullets in the database, the process would be 
repeated for bullet B, then for bullet C and finally for bullet D allowing four separate correlation lists 
to be generated – one for bullet A, bullet B, bullet C and bullet D. It should be noted that the 
correlation scores presented by the systems are not traditional correlation coefficients and they are 
not measures of statistical significance. They are scores generated by the proprietary algorithms of 
each system and therefore can only be considered in the context of the system that generated the 
score. This point is made by Cork et al (2008:126) albeit referring to the IBIS Heritage system:  
͞The seĐoŶd ďasiĐ flaǁ is the use of the terŵ ͞ĐorrelatioŶ͟ to desĐriďe the IBI“ ĐoŵparisoŶ 
process, which imputes to the system an unjustified air of technical exactness. The common, 
statistical use of the term implies a particular type of relationship and quantifies the strength 
of that relationship. IŶ ĐoŵparisoŶ, IBI“ sĐores are desĐriďed ďǇ the sǇsteŵ’s oǁŶ traiŶiŶg 
materials as having no intrinsic value, severely limiting the ability to express the strength of 
similarity between two exhibits and to compare results across differeŶt ruŶs of the sǇsteŵ.͟ 
The only point of known similarity between the systems examined in this Thesis concerns the range 
of the scores. Each system generates correlation scores in the range of 0 to 1 where a score of 1 
would represent a greater similarity than a score of 0. Although bullets have been used to explain the 
correlation list generation procedure above, the same procedure also applies to cartridge cases. It is 
for the above reasons that the correlation scores are not considered but instead the correlation list 
positions are used for analysis. The correlation scores can be found for all the test bullets and 
cartridge cases in Appendix one.   
There were twenty three bullets selected to be test bullets and twenty two cartridge cases selected 
to be test cartridge cases. The four digit index number for each of the twenty three bullets and 
twenty two cartridge cases was used to identify the correlation list of each object. The two known 
matches in the database for each of the test objects can also be identified by a four digit index 
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number and it was this number that identified the object on each correlation list. Because the four 
digit index numbers can be used to identify the objects, the matches and the non matches in the 
database, they are not used in the presentation and discussion of the results. Instead, each test 
bullet or cartridge case is labelled with a number (1 to 23 for bullets and 1 to 22 for cartridge cases) 
and the post-fix A. The two known matches are labelled with the same number and the post-fix B and 
C respectively.  
On receipt of the results, the correlation lists for each of the twenty three cartridge cases and twenty 
two bullets were examined to ascertain the positions on the correlation lists of the two known 
matches for each bullet or cartridge case. The correlation lists for each of the two different systems 
were examined to enable the correlation lists to be compared for the same object for each different 
system. The two companies that participated in the experiment did so under a confidentiality 
agreement therefore the systems are not identified and are instead referred to as system A and 
system B.  
5.1.4 Potential for Statistical Analysis of the Results 
Consideration was given to carrying out statistics analyses on the results generated by each system. 
OŶe ĐoŶsideƌed ŵeasuƌe ǁas a PeaƌsoŶ͛s ƌaŶk oƌdeƌ ĐoƌƌelatioŶ aŶalǇsis.  A PeaƌsoŶ͛s ĐoƌƌelatioŶ 
coefficient is a measure of the strength of the relationship between two variables. Consideration was 
given to undertaking analysis of the correlation list positions and correlation scores of the highest 
known match for each of the test objects to ascertain whether or not there was a statistically 
significant relationship between correlation list position and correlation scores for known match 
objects.  
However after careful consideration it was thought that this was not appropriate and could generate 
potentially misleading results for the following reasons. The first relates to the ways in which the 
systems work and the correlation scores that are generated by each system. It was described above 
how the correlations scores generated by each system are not traditional correlation coefficients but 
are generated by proprietary algorithms to each system. Cork et al (2008) implied that the use of the 
term correlation is somewhat misleading. Instead the correlation scores should be considered more 
as similarity score between two objects generated for the sole purpose of ranking objects for relative 
similarity. Consequently, the correlation scores cannot be compared between systems. A further 
point is that each correlation score is only relative to the current questioned object. For example, 
consider object 1A that has a match in the database (object 1B). The correlation algorithm generates 
a score of 0.513 and this places object 5B at position 1 on the correlation list as the correlation 
procedure has not rated any other objects as being more similar. Now consider object 2A which has a 
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further match (2B) in the database. The correlation procedure generates a correlation score of 0.634 
and places object 2B at position 2 as there was an additional non matching object that the 
correlation procedure scored more highly. This shows that the generated correlation scores are only 
relative to the questioned object and should not be compared between objects in the same system. 
This undermines the case for conducting statistical analyses on the correlation scores even within the 
same system. The fact that the integrity of the generated correlation scores is low and is recognised 
as such by users and the manufacturers again undermines the case for conducting statistical 
analyses.  
The second reason for not conducting statistical analyses relates to the ways in which the systems 
are used and research that has previously been conducted. Research conducted previously 
examining more than one system (Brinck, 2008) did not include any statistical analysis of generated 
correlation scores for the reasons described above. Correlation list positions and percentage success 
rates have been the chosen medium by which the results have been communicated to the ballistics 
community for the reason that this way of describing the results is clearly understood. Reporting the 
correlation list positions and percentage success rates for an experiment that is clearly described is 
an objective way of reporting the experience of using a particular system. There is also widespread 
reluctance by users of these systems to attach any significance to the correlation scores. It is for this 
reason that measures of statistical significance were through inappropriate as the lack of coherence 
of the correlation scores is widely recognised.  
If PeaƌsoŶ͛s ĐoƌƌelatioŶ ĐoeffiĐieŶt ǁas ĐalĐulated, any conclusions drawn from this measure of 
statistical significance would be severely hindered by the fact that the correlation algorithms that 
generate the scores are proprietary methods that were not shared with the author or indeed with 
any other party. Any conclusions would have been affected by the fact that no comment could be 
made on the methods utilised to generate the scores therefore any conclusion would be affected by 
a high level of uncertainty and speculation.  
It was also felt that reporting of the correlation list positions, percentage success rates and 
percentage error rates in a similar fashion to previous research would provide ample discussion 
points. Reporting the percentage success rates has also allowed the current results to be compared 
to results from previous research. This follows in sections 5.2.4 and 5.3.4.  
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5.1.5 Explanation of terms used 
Thƌoughout this Đhapteƌ the teƌŵ ͞peƌfeĐt ƌesult͟ is used. This ƌefeƌs to a ƌesult ǁheƌe the tǁo 
matching objects to the test object were correlated at positions one and two.  
Thƌoughout this Chapteƌ the teƌŵ ͞opposite ƌesult͟ is also used. This ƌefeƌs to a ƌesult ǁheƌe oŶe of 
the systems has correlated the two matching objects in one particular order whilst the other system 
has correlated the same objects in the opposite relative order. Consider the following example for 
bullet AA. Bullet AA has two known matches in the database (bullet BB and bullet CC). System A may 
have correlated matching bullet BB at position 1 above matching bullet CC in position 2. System B 
however has correlated bullet BB at position 2 below bullet CC at position 1. Table 5-2 shows the two 
example correlation lists and demonstrates the opposite relative order that the bullets have been 
correlated in by each system. 
Table 5-2: Example Correlation Lists for Example Bullet AA to Demonstrate Use of the Term 
͞Opposite Order͟. 
Correlation List Position System A System B 
1 Bullet BB Bullet CC 
2 Bullet CC Bullet BB 
3 Other non-match bullet  Other non-match bullet 
4 Other non-match bullet Other non-match bullet 
n Other non-match bullet Other non-match bullet 
 
The results for the bullets and cartridge cases are discussed separately. Whilst there are common 
findings between the bullet and cartridge case results, the different nature of the objects and the 
intricacies in the data acquisition and correlation procedures necessitated separate discussion. 
Separate discussion was also thought necessary as some laboratories will primarily focus on bullet 
examinations rather than cartridge case examinations and vice versa. Separating bullets and 
cartridge cases allows greater specificity and avoids generalisations.  
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5.2 – Bullet Results 
Table 5-3 shows the results for the bullet analysis condition and is the basis for the discussions in this 
chapter. This table shows the correlation list positions for both known matching bullets for both 
system A and system B. Where there is no correlation list position given, this means the system did 
not correlate the matching bullets on the correlation list. The full results including a description of 
the results for each individual test bullet can be found in Appendix one. 
Table 5-3: Bullet Results Matrix 
 
KNOWN MATCH 1 
 
KNOWN MATCH 2 
 
 
Test 
Index  
Known 
Match 
Object 
(1) 
System  
A 
Position 
(KM1) 
System 
B 
Position 
(KM2) 
Known 
Match 
Object 
(2) 
System  
A 
Position 
(KM2)  
System  
B 
Position 
(KM2) 
1 1A 1B 1 1 1C 2 
 
2 2A 2B 2 1 2C 1 8 
3 3A 3B 1 2 3C 2 1 
4 4A 4B 2 1 4C 1 2 
5 5A 5B 1 1 5C 2 2 
6 6A 6B 2 2 6C 1 1 
7 7A 7B 1 1 7C 2 
 
8 8A 8B 2 2 8C 1 1 
9 9A 9B 1 1 9C 2 2 
10 10A 10B 
  
10C 
  
11 11A 11B 1 1 11C 2 2 
12 12A 12B 1 
 
12C 17 
 
13 13A 13B 1 
 
13C 2 3 
14 14A 14B 1 
 
14C 2 8 
15 15A 15B 2 
 
15C 20 
 
16 16A 16B 1 1 16C 2 2 
17 17A 17B 57 
 
17C 107 
 
18 18A 18B 1 1 18C 2 2 
19 19A 19B 1 
 
19C 6 
 
20 20A 20B 78 
 
20C 
  
21 21A 21B 6 
 
21C 11 10 
22 22A 22B 2 2 22C 1 1 
23 23A 23B 1 
 
23C 37 
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The results in Table 5-3 can be used to discuss a range of issues relevant to ballistics analysis systems 
when correlating bullets. These are discussed below. Some of these concern the performance of the 
systems, whilst others concern the interaction between the systems and the users. The first two 
topics discussed are the results that demonstrate agreement and disagreement between the two 
systems.  
5.2.1 Bullets - Agreement between Systems 
As previously described, one of the aims of this Thesis was to use the results generated by the 
systems to inform a debate as to whether or not interoperability between systems is possible. It was 
argued that a prerequisite for interoperability is an understanding of the ways in which the systems 
work and the data they produce. The extent to which there is agreement between the systems is one 
way of assessing the data produced by the systems in the context of potential interoperability. If 
there are some forms of agreement between the results produced by the systems then this is a 
favourable result in terms of interoperable systems. If however, there is clear disagreement between 
the systems, then this could point towards the difficulties of implementing interoperable systems 
and perhaps suggest that interoperability is not possible. 
The results obtained for the two systems for bullets highlight some important points relating to this. 
The results show that the systems are capable of producing identical results in terms of correlation 
list positions. Table 5-3 shows complete agreement between the systems for bullets 5A, 6A, 8A, 9A, 
11A, 16A, 18A and 22A. Both systems found both known matches in the top two positions and both 
known matches were found in the same positions for both systems. There was also agreement 
between the systems for object 10A because neither system found the matching bullets or produced 
a correlation list. This suggests that there are common features and functionalities between system A 
and system B when capturing and correlating bullets that would support the case for interoperable 
systems. 
5.2.2 Bullets - Disagreement between Systems  
As previously noted, the extent to which there is agreement between the systems is an important 
variable when considering the extent to which interoperable systems may be possible. Agreement 
thus far has referred to the systems correlating the same bullets in the exact same positions on the 
correlation lists. Just as important for informing the debate on interoperability is the extent to which 
there is clear disagreement between the systems. 
Table 5-3 shows that there are occasions (results for bullets 2A, 3A, 4A, 13A, 14A and 21A) where 
there is clear disagreement between the systems. The results are inconsistent and suggest that the 
systems are working in different ways. Taking the result for bullet 2A demonstrates this point. 
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System A has correlated bullet 2B in position 2 and bullet 2C in position 1. System B however has 
correlated bullet 2B in position 1 and bullet 2C in position 8. If the correlation and ranking of the 
objects was only determined by the quality of marks and ammunition type then it would be expected 
that the systems would perform consistently in relation to the ranking of the bullets. This means that 
it would be expected that regardless of the actual correlation list position the consistent result would 
be that bullet B was correlated higher than bullet C for both systems. However the results for bullets 
2A, 3A, 4A, 13A, 14A and 21A have shown that this is not the case. This demonstrates that there may 
be an interaction between the key variables of ammunition type, quality of the striations on the 
bullet, data acquisition procedures and correlation procedures. It is suggestive of these variables 
affecting the results generated by each system.  
5.2.3 Bullet Accuracy – Success Rate Scores 
The teƌŵ ͞aĐĐuƌaĐǇ͟ ĐaŶ ďe used to desĐƌiďe ŵaŶǇ of the ƌesults oďtaiŶed thƌough eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of 
the systems. For coherence, different types of accuracy are discussed here. In this section, the 
accuracy in terms of success rate of the systems is analysed. This refers to the percentage of 
occasions where a bullet or bullets was found on correlation lists of varying lengths. The results 
presented in Table 5-3 were used to calculate percentage success rate scores. The correlation lists 
were examined for each test bullet to ascertain the position of the highest placed bullet out of the 
two known matches. This was used to calculate the percentage success rate that is subsequently 
referred to as correlating one out of the two known matches. 
Table 5-4 shows the percentage success rate for the highest placed known match for bullets on 
correlation lists of varying lengths. It should be noted that there will be occasions where the second 
matching bullet has also been correlated in the top twenty. This is discussed below in the section on 
success rates for finding both known matches. There will also be occasions where the second 
matching bullet has been correlated outside the top twenty. 
Table 5-4:  Success Rate Percentage for system A and system B finding 1 Known Match and 
Correlation List Length 
Correlation List Length System A % System B % 
Top 1 78.26% 56.52% 
Top 3 82.61% 60.87% 
Top 5 82.61% 60.87% 
Top 10 86.96% 69.56% 
Top 20 86.96% 69.56% 
 
Table 5-4 suggests that overall system A performed better with a success rate percentage of 78.26% 
for finding one of the two objects in the top position compared to 56.52% for system B. The 
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percentage success rate for finding one of the two matches in the top 20 was 86.96% and 69.56% for 
system A and System B respectively. Interestingly both systems display no difference in success rate 
for correlation lists of ten objects in length or twenty objects in length when finding one of the two 
known matches. This finding is discussed later in this Chapter in the section on correlation list 
lengths. Figure 5-1 below shows the result presented in Table 5-4 and allows the differences and 
similarities between the systems to be observed. This graph clearly shows that for both systems 
percentage success rate increased as correlation list length increased but only up to correlation lists 
with ten bullets. There was no increase in performance to be gained by increasing the correlation list 
length to twenty bullets. 
Figure 5-1: Comparison of System A and System B Success Rate finding 1 Known Match and 
Correlation List Length 
 
Table 5-5: Success Rate Percentage for system A and system B finding Both Known Matches and 
Correlation List Length 
Correlation List Length System A % System B % 
Top 2 65.22% 43.48% 
Top 3 65.22% 43.48% 
Top 5 65.22% 43.48% 
Top 10 69.57% 47.83% 
Top 20 82.61% 47.83% 
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Table 5-5 compares the success rate percentage for system A and B when finding both known match 
bullets on correlation lists of varying lists. This table suggests that overall system A performed better 
with a success rate percentage of 65.22% for finding both bullets in the top 2 positions compared to 
43.38% for system B. The percentage success rate for both known matches in the top 20 was 82.61% 
and 47.83% for system A and system B respectively.  
Figure 5-2: Comparison of system A and system B Success Rate finding Both Known Matches and 
Correlation List Length 
 
 
Figure 5-2 visualises the results presented in Table 5-5 and shows that for both systems the success 
rate for finding both bullets stays the same for correlation lists that are two, three and five bullets in 
length. The success rate for system A rises to 69.57% for a correlation list of ten bullets compared to 
a success rate of 47.83% for system B. For a correlation list of twenty bullets the success rate for 
system A rises sharply to 82.61% whilst remaining at 47.83% for system B. This result has implications 
for the recommended correlation list length and is discussed in a later section of this Chapter. The 
next section of this chapter discusses the results in the context of research that has been conducted 
with the bullet correlation functionality of ballistics analysis systems.  
5.2.4 Bullet Accuracy - Comparison with Previous Research 
Brinck (2008) examined the IBIS Heritage system and the IBIS BulletTRAX 3D system with bullets fired 
from consecutively manufactured barrels. The success rates of systems A and B can be considered 
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alongside the results of Brinck (2008) to assess any significant similarities and differences between 
IBIS Heritage, IBIS BulletTRAX 3D, system A and system B. Brinck (2008) found that for copper-
jacketed bullets IBIS Heritage correlated 90% of the test bullets in the top position. The remaining 
10% of bullets were correlated in positions eleven to twenty. The results for BulletTRAX 3D showed 
that 100% of the test bullets were correlated in the top position. For lead jacketed bullets, IBIS 
Heritage correlated 30% of test bullets in the top ten positions with the remaining 70% falling outside 
the top twenty. The results for BulletTRAX 3D showed that 70% of test bullets were correlated in the 
top position with the remaining 30% being correlated in the top ten. Unfortunately Brinck (2008) 
does not provide exact correlation list positions so the results cannot be compared in the exact same 
way to the present results. 
 
Nennsteil and Rahm (2006b) also conducted research examining the bullet correlation function of 
IBIS Heritage and quoted a success rate of between 50% and 75% for bullet comparisons. The success 
rate refers to the percentage of occasions where the match was found in the top five positions. 
Unfortunately Nennsteil and Rahm (2006b) do not include a breakdown of the exact correlation list 
positions so the results cannot be compared in exactly the same way. Table 5-6 provides a summary 
of the current results for system A and system B with the previous work of Nennsteil and Rahm 
(2006b) and Brinck (2008). It should be noted that the methodologies employed by Nennsteil and 
Rahm (2006b) and Brinck (2008) were different to the methodology employed here so the results 
should not be interpreted as a strict comparison. Differentiating variables include the database size 
and weapon type used by Brinck (2008) and Nennsteil and Rahm (2006b).  Other research conducted 
on IBIS Heritage and IBIS BulletTRAX (Argaman, Shoshani and Hocherman, 2001; Giverts, 2004) does 
not quote success rate scores and instead focuses on recommendations relating to the usability of 
the systems.  
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Table 5-6: Comparison on the results of this Thesis with prior Research 
 Success 
Rate 
Top 1 
Success 
Rate 
Top 5 
Success 
Rate 
Top 10 
System A 1 out of 2 Known Matches 78.26% 82.61% 86.96% 
System A Both Known Matches (Top 2) 65.22% 65.22% 65.22% 
System B 1 out of 2 Known Matches 56.52% 60.87% 60.87% 
System B Both Known Matches (Top 2) 43.48% 43.48% 43.48% 
IBIS Heritage Copper Jacketed Bullets (Brinck, 2008). 90%  100% 
IBIS Heritage Lead Jacketed Bullets (Brinck, 2008)   30% 
IBIS Heritage (Nennsteil and Rahm, 2006b)  50% - 75%  
IBIS BulletTRAX 3D Copper Jacketed Bullets (Brinck (2008)  100%   
IBIS BulletTRAX 3D Lead Jacketed Bullets (Brinck, 2008) 70%  100% 
 
5.2.5 Bullet Accuracy – ͞Miss͟ Rate 
The ͞Miss͟ ‘ate IŶ this Thesis is used to desĐƌiďe those oĐĐasioŶs ǁheƌe one or both known matching 
bullets were correlated outside the top twenty positions on the list or not correlated at all.  This 
terminology is in keeping with previous research (Tulleners, 2001) and the rationale is that these 
objects would be unlikely to be discovered in real case work so are laďelled as a ͞ŵiss͟ as opposed to 
a ͞hit͟ ǁheƌe the ďullet is aĐtuallǇ fouŶd. The accuracy of systems in terms of the number of misses 
is important. Consider a similar application in another area of forensic science, that of DNA 
identification. If a DNA sample is loaded onto a National DNA database and no matches are returned, 
then the investigating officer can be confident that there is not a matching sample on the database. 
A police officer on receipt of a result from a ballistics analysis system that states there are no 
matches in the database cannot be confident to the same degree as in other areas of forensic 
science. 
Table 5-5 shows that when finding both known matches in the top twenty, system A achieved a 
success rate percentage of 82.61%. This result reversed shows that on four occasions (17.39%) one or 
both known matching bullets were correlated outside the top twenty. For three of the test bullets, 
both known matches were correlated outside the top twenty or not at all (bullets 10A, 17A and 20A). 
For bullet 23A, one of the two bullets was correlated outsider the top twenty (bullet 23B at position 
1 and bullet 23C at position 37). For system B there were twelve occasions where one or both known 
match bullets were correlated outside the top twenty - 52.17%.  Both known match bullets were 
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correlated outside the top twenty or not at all for bullets 10A, 12A, 15A, 17A, 19A, 20A and 23A. One 
of the two matching bullets was correlated outsider the top twenty for bullets 1A, 7A, 13A, 14A and 
21A
15
.  
The results regarding the miss percentages for systems A and B suggest that it is difficult for a 
ballistics examiner or police officer to comprehensively and definitively know that there are or are 
not links to other crimes in the databases of automated ballistics analysis systems. Much of the focus 
of using ballistics analysis systems to generate leads for police investigations may be to link crimes 
together through ballistics evidence. It is equally important to definitively know that there are no 
links to other crimes. Whilst the results for bullets suggest that ballistics analysis systems may reveal 
previously unknown links to other crimes on some occasions, it cannot be said that they can 
definitively rule out links to other crimes. Consider the result for both systems for bullet 10A. Neither 
system has correlated either of the two matching bullets. This may lead a ballistics examiner to 
report that there are no matches to other ballistics exhibits in the database. This would be a false 
conclusion. Consider the impact on a police investigation. The worst and incorrect interpretation of 
this result would be that the weapon involved in a shooting has not been used previously before. The 
correct interpretation is that there is no evidence in hand to suggest the weapon has been used 
previously before. There are links in the database but neither system has been able to successfully 
correlate the matching bullets. There is a subtle but important difference in definitively knowing 
there is no match is a database compared to assuming there is no match because a match has not 
been found. 
Ballistics analysis systems are used to check for links between crimes based on ballistics evidence. 
The accuracy of systems both in terms of success rates and miss rates directly affects the success of 
this approach. A system that is known to be highly accurate will generate higher confidence in the 
results than a system than is known or thought to be less accurate. The issue is that accuracy levels, 
resultant confidence levels and the factors that affect accuracy and confidence levels are not widely 
known or published for the ballistics analysis systems examined in this Thesis. The next section 
discusses the accuracy of the systems in terms of those occasions where a known non-matching 
bullet or bullets were presented above the known matching object. An analysis of those occasions 
ǁheƌe a ͞false positiǀe͟ ƌesult has ďeeŶ geŶeƌated aƌe iŵpoƌtaŶt ǁheŶ assessiŶg the output of the 
systems.  
                                                          
15
 For test bullet 10A, neither system correlated the two known matching bullets. Neither system produced a 
correlation list. Therefore this bullet is included in the percentage of occasions where the systems did not 
Đoƌƌelate the kŶoǁŶ ŵatĐhes ;the ͞ŵiss͟ peƌĐeŶtageͿ.  
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5.2.6 Bullet Accuracy – False Positives 
The performance of ballistics analysis systems is directly related to policing issues. The time taken by 
ballistics examiners to produce potential leads, evidence or intelligence can be critical to an 
investigation. The ballistics analysis systems that are employed impact on this through the accuracy 
levels and the resultant time that it takes to examine the bullets on the correlation list. Time is often 
the most critical variable in police investigations and generally, the sooner evidence is available the 
better. Results where non-matching bullets have been presented in a higher correlation list position 
than known matching bullets are important. They make the task of the examiner more complex and 
theoretically their presence may lead a ballistics examiner to reach a false conclusion. The presence 
of non-matching objects in positions above the actual match may also increase the time it takes for 
aŶ eǆaŵiŶeƌ to fiŶd the aĐtual ŵatĐh, effeĐtiǀelǇ ĐƌeatiŶg ͞Ŷoise͟ iŶ the ƌesults. These faĐtoƌs Đould 
potentially waste investigation time and create confusion in the investigation if matches were falsely 
declared based on the correlation list results. Every non-matching bullet that is presented above a 
known matching bullet has to be considered and discounted before the known matching bullet is 
found. 
Where the result for a test bullet is not a perfect match then by definition, there has been a non-
matching bullet or bullets presented as being more similar than the actual known matching bullet or 
bullets. The results in Table 5-3 show that both systems correlated non-matching bullets in a higher 
position than the actual matching bullet on multiple occasions. System A correlated non-matching 
bullets above the actual matching bullets on seven occasions (bullets 12A, 15A, 17A, 19A, 20A 21A 
and 23A). System B correlated non-matching bullets above the actual matching bullets on 13 
occasions (bullets 1A, 2A, 7A, 10A, 12A, 13A, 14A, 15A, 17A, 19A, 20A, 21A and 23A)
16
. These results 
are used to define an error rate for the systems. This is discussed in a later section of this Chapter. 
There is the potential for these results to mislead a firearms examiner into declaring a false positive 
match. The extent to which this may actually happen is not known. There is an important finding with 
regards to the number of non-matching bullets ranked higher than the actual matching bullets. 
Generally system B produces correlation lists smaller in length than system A for bullet correlations.  
Table 5-7 shows the correlation list lengths for each of the test bullets and a count of the number of 
non-matching bullets presented in a higher correlation list position than the actual matching bullets. 
This is referred to as the number of false positives presented by each system. 
                                                          
16
 For bullet 10A neither system correlated the two known matches. However both systems did not produce a 
correlation list. This means that there were no false positives produced for object 10A because no bullets were 
correlated at all.  
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Table 5-7: Correlation List Length and the number of False Positives presented by each system 
 
Test 
Index 
System A 
Correlation List 
Length 
System B 
Correlation List 
Length 
System A 
Number of 
False Positives 
System B 
Number of 
False Positives 
1 1A 187 17 0 16 
2 2A 193 8 0 6 
3 3A 194 22 0 0 
4 4A 193 46 0 0 
5 5A 194 34 0 0 
6 6A 193 6 0 0 
7 7A 194 14 0 13 
8 8A 194 38 0 0 
9 9A 188 12 0 0 
10 10A 0 0 0 0 
11 11A 194 25 0 0 
12 12A 175 1 15 1 
13 13A 193 9 0 8 
14 14A 186 15 0 14 
15 15A 184 11 18 11 
16 16A 193 23 0 0 
17 17A 192 4 105 4 
18 18A 194 25 0 0 
19 19A 186 3 4 3 
20 20A 186 10 185 10 
21 21A 186 17 9 16 
22 22A 194 12 0 0 
23 23A 187 10 35 10 
    Total  = 371 
 
Total = 112 
 
  
Table 5-7 demonstrates that when system A seems to outperform system B in terms of finding the 
matching bullets, the fact that often the second matching bullet has been correlated by system A at a 
fairly low position means that the number of higher ranking non-matching objects is greater than 
those generated by system B which has not correlated the bullet at all. Consider the results for object 
17A an extract for which is shown in Table 5-8 and Table 5-9. 
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Table 5-8: Results for Bullet 17A 
 
Test 
Index  
Known 
Match 
Object (1) 
System  
A 
Position 
(KM1) 
System B 
Position 
(KM2) 
Known 
Match 
Object (2) 
System  
A Position 
(KM2)  
System  
B Position 
(KM2) 
17 17A 17B 57 No  
Correlation 
17C 107 No 
Correlation 
 
Table 5-9: Correlation List Length and False Positives for Bullet 17A 
 
Test 
Index 
System A 
Correlation 
List Length 
System B 
Correlation List 
Length 
System A 
Number of 
False Positives 
System B 
Number of 
False Positives 
17 17A 192 4 105 4 
 
The extract in Table 5-8 shows that system A correlated bullet 17B in position 57 and bullet 17C in 
position 107. This table also shows that system B correlated neither bullet. Table 5-9 shows system A 
produced a correlation list for bullet 17A that contained 192 bullets. System B produced a correlation 
list containing only four bullets. Because the matching bullets were correlated at such low positions 
by system A, it is unlikely that these matches would be detected. It is likely that a ballistics examiner 
would examine the top twenty objects to not find a match. Consider the same ballistics examiner 
using system B. As the correlation list only contains four bullets, they would at most examine four 
bullets to realise that there was not a match on the correlation list. There is a trade-off between 
correlating the matching bullets at low positions versus not correlating the bullets at all.  
5.2.7 Bullets - Overall Accuracy of the Systems  
The results of the experiment have revealed that the systems work differently and produce different 
results. Although the data acquisition principles are the same (digital camera images) the specifics of 
the acquisition process such as image resolution, focus, and lighting will presumably differ. 
Presumably, the data is also treated differently by each system and the correlation algorithms are 
different. The variance in the results was therefore expected. However, the nature and 
characteristics of the variance is a discussion point of interest. For the bullet condition the two 
systems produced an identical result in terms of correlation list positions for 8 out of the 23 test 
bullets examined (bullets 5A, 6A, 8A, 9A, 11A, 16A, 18A and 22A). Conversely, this result 
demonstrates that there were fifteen occasions where the systems did not produce identical results. 
This suggests the systems treat the measured data differently and consequently produce different 
results.  
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The results clearly show that neither system is completely accurate (and it should be noted that the 
manufacturers do not make this claim). Recall that each test bullet had two matches in the database 
and the results indicate that both systems perform better when finding one out of the two matches 
rather than both matches. For bullets and finding one out of the two matches in the top twenty, 
system A achieved a success rate percentage of 86.96% and system B achieved a percentage of 
56.52%. Comparing this to the percentage success rates of 65.55% (system A) and 43.48% (system B) 
when finding both known matches shows the drop in accuracy and clearly demonstrates that in both 
conditions, bullets that are known not to match are being placed in higher positions on the 
correlation list that the actual known matching bullets.   
The teƌŵ ͞peƌfeĐt ƌesult͟ ǁas ĐoiŶed to ƌepƌeseŶt those oĐĐasioŶs ǁheƌe eitheƌ sǇsteŵ Đoƌƌelated 
both known matches in the top two positions. For the bullet condition, the systems achieved a 
perfect result on 65.22% (system A) and 43.48% (system B) of occasions. This shows that on 34.78% 
and 56.52% of occasions respectively the systems did not produce a perfect result. Non-matching 
bullets were presented to the user in higher positions that known matching objects on multiple 
occasions. The accuracy of the systems is discussed in terms of error rate calculations in a later 
section of this Chapter. The next part of this section discusses the different lengths of correlation lists 
that are examined and uses the evidence generated in this thesis to make practical suggestions.  
5.2.8 Bullets – Ammunition Type 
The test fired bullets were generated by multiple laboratories by many different individuals. 
Although, the type of ammunition was specified, when the test fired ammunition was delivered, the 
bullets were not labelled accordingly. Unlike cartridge cases which have a headstamp identifying the 
ammunition type, there is no easy way to identify the bullet ammunition type. It was expected that 
the different types of ammunition would affect the results but it was not possible to examine this 
variable for bullets. An analysis of the effect of ammunition type on the cartridge case results is 
conducted in a later section of this Chapter.  
5.2.9 Bullets - Correlation List Length 
One of the aims of the Thesis was to conduct multidisciplinary research. A further aim was to discuss 
the results in the context of wider policing issues. One such issue is the impact ballistics analysis 
systems can have on police investigations of gun crime. There are a number of aspects relating to the 
ways in which ballistics analysis systems are used that are relevant.  The time taken to uncover 
potential links to other crimes through the use of a ballistics analysis system is an example. As a 
ballistics expert will have to manually examine a list of potential matches, the capability of ballistics 
systems to correlate the known matches at high positions on the correlation list is a key finding. 
There is a trade-off between the number of bullets that need to be examined and the matches that 
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are actually discovered. Knowing the likelihood of a match being discovered given the examination of 
all bullets on a correlation list of any particular length is important for both ballistics experts and the 
police.  
There are no standards in place to determine what the length of the correlation list should be. The 
IBIS training manual suggests it should contain ten objects. Other researchers have suggested 
different lengths. Silverwater and Koffman (2000) suggested it should contain five objects. Nennsteil 
and Rahm (2006a) suggested the list should contain between five and ten objects. Brinck (2008) 
considered the top twenty objects on the correlation list. The research conducted here differed 
slightly as there were two matching objects in the database for each test object meaning that there 
are two success rate scores, one for finding at least one out of the two known matches and one for 
finding both known matches. These success rates contribute to the debate on ideal correlation list 
lengths. 
When finding at least one out of the two matching bullets, both systems showed that the percentage 
success rate increased as the correlation list length increased but only until the correlation list 
contained ten bullets. After ten bullets there was no increase in performance to be gained by 
increasing the correlation list to twenty bullets. However, it is of importance to find all the matches 
that are present in a database. For this reason, when considering the ideal correlation list length, the 
success rate for finding both known matches must be used. For system B, on 47.83% of occasions 
both known matches were found in the top ten and this did not improve when increasing the 
correlation list length to twenty bullets. For system A, a percentage success rate of 69.57% was 
achieved for a correlation list of ten bullets, improving to 82.61% when the correlation list was 
extended to contain twenty bullets. A consistent result for systems A and B is that there was no 
improvement by increasing the correlation list from two bullets (a perfect result) to five bullets. The 
improvement came when the correlation list was extended to ten bullets for both systems. When 
attempting to find both known matches, the results suggest that the correlation list should contain 
ten objects for system B and twenty objects for system A. Table 5-10 shows the suggested lengths of 
correlation lists to be examined for each system. 
Table 5-10: Suggested correlation list length for Bullets based on Experimental Research 
 Bullets Both Known Matches 
System A 20 
System B 10 
The next section describes and discusses the results for the Cartridge Case correlations.  
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5.3 – Cartridge Cases Results 
This section contains the cartridge case results.  Both system A and system B have two separate 
algorithms for correlating cartridge cases. One of the algorithms examines the breech face 
impression and the other examines the firing pin impression. The results for each algorithm are 
presented separately. Table 5-11 shows the results for the cartridge case breech face impression and 
shows the correlation list positions for both matching cartridge cases for both System A and System 
B. Figure 5-3 shows a cartridge case with the breech face impression marked. The full results 
including a description of the results for each individual test cartridge case can be found in Appendix 
one. 
Figure 5-3: Cartridge Case Head Showing the Breech Face Impression (Area Between the Two Red 
Circles). 
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Table 5-11: Cartridge Case Results Matrix (Breech Face Impression) 
 
KNOWN MATCH 1 
 
KNOWN MATCH 2 
 
 
Test 
Index  
Known 
Match 
Object 
(1) 
Sys A P  
KM1 
BF 
Sys B 
P 
KM1 
BF 
Known 
Match 
Object 
(2) 
Sys A  
P 
KM2 
BF 
Sys B 
P  
KM2  
BF2 
1 1A 1B 1 1 1C 2 2 
2 2A 2B 1 1 2C 2 44 
3 3A 3B 1 1 3C 2 202 
4 4A 4B 34 363 4C 45 33 
5 5A 5B 1 13 5C 10 217 
6 6A 6B 1 47 6C 95 1 
7 7A 7B 2 268 7C 13 109 
8 8A 8B 5 220 8C 31 8 
9 9A 9B 1 7 9C 4 357 
10 10A 10B 2 114 10C 1 1 
11 11A 11B 3 1 11C 2 84 
12 12A 12B 1 1 12C 2 81 
13 13A 13B 1 1 13C 2 197 
14 14A 14B 1 9 14C 2 42 
15 15A 15B 1 1 15C 2 78 
16 16A 16B 2 163 16C 1 223 
17 17A 17B 2 2 17C 1 141 
18 18A 18B 5 2 18C 139 234 
19 19A 19B 116 75 19C 181 277 
20 20A 20B 1 1 20C 2 235 
21 21A 21B 168 1 21C 1 33 
22 22A 22B 157 1 22C 1 28 
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Table 5-12 shows the results for the cartridge case firing pin impression and is the basis for 
discussions in this chapter. Table 5-12 shows the correlation list positions for both matching cartridge 
cases for both System A and System B. Figure 5-4 shows a cartridge case head with the firing pin 
impression marked. The full results including a description of the results for each individual test 
cartridge case can be found in Appendix one. 
Figure 5-4: Cartridge case Head with Firing Pin impression Marked (Area inside the Red Circle) 
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Table 5-12: Cartridge Case Results Matrix (Firing Pin Impression) 
  
KNOWN MATCH 1 
 
KNOWN MATCH 2 
 Test 
Index  
Known 
Match 
Object 
(1) 
Sys A P 
KM1 
FP 
Sys B P 
KM1 
FP 
 
Known 
Match 
Object 
(2) 
Sys A P  
KM2  
FP 
Sys B P 
KM2 
FP 
1 1A 1B 1 1 1C 183 192 
2 2A 2B 3 1 2C 57 166 
3 3A 3B 1 1 3C 176 60 
4 4A 4B 9 4 4C 1 1 
5 5A 5B 98 257 5C 109 212 
6 6A 6B 1 1 6C 6 2 
7 7A 7B 35 14 7C 23 18 
8 8A 8B 74 1 8C 3 48 
9 9A 9B 180 3 9C 1 1 
10 10A 10B 49 13 10C 1 1 
11 11A 11B 1 1 11C 321 335 
12 12A 12B 1 1 12C 315 345 
13 13A 13B 1 1 13C 221 8 
14 14A 14B 1 1 14C 287 359 
15 15A 15B 1 1 15C 199 150 
16 16A 16B 1 1 16C 2 2 
17 17A 17B 2 1 17C 1 10 
18 18A 18B 1 8 18C 2 11 
19 19A 19B 67 63 19C 41 66 
20 20A 20B 1 1 20C 2 2 
21 21A 21B 7 2 21C 11 6 
22 22A 22B 12 32 22C 82 176 
 
5.3.1 Cartridge Cases – Agreement between Systems 
The results generated by system A and system B for the cartridge case breech face correlation 
algorithm (Table 5-11) show that there is variance between the systems.  The systems are capable of 
producing the same result but this has happened on only one occasion (cartridge case 1A) for the 
breech face analysis. If a similar correlation list position is considered rather than an exact correlation 
list position there does not appear to be any further similar results produced suggesting that the 
result for cartridge case 1A is the exception rather than the rule. For this particular condition, 
interoperability appears to be a difficult problem to address simply because of the lack of agreement 
between the systems when correlating cartridge cases using the breech face algorithm. 
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The results generated by system A and system B for the cartridge case firing pin algorithm (Table 5-
12) again show that there is variance between the systems. The results do show that the systems are 
capable of producing the same results. The same result has been produced (also a perfect result) on 
two occasions (cartridge cases 16A and 20A). However, if a similar correlation list position is 
considered rather than an exact correlation list position, it could be considered that there is 
agreement of sorts between the systems for cartridge cases 1A, 3A, 11A, 12A 14A and 15A. Both 
systems have correlated the same cartridge case in position one and the other cartridge case much 
further down the correlation list. Although the correlation list position of the second object cartridge 
case differs, given the fact that there are obviously different algorithms and techniques applied, the 
similarity of the results is striking. For test cartridge case 1A, known matching cartridge case 1C has 
been correlated in position 183 by system A and position 192 by system B. Also consider cartridge 
case 11A where cartridge case 11C was correlated at position 321 by system A and position 335 by 
system B. Despite the number of variables involved in the entire process from acquiring the data to 
calculating the correlation scores there appears to be some underlying consistency between the 
systems for the firing pin algorithm. There is a clear difference in the results between the systems 
obtained for the two different cartridge case algorithms. The level of agreement between the 
systems was greater for the firing pin algorithm than for the breech face algorithm. As the 
ammunition type was the same for both algorithms, it may be the case that the type of mark has 
influenced these results. It may be the case that for this particular type of firearm (Beretta 92) the 
firing pin impression is used by experts for matching ammunition rather than the breech face 
impression because the markings are of better quality. This would explain the differences in results 
for the breech face impression where agreement between the systems was less than the firing pin 
impression results.  
5.3.2 Cartridge Cases – Disagreement between Systems 
The number of occasions where there was agreement between the systems for the cartridge case 
breech face results was low. As was the case for the bullet results, there are results that show a clear 
disagreement between the systems and again suggest the systems are working differently. The 
results for cartridge cases 21A and 22A (breech face algorithm) are examples. System A has 
correlated cartridge cases 21C and 22C at position 1 whilst system B has correlated cartridge cases 
21B and 22B at position 1 – an opposite result.  This type of result was also observed for cartridge 
cases 4A, 6A, 7A, 8A, and 11A.  
This pattern is also observed for the cartridge case firing pin algorithm. The result for cartridge case 
17A is an example. System A has achieved a perfect result correlating cartridge case 17C at position 1 
and cartridge case 17B at position 2 whereas system B has produced an opposite result correlating 
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cartridge case 17B higher than cartridge case 17C (positions 1 and 10 respectively). This type of result 
has also been observed for cartridge cases 5A, 7A, 8A, and 19A. This adds strong evidence to the 
argument that there is an interaction between the marks on the ammunition, the data acquisition 
techniques utilised by each system and the correlation algorithms employed. 
5.3.3 Cartridge Cases Accuracy – Success Rate Scores 
As desĐƌiďed duƌiŶg the disĐussioŶ oŶ the ďullet ƌesults, ͞aĐĐuƌaĐǇ͟ ĐaŶ ďe used to desĐƌiďe ŵaŶǇ of 
the results obtained through examination of the systems. In this section, the accuracy in terms of 
success rate of the systems is analysed. This refers to the percentage of occasions where a cartridge 
case or cartridge cases were found on correlation lists of varying lengths. The correlation list position 
of the highest placed known match was considered. This was used to calculate the success rate for 
finding one out of the two matches. It should be noted that there will be some occasions where the 
second known match was also correlated in the top twenty. This is discussed in a later section. There 
were also occasions where the second matching bullet was correlated outside the top twenty. 
Table 5-13: Success Rate Percentage for Cartridge Cases. System A (Breech Face Impression) and 
System B (Breech Face Impression) finding 1 Known Match and Correlation List Length 
Correlation List Length System A BF% System B BF % 
Top 1 72.7% 54.55% 
Top 3 81.82% 63.64% 
Top 5 90.91% 63.64% 
Top 10 90.91% 77.27% 
Top 20 90.91% 81.82% 
 
Table 5-13 shows the success rate percentages for system A and system B when finding one out of 
the two known matching cartridge cases on correlation lists of varying lengths for the breech face 
algorithm. This table shows that system A achieved a success rate of 72.7% when finding one of the 
two matches in the top positions and system B achieved a success rate of 54.55%. For correlating one 
out of the two matches within the top twenty, system A achieved a success rate of 90.91% and 
system B achieved a percentage success rate of 81.82%.  Table 5-13 also shows that there was no 
improvement in success rate beyond a correlation list of five cartridge cases for system A. The 
accuracy for system B improved as the correlation list length increased to twenty objects. Figure 5-5 
illustrates the findings presented in Table 5-13 and allows the differences between the two systems 
to be clearly observed. 
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Figure 5-5: Comparison of System A and System B Success Rate for Cartridge Cases (Breech Face 
Impression) finding 1 Known Match and Correlation List Length 
 
Table 5-14: Success Rate Percentage for Cartridge Cases. System A (Breech Face Impression) and 
System B (Breech Face Impression) finding Both Known Matches and Correlation List Length 
Correlation List Length System A BF% System B BF % 
Top 2 50% 4.55% 
Top 3 54.55% 4.55% 
Top 5 59.09% 4.55% 
Top 10 63.64% 4.55% 
Top 20 68.18% 4.55% 
 
System A achieved a perfect result, correlating both known matches in the top two positions on 50% 
of occasions. The success rate percentage for system B was 4.55%. When considering the results for 
finding both matches system A correlated both known matches in the top twenty on 68.18% of 
occasions and system B on only 4.55% of occasions. This result suggests that the breech face 
algorithms employed by each system whilst examining the same feature, are different. It also shows 
that for system B, on the majority of occasions both known matches are not correlated within the 
top twenty (although one of the two cartridge cases may indeed be in the top twenty). It is possible 
that the ammunition type affected this result and this is discussed in a later section of this Chapter. 
Figure 5-6 illustrates Table 5-14 and shows the differences between the systems.  
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Figure 5-6: Comparison of System A and System B Success Rate for Cartridge Cases (Breech Face 
Impression) finding Both Known Matches 
 
 
Table 5-15: Success Rate Percentage for Cartridge Cases. System A (Firing Pin Impression) and 
System B (Firing Pin Impression) finding 1 Known Match and Correlation List Length 
Correlation List Length System A FP % System B FP % 
Top 1 68.18% 72.72% 
Top 3 77.27% 77.27% 
Top 5 77.27% 77.27% 
Top 10 81.82% 81.82% 
Top 20 86.36% 86.36% 
 
The results for the firing pin impression algorithm show that on 68.18% of occasions, system A 
correlated one out of the two cartridge cases in the top position. System B achieved a percentage of 
72.77%. For correlating one out of the two matches within the top twenty both systems achieved a 
percentage success rate of 86.36%. Figure 5-7 visualises the results in Table 5-15 and clearly shows 
that both systems performed similarly in terms of overall success rates.   
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Figure 5-7: Comparison of System A and System B Success Rate for Cartridge Cases (Firing Pin 
Impression) finding 1 Known Match and Correlation List Length 
 
 
Table 5-16: Success Rate Percentage for Cartridge Cases. System A (Firing Pin Impression) and 
System B (Firing Pin Impression) finding Both Known Matches and Correlation List Length 
Correlation List Length System A FP % System B FP % 
Top 2 18.18% 13.64% 
Top 3 18.18% 18.18% 
Top 5 18.18% 22.73% 
Top 10 27.27% 36.36% 
Top 20 31.82% 50% 
 
Table 5-16 presents the results for each system finding both known matching cartridge cases on 
correlation lists of varying lengths for the firing pin impression algorithm. System A achieved a 
perfect result on 18.18% of occasions. System B achieved a perfect result on 13.64% of occasions. For 
system A, there was no increase in success rate when the correlation list was extended from two 
cartridge cases to three and five cartridge cases. The increase in success rate only became apparent 
when the correlation list was extended to ten cartridge cases and twenty cartridge cases. The success 
rate percentage for system B improved for each different correlation list length. Figure 5-8 illustrates 
the results in Table 5-16. 
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Figure 5-8: Comparison of System A and System B Success Rate for Cartridge Cases finding Both 
Known Matches and Correlation List Length. 
 
 
5.3.4 Cartridge Cases Accuracy - Comparison with Previous Research 
Previous research has been conducted with the IBIS Heritage system. Some of this has been 
conducted using open case file data (Nennsteil and Rahm, 2006b) whilst other research has focussed 
on the potential application of the technology to a reference ballistics imaging database (Tulleners, 
2001). The research methods utilised previously have been different in many ways. Key 
differentiating variables include database size, weapon type and the number of test objects. A 
summary of success rates derived from other research is presented here and in Table 5-17 and Table 
5-18. Nennsteil and Rahm (2006b) quote a success rate of between 75% and 95% depending on the 
circumstances. This refers to the known match being found in the top five positions on the 
correlation list. Tulleners (2001) examined IBIS Heritage using a background database on 792 
cartridge cases and 50 test cartridge cases. The data is presented in such a way that it has been 
possible to calculate the percentage success rates for correlation lists of different lengths. The 
percentage success rates for Tulleners (2001) can be seen in Table 5-17 and Table 5-18. George 
(2004a) examined IBIS Heritage using different combinations of ammunition type. George (2004a) 
quotes an overall success rate percentage of 48% referring to the known match being correlated in 
the top ten. It is not specified if this was for the breech face or firing pin algorithm. De Kinder, 
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Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004) correlated 32 test cartridge cases against a database of 600 cartridge 
cases using IBIS Heritage. They quoted a success rate of 71.8% when finding the match in the top ten 
positions. The ammunition type of the test cartridge case and the match in the data was the same in 
the De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004) study. The best ranking was taken from the breech face 
and firing pin algorithms. 
Table 5-17: Research Findings Compared to Previous Research Findings (Breech Face Algorithm) 
 Top 1  Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 
System A 1 out of 2 BF 72.7% 81.82% 90.91% 90.91% 
System A Both KM BF 50% 54.55% 59.09% 63.64% 
System B 1 out of 2 BF 54.55% 63.64% 63.64% 77.27% 
System B Both KM BF 4.55% 4.55% 4.55% 4.55% 
IBIS Heritage BF (Tulleners, 2001) 26% 34% 36% 38% 
IBIS Heritage (Nennsteil and Rahm, 2006b)   75%-95%  
IBIS Heritage.  
(George, 2004a)  
   48% 
IBIS Heritage  
(De Kinder, Tulleners, Thiebaut, 2004) 
   78.1% 
 
Table 5-18: Research Findings Compared to Previous Research Findings (Firing Pin Algorithm) 
 Top 1 Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 
System A 1 out of 2 BF 68.18% 77.27% 77.27% 81.82% 
System A Both KM BF 18.18% 18.18% 18.18% 27.27% 
System B 1 out of 2 BF 72.72% 77.27% 77.27% 81.82% 
System B Both KM BF 13.64% 18.18% 22.73% 36.36% 
IBIS Heritage FP (Tulleners, 2001) 26% 30% 32% 42% 
IBIS Heritage (Nennsteil and Rahm, 2006b)   75%-95%  
IBIS Heritage.  
(George, 2004a) 
   48% 
IBIS Heritage  
(De Kinder, Tulleners, Thiebaut, 2004) 
   78.1% 
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5.3.5 Cartridge Cases Accuracy – ͞Miss͟ Rate 
As described in the previous section on bullet results, the miss rate is used to describe the occasions 
where one or both matching cartridge cases were correlated outside the top twenty or not at all. The 
rationale for using this term is that these cartridge cases would be unlikely to be discovered in real 
case work due to their low position on the correlation list. The accuracy in terms of the miss rate is 
important because it provides an insight into the percentage of known matches a system could 
realistically be expected to find.  
Table 5-14 shows that for the breech face algorithm, when finding both known matches in the top 
twenty, system A achieved a success rate of 68.18%. This result reversed shows that on 31.82% of 
occasions one or both known matches were correlated outside the top twenty. For two of the test 
cartridge cases (cartridge cases 4A and 19A) both known matches were correlated outside the top 
twenty. For five of the test cartridge cases (cartridge cases 6A, 8A, 18A, 21A and 22A) one out of the 
two known matches was correlated outside the top twenty. For system B the success rate 
percentage for finding both known matches was 4.55% resulting is a miss rate percentage of 95.45% 
for the breech face algorithm. For fifteen of the test cartridge cases both known matches were 
correlated outside the top twenty (cartridge cases 4A, 6A, 8A, 9A, 10A, 11A, 12A, 13A, 14A, 15A, 17A, 
18A, 20A, 21A and 22A). For 6 of the test cartridges the one of the two known matches was 
correlated outside the top twenty (cartridge cases 2A, 3A, 5A, 7A, 16A, 19A).  
For the firing pin algorithm and correlating both known matches Table 5-16 shows system A achieved 
a success rate of 31.82% and system 50%. Reversed this shows the miss rates to be 68.18% and 50% 
respectively for the firing pin algorithm. For system A, for three of the test cartridge cases (cartridge 
cases 5A, 7A and 19A) both known matches were placed outside the top twenty. For twelve of the 
test cartridge cases (cartridge cases 1A, 2A, 3A, 8A, 9A, 10A, 11A, 12A, 13A, 14A, 15A and 22A) one 
out of the two known matches was placed outside the top twenty. For system B, for three of the test 
cartridge cases (cartridge cases 5A, 19A and 22A) both known matches were placed outside the top 
twenty. For eight of the test cartridge cases (cartridge cases 1A, 2A, 3A, 8A, 11A, 12A, 14A and 15A) 
one out of the two known matches was placed outside the top twenty. The calculated miss rates 
explained here suggest that it is difficult for an examiner to be absolutely sure that there is or is not a 
match to the questioned cartridge case in the database. 
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5.3.6 Cartridge Cases Accuracy – False Positives 
For the cartridge case breech face algorithm results, the extent to which the systems were capable of 
producing a perfect result varied dramatically. System B produced a perfect result on just one 
occasion. System A, however, produced a perfect result on 11 out of 22 occasions. This shows that 
that for both systems there were non-matching cartridge cases that were presented as being more 
similar than those cartridge cases that do match.  For system A and the breech face algorithm, non-
matching cartridge cases were correlated higher than the actual matching cartridge cases on eleven 
occasions (cartridge cases 4A, 5A, 6A, 7A, 8A, 9A, 11A, 18A, 19A, 21A and 22A. For system B non-
matching cartridge cases were correlated higher than the actual matching cartridge cases for every 
cartridge case with the exception of cartridge case 1A (21 out of 22 test cartridge cases). There were 
results for both systems where one of the known matching cartridge cases was correlated in the top 
position whilst the other matching cartridge case was  correlated in a much lower position resulting 
in a large number of non-matching cartridge cases being presented as more similar than the second 
matching cartridge case.  
Consider the result system A produced for cartridge case 21A. Cartridge case 21C has been correlated 
at position 1 whilst cartridge case 21B has been correlated at position 168 meaning that 166 non-
matching cartridge cases have been ranked as more similar than the second actual matching 
cartridge case. A similar result is observed for system B for cartridge case 20A where cartridge case 
20B has been correlated at position 1 and cartridge case 20C has been correlated at position 235 
meaning that 233 non-matching cartridge cases have been ranked in a higher position than the 
second actual matching cartridge case. It is unlikely that these cartridge cases would be discovered in 
a real life situation as examiners generally only examine the top twenty suggested matches. This 
raises the possibility of links between crimes remaining undiscovered. The other implication of this 
type of result is that the presence of non-matching cartridge cases in high correlation list positions 
may mislead the examiner into declaring a false positive match.  An example of this type of result is 
that generated by both systems for test cartridge case 18A. System A has correlated cartridge case 
18B at position 5 and system B has correlated cartridge case 18B at position 2. This shows that there 
are a small number of cartridge cases that would be examined and the issue would be the extent to 
which the presence of the non-matching cartridge cases would affect the conclusions of an examiner. 
This is especially true of situations where there is a high degree of similarity between the cartridge 
cases in the top twenty. The effect of ballistics analysis systems on firearms examiners is discussed in 
a later section of this Chapter.  
For the firing pin algorithm, system A correlated non-matching cartridge cases higher than the actual 
matches on 18 occasions (cartridge cases 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A, 5A, 6A, 7A, 8A, 9A, 10A, 11A, 12A, 13A, 14A, 
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15A, 19A, 21A and 22A) . System B correlated non-matching cartridge cases higher than the actual 
matches on 19 occasions (cartridge cases 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A, 5A, 7A, 8A, 9A, 10A, 11A, 12A, 13A, 14A, 
15A, 17A, 18A, 19A, 21A and 22A). There are examples where a large number of non-matching 
cartridge cases have been correlated above the known matching cartridge cases. For cartridge case 
12A, system A has placed 313 non matching cartridge cases above the second known matching 
cartridge case and system B as placed 343 non matching cartridge cases above the known match. As 
was previously discussed for the breech face results, it is unlikely that this cartridge case would be 
discovered in a real life situation as examiners generally only examine the top twenty suggested 
matches. Again, this raises the possibility of links between crimes being undiscovered despite the 
evidence being present. The results are also similar to the breech face algorithm results because the 
presence of non-matching cartridge cases in high correlation list positions may mislead the examiner 
into declaring a false positive match. An example of this type of result is that generated for cartridge 
case 21A. Both systems have correlated both cartridge cases within the top twenty. System A has 
placed the known matching cartridge cases at position 7 and 11 and system B has placed the known 
matching cartridge cases at positions 2 and 6. This shows that there are a small number of cartridge 
cases that would be examined and the issue would be the extent to which the presence of the non-
matching cartridge cases would affect the conclusions of an examiner. This is especially true of 
situations where there is a high degree of similarity between the cartridge cases in the top twenty. 
These results are used to define error rates for the systems and are discussed later in this Chapter. 
As previously noted through the analysis of the bullet results in an earlier section of this Chapter, the 
performance of ballistics analysis systems, especially with regards to accuracy can affect a police 
investigation it terms of time it takes to return evidence or intelligence to the investigating officer. 
Results where non-matching cartridge cases have been presented in a higher correlation list position 
than known matching cartridge cases are important in this context because they make the task of the 
examiner more complex and at worst may lead an examiner to reach a false conclusion. The 
presence of non-matching cartridge cases in positions above the actual match may also increase the 
tiŵe it takes foƌ aŶ eǆaŵiŶeƌ to fiŶd the aĐtual ŵatĐh, effeĐtiǀelǇ ĐƌeatiŶg ͞Ŷoise͟ iŶ the ƌesults. 
These factors could potentially waste investigation time and create confusion in the investigation. 
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5.3.7 Cartridge Cases Accuracy – Total Length of Correlation List and False Positives 
Where the result for a test cartridge case is not a perfect match then by definition, there has been a 
non-matching cartridge case or cases presented as being more similar than the actual known 
matching cartridge case or cases. Recall that for the bullet results, the total correlation list length 
varied for each test bullet. This is not the case for the cartridge case results. Each cartridge case in 
the database has a correlation list containing every other cartridge case in the database. The length 
of each cartridge case correlation list is therefore 389 cartridge cases. However, the same point can 
still be made regarding the number of known non-matching cartridge cases that are placed in higher 
positions on the correlation list than the actual matching cartridge cases. Table 5-19 shows the 
number of non-matching cartridge cases ranked in a higher position than the actual matching 
cartridge cases for each of the test cartridge cases for both the breech face algorithm and the firing 
pin algorithm. This is referred to as the number of false positives.  
Table 5-19:  Number of False Positives for System A and System B (Cartridge Case Breech Face 
Algorithm and Cartridge Case Firing Pin Impression) 
 
Test 
Index 
System A BF  
Number of False 
Positives 
System B BF 
Number of False 
Positives 
System A FP 
Number of 
False Positives 
System B FP 
Number of 
False Positives 
1 1A 0 0 181 190 
2 2A 0 42 55 164 
3 3A 0 200 174 58 
4 4A 43 361 7 2 
5 5A 8 215 107 255 
6 6A 93 45 4 0 
7 7A 11 266 33 16 
8 8A 29 218 72 46 
9 9A 2 355 178 1 
10 10A 0 112 47 11 
11 11A 1 82 319 333 
12 12A 0 79 313 343 
13 13A 0 195 219 6 
14 14A 0 40 285 357 
15 15A 0 76 197 148 
16 16A 0 221 0 0 
17 17A 0 139 0 8 
18 18A 137 232 0 9 
19 19A 179 275 65 64 
20 20A 0 233 0 0 
21 21A 166 31 9 4 
22 22A 155 26 80 174 
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5.3.8 Cartridge Cases Accuracy - Overall Accuracy of the Systems  
The results of the experimental research with cartridge cases have revealed that the systems are 
working differently and are producing different results. This is to be expected as it is assumed that 
both manufacturers are using different data acquisition and correlation techniques. For the breech 
face algorithm, an identical result was produced on just one occasion (cartridge case 1A). Therefore 
on 21 occasions a different result was produced. For the firing pin algorithm, an identical result was 
observed on two occasions (cartridge cases 16A and 20A). A similar result was observed on a further 
six occasions (cartridge cases 1A, 3A, 11A, 12A, 14A and 15A). Therefore on 20 occasions a different 
result was observed. This demonstrates the fact that the systems are working differently and 
produce different results.  
The results for both cartridge case algorithms also show that neither system is completely accurate 
(as was described in the previous section on bullet results, neither manufacturer make a claim of 
total accuracy). Each cartridge case had two known matches in the database and the result indicate 
that for both systems and both algorithms the performance is better when correlating one out of the 
two known matches as opposed to both known matches. The success rate percentages for finding 
one out of the two matches for the breech face impression were 72.7% for system A and 54.55% for 
system B. When finding both known matches, the success rate percentages dropped to 50% and 
4.55% respectively. For the firing pin impression, the success rate percentages for finding one of the 
two matches was 68.18% (system A) and 72.72% (system B).  When finding both known matches, this 
dropped to 18.18% and 13.64% respectively. These results clearly show that there are multiple 
occasions where non-matching objects are correlated in higher positions than the actual matching 
objects. 
For the cartridge case breech face impression, a perfect result was achieved on 50% (system A) and 
4.55% (system B) of occasions showing that on 50% of occasions and 95.45% of occasions 
respectively, non-matching cartridge cases were presented to the user in higher positions than actual 
matches. For the firing pin impression, a perfect result was achieved on 18.18% (system A) and 
13.74% of occasions (system B) resulting in non-matching cartridge cases being correlated higher 
than actual matches on 81.82% and 86.26% of occasions respectively. Although there were not any 
occasions where a cartridge case was not correlated at all, there are multiple occasions where a 
matching object has been correlated outside the top twenty and many of these cartridge cases were 
correlated at considerably low positions. It is likely that these cartridge cases would not be 
discovered in a real-life situation. The accuracy of the systems in terms of error rates is discussed in a 
later section of this Chapter. 
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5.3.9 Cartridge Cases – Correlation List Length 
The impact of ballistics analysis systems on police investigations was discussed in the bullet results 
section with specific relevance to the correlation list length and the number of bullets or cartridge 
cases that a ballistics expert should examine. It was described how there are no standards in place to 
determine what length the correlation list should be although previous research has suggested 
varying correlation list lengths of ten objects (IBIS training manual), five objects (Silverwater and 
Koffman, 2000) between five and ten objects (Nennsteil and Rahm, 2006a) and twenty objects 
(Brinck, 2008). When correlating cartridge cases, each system has two different algorithms, one 
examining the breech face impression and the other examining the firing pin impression. Each 
system therefore produces two different correlation lists, meaning that if the examiner was to 
examine the top twenty objects on each list, they would potentially be examining forty objects. It 
could of course be less than this if the same object appeared on both correlation lists. But the 
implication of this is that any findings that highlight the ideal correlation list length could be of 
importance in reducing examiner workload particularly for cartridge cases due to the two different 
algorithms.  
As previously described, the research conducted for this Thesis differed slightly to previous research 
as there were two matching objects in the database for each test object meaning that there are two 
success rate scores, one for finding one out of the two known matches and one for finding both 
known matches. These success rates can contribute to the debate on what the correlation list length 
should be. As it is of vital importance to find all the potential links in a database, the success rates for 
correlating both known matches have been used to inform the ideal correlation list length. When 
finding both known matches for the breech face impression algorithm, the results for system A 
suggest that the correlation list should be examined up until position twenty as the success rate 
increased as correlation list increased. For system B, a perfect result was obtained on 4.55% of 
occasions. This percentage did not improve by extending the correlation list length to twenty objects 
For the firing pin algorithm, for finding both known matches, both systems success rate increased as 
the correlation list increased to contain twenty objects. . Table 5-20 shows the suggested correlation 
list lengths for the cartridge case breech face algorithm and the firing pin algorithm for both systems.  
Table 5-20: Suggested Correlation List Lengths for the Cartridge Case Breech Face Algorithm and 
Firing Pin Algorithm 
 System A System B 
CC BF Both Known Matches 20 2 
CCFP Both Known Matches 20 20 
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5.3.10 Cartridge Cases – Effect of Ammunition Type 
The ways in which ballistics analysis systems are used should be in such a way as to ensure the best 
possible performance. This should in turn ensure that a system and the correlation algorithms are as 
accurate as possible. The results have demonstrated occasions where one bullet or cartridge case 
was correlated at position one and the second matching bullet or cartridge case has been correlated 
at a lower position on the list. Non-matching bullets or cartridge cases have been placed in between. 
It is therefore suggested that ammunition type and the resultant quality of the marks on the 
ammunition may have been a variable that contributed to this result. Understanding the extent to 
which this is true could lead to recommendations for laboratories using these systems. For example, 
if it is the case that the systems are more successful when correlating ammunition of the same type 
then procedures could be put in place to ensure that multiple samples are uploaded to a system for 
each type of ammunition already present in the database. This approach has been suggested by 
Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) and Argaman, Shoshani and Hocherman (2001). 
The ammunition that was used for the experimental research in this Thesis was generated by 
multiple individuals and laboratories across Europe. It was decided in the early stages of the 
methodology design that it would be impractical to try and use the same one or two brands of 
ammunition because there was no guarantee that every laboratory would have the same 
ammunition type readily available. The priority at that time was generating a sample that was of 
sufficient size to enable the results to be valid. It also should be noted that the overall aim of the 
experimental research at that time was enabling each system to capture the same physical 
ammunition samples to enable the results to be discussed within the same terms of reference. The 
key point was the same bullets and cartridge cases being acquired by each system to observe 
similarities and differences in the data rather than the design of a performance test. However, one of 
the key findings of the research has been that there is a difference in success rate when finding one 
out of the two known matches and both known matches. With the cartridge case sample, it has been 
possible to examine the ammunition type and discuss the results knowing the brand of ammunition. 
Table 5-21 shows which objects are of the same ammunition type for each test object and the 
correlation list positions for each system for both algorithms. 
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Table 5-21: Cartridge Case Result Matrix for System A and System B and Ammunition Type (Breech 
Face Algorithm and Firing Pin Algorithm) 
Test  
CC  
KM  
1  
CC 
Sys  
A  
BF 
Sys  
B  
BF 
Sys  
A  
FP  
Sys 
B  
FP 
KM  
2  
CC 
Sys  
A  
BF 
Sys  
B  
BF 
Sys  
A  
FP  
Sys  
B  
FP 
1A 1B 1 1 1 1 1C 2 2 183 192 
2A 2B 1 1 3 1 2C 2 44 57 166 
3A 3B 1 1 1 1 3C 2 202 176 60 
4A 4B 34 363 9 4 4C 45 33 1 1 
5A 5B 1 13 98 257 5C 10 217 109 212 
6A 6B 1 47 1 1 6C 95 1 6 2 
7A 7B 2 268 35 14 7C 13 109 23 18 
8A 8B 5 220 74 1 8C 31 8 3 48 
9A 9B 1 7 180 3 9C 4 357 1 1 
10A 10B 2 114 49 13 10C 1 1 1 1 
11A 11B 3 1 1 1 11C 2 84 321 335 
12A 12B 1 1 1 1 12C 2 81 315 345 
13A 13B 1 1 1 1 13C 2 197 221 8 
14A 14B 1 9 1 1 14C 2 42 287 359 
15A 15B 1 1 1 1 15C 2 78 199 150 
16A 16B 2 163 1 1 16C 1 223 2 2 
17A 17B 2 2 2 1 17C 1 141 1 10 
18A 18B 5 2 1 8 18C 139 234 2 11 
19A 19B 116 75 67 63 19C 181 277 41 66 
20A 20B 1 1 1 1 20C 2 235 2 2 
21A 21B 168 1 7 2 21C 1 33 11 6 
22A 22B 157 1 12 32 22C 1 28 82 176 
Table 5-21 Key: Green denotes cartridge cases that are of the same ammunition type.  
Research conducted by Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) suggested that test fires that are to be inputted 
to an automated system should be of the same brand of ammunition as the evidential object seized 
at the crime scene. This finding was also presented by De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004). The 
research conducted for this Thesis also provides some evidence to support the theory that 
automated systems are more successful when correlating cartridge cases that are of the same 
ammunition type. It is probable that ammunition of different types is made from variations of metal 
alloys and hence the materials will have different hardness values. As a consequence of these 
different hardness values, the marks imprinted on the ammunition be it bullets or cartridge cases will 
be less apparent on harder materials. This could go some way to explain why differing ammunition 
types appear harder to correlate. 
Table 5-21 shows that for 13 out of the 22 test cartridge cases, there was one out of the two 
cartridge cases in the database that was of the same ammunition type. These are highlighted in 
green in the table above. The ammunition type of the test cartridge case and the ammunition type of 
162 
 
the two matching cartridge cases enables the effect of ammunition type to be considered. A 
measurement of the occasions where the cartridge case of the same ammunition type as the test 
cartridge case was correlated above the other object of a different ammunition type has been 
conducted. The results are presented in Table 5-22. 
Table 5-22: Occasions where the Same Ammunition Type as Test Cartridge Case was Correlated 
Higher than the Other Cartridge Case 
 System A 
BF 
System B 
BF 
System A 
FP 
System B 
FP 
Occasions where same ammunition 
type as test cartridge case was 
correlated above other cartridge 
cases 
9 13 11 13 
 
Percentage 
 
69.23% 100% 84.62% 100% 
 
The results whilst somewhat limited due to the small sample size of thirteen cartridge cases show 
that system B correlated the cartridge case of same ammunition type above the other cartridge case 
on 100% of occasions for both algorithms. The results for system A are similar showing that the 
cartridge case of the same ammunition type was correlated above the other cartridge case on 9 out 
of 13 occasions (69.23%) for the breech face algorithm and 11 out of 13 occasions for the firing pin 
algorithm (84.62%). These results clearly demonstrate that ammunition type is an important variable 
that affects the performance of automated systems and provides evidence to support the findings of 
Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) and De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004). It may be suggested that 
when test fires are acquired by a system, there should be multiple samples acquired, one of each 
ammunition type that is already in the database. Argaman, Shoshani and Hocherman (2001) also 
made this suggestion. There is a problem however, that arises because Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) 
suggested that the success rate decreases as database size increases and acquiring multiple samples 
will lead to a greater database size. It is likely that there is a compromise to be made between the 
overall database size and the policy with regards to the type of ammunition and number of samples 
uploaded. However, the nature and characteristics of this compromise is an area for further 
research. 
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5.3.11 Comparison of the Breech Face Results and the Firing Pin Results 
The comparison of the breech face results and the firing pin results is important because having two 
sets of results to examine for the same cartridge case potentially doubles the time taken for an 
examiner to reach a conclusion. It is for this reason that the two sets of results are compared and 
discussed because any findings that can reduce the time taken for an examiner to reach a conclusion 
are important. Table 5-21 shows the correlation list positions for cartridge cases for systems A and B 
and for both the breech face algorithm and the firing pin algorithm. The analysis of the results 
presented thus far has treated the algorithms as separate entities – the results for the breech face 
algorithm of each system were analysed separately to the firing pin impression results. This was done 
to ensure that any conclusions were drawn as a results of comparing like with like. A user of these 
systems would of course be able to switch between the firing pin results and the breech face results 
depending on the specific situation and the type of classmarks they were examining.  
However, comparing the breech face results with the firing pin results for each system, as presented 
in the above table can yield some important points for discussion. Table 5-21 demonstrates the 
variance in the results. There was not a single occasion where there was agreement between both 
algorithms for both systems. Furthermore, there was wide variance within systems. Consider the 
comparison of the breech face algorithm results and firing pin impression results for system A. There 
are only two occasions when there is complete agreement for the two algorithms (cartridge cases 
17A and 20A). For system B there are no occasions when the same result is observed for the breech 
face algorithm and for the firing pin algorithm. This may be expected as the breech face impression 
may be of better quality than the firing pin impression and vice versa, resulting in a situation where 
the results vary. Consider the results for cartridge case 1A. Both systems have correlated cartridge 
case 1B in the top position for both the breech face algorithm and the firing pin algorithm perhaps 
suggesting that this cartridge case has excellent quality marks for both the breech face and the firing 
pin. Both systems have also correlated cartridge case 1C in position 2 for the breech face algorithm 
but have correlated the same cartridge case at a much lower position for the firing pin impression 
(system A position 183 and system B position 192). This suggests that the breech face impression for 
cartridge case 1C is of good quality whilst the firing pin impression may not be.  
There are also occasions where the comparison of results between systems and algorithms suggest 
differences between the ways in which the systems are operating regardless of the quality of the 
marks on the ammunition. Consider the result obtained for cartridge case 20A. Both systems have 
achieved the same perfect result for the firing pin algorithm. The breech face algorithm has however 
produced a different result. System A has achieved a perfect result whilst system B has correlated 
one known match at position one and the other at position 235. This suggests that there has been an 
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interaction specific to system B between the marks on the ammunition and the correlation algorithm 
employed. 
5.3.12 Effect of the Operator on Both Bullet and Cartridge Case Results 
It is recognised that the different operators of each systems could have contributed to the variance 
between the systems observed in the results. However, whilst recognising this factor there were 
multiple steps taken to reduce the effect of the operator and control this variable. 
As described in Chapter four, both manufacturers that participated were asked to provide an 
operator to enter the bullets and cartridge cases onto the database. The rationale behind this 
decision was that there was no suitably qualified person who could operate both systems to a 
sufficiently high standard. By asking the manufacturers to provide an operator, the rationale was that 
it was in the interests of each manufacturer to provide a suitably qualified person. The expertise of 
the operator of each system is not limited to just ballistics expertise. As each operator had 
information on the proprietary methods employed to capture and correlate images, there was an 
additional level of expertise relating to the interaction between the images and the proprietary 
correlation methods. This information was unknown to the author but resulted in a situation where 
the operator of each system was not only qualified to identify distinguishing features from a ballistics 
standpoint but also qualified to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the particular system 
ensuring that the data captured was of a high quality.  
It should also be noted that some parts of the process are automated to a greater extent than others. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that less user interaction is required when marking key features on 
cartridge cases than when marking striations on bullets. Often the only user input for cartridge cases 
is marking the outer edge, the breech face impression and the firing pin impression. These features 
are more easily identifiable than bullet striations. There was more variance in the results between 
systems for the cartridge case condition suggesting that the effect of the operator did not play a 
significant role. For the cartridge case breech face impression algorithm the systems produced the 
same result on one occasion and for the firing pin impression the same result was observed on two 
occasions. This contrasts greatly with the bullet condition where the same result was observed for 
both systems on eight occasions despite the fact that there is more opportunity for different inputs 
by different operators.  
It should also be noted that the results of the experimental work has been communicated and 
discussed with each manufacturer in some detail and neither has raised any concerns relating to the 
quality of the data capture or the correlation results. 
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The next section considers the results and defines error rates for the systems examined. The success 
rates presented in this section are explored in greater detail and used to calculate and define error 
rates. 
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5.4 - Definition of an Error Rate for Automated Systems 
Consider the results described in this Chapter in a different light and outside of the debate on 
subjectivity in forensic ballistics. If an objective standpoint is taken and the results are considered to 
be either correct (a perfect result) of incorrect (every other occasion where a perfect result was not 
achieved) then an error rate can be defined, calculated and presented. This is a perfectly reasonable 
approach to take as this experiment was controlled in order for the matches and non matches to be 
known. The known matches and non-matches are documented and an audit trail is in place so that 
every bullet and cartridge case can be traced back to the source firearm. Therefore, it is extremely 
unlikely that there have been errors in the indexing process. Consequently the terminology relating 
to ͞ĐoƌƌeĐt͟ aŶd ͞iŶĐoƌƌeĐt͟ ƌesults ĐaŶ ďe used ǁith aŶ eǆtƌeŵelǇ high ĐoŶfideŶĐe leǀel.  
5.4.1 Total Error Rate Percentage  
It should be noted that for some of the test objects (bullet or cartridge case), one object will have 
been correlated in position one and the other will have been correlated in a position other than two. 
This is still considered to be an incorrect result as non-matching objects were presented to the user 
higher than the second actual matching object. There was also a single occasion for bullet 10A where 
no correlation list was produced. This is also considered as an incorrect result as the matching bullets 
were in the database but not successfully correlated. The error rate in this context is defined by the 
author as follows: 
The occasions where the system has produced a result that is incorrect; a perfect result has 
not been achieved and whilst one of the two objects may have been correlated in the top 
position, a non-matching object or objects is presented in a higher position than the second 
actual matching object. Alternatively, no correlation list was produced despite matches being 
present in the database. 
This will be called the Total Error Rate Percentage. Table 5-23 shows the Total Error Rate 
percentages for each system and each experimental condition.  
Table 5-23: Total Error Rate Percentage for System A and System and Every Condition 
 System A Error Rate System B Error Rate 
Bullets 34.78% 56.52% 
Cartridge Cases (BF) 50% 95.45% 
Cartridge Cases (FP) 81.82% 86.36% 
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5.4.2 False Positive Error Rate 
The results also clearly show that there are occasions where a non-matching object has been 
correlated in the top position. This is by definition a false positive result. Consider an alternative 
definition of the error rate – in this case, the definition is: 
Any occasion where a non-matching object has been correlated in the top position above the 
known matching objects.   
This will be called the False Positive Error Rate. Table 5-24 shows the error rate for this condition. 
Table 5-24: False Positive Error Rate for System A and System B and Every Condition 
 System A Error Rate System B Error Rate 
Bullets
17
 17.39% 39.13% 
Cartridge Cases (BF) 27.27% 45.45% 
Cartridge Cases (FP) 31.82% 27.27% 
 
Table 5-23 and Table 5-24 show that whichever definition of error rate is applied, the error rates are 
high and clearly demonstrate that innovation and improvement is needed to reduce the error rates. 
Despite the complexity and variance in the results that has been demonstrated, the performance of 
the systems can be defined in terms of the error rates. The effect of any improvements or 
adjustments to each system can be assessed by the impact on the error rates as defined by the 
author in this Thesis. It may also be useful to apply these definitions of error rates to any future 
research. It would certainly be useful to consider the success rates and error rates of a system 
together, as both calculations present different dimensions of the capabilities of automated systems.  
The next section discusses the conclusions of the research conducted and aims to place the findings 
if the research in the context of research discussed in the literature review.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 There was a single occasion for bullets where a correlation list was not produced. This was for bullet 10A. 
Therefore as there was no correlation list produced there were also no false positives produced. 
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6.1 – Results and Conclusions in the Wider Context of Policing Issues 
The literature review identified the fact that there is a lack of multidisciplinary research combining 
research in the forensic ballistics arena with research conducted on gun crime. One of the aims 
identified in Chapter three was to address this by placing the results of the experimental research 
conducted in this Thesis back into the context of policing issues relevant to gun crime. This section 
discusses the results in the context of some of the issues raised in the literature review and aims to 
draw conclusions.   
6.1.1 Use of Systems and the Rate of Gun Crimes 
Home Office statistics showed that in 2008/09, gun crime accounted for 0.3% of all offences in the 
UK representing over 14,000 crimes (Smith et al, 2010). This figure includes air weapons. Excluding 
air weapons, the number of gun crimes was 8,208. It is probable that there is not ballistics evidence 
in the form of bullets, cartridge cases or firearms recovered from every crime because there will have 
been occasions where the firearm was used as a blunt weapon or to threaten a person. It is also 
possible that is some of these cases, the firearm may have been an imitation weapon. The number of 
offences officially recorded does, however, provide an insight firstly into the scale of the problem 
facing the police but also secondly the resultant workload of forensic ballistics examiners in the UK 
This is despite the fact that compared to other countries, crimes involving firearms occur less 
frequently in the UK than in other countries (Krug et al, 1998) - arguably because of the nature of the 
law, in the UK governing firearm possession (Warlow, 1997; Spritzer, 1998). However, consider if 
there was a single bullet or cartridge case recovered from just half of the crimes involving firearms 
reported each year and the workload this would generate for ballistics experts. Also consider the 
time it would take for these exhibits to be uploaded to a ballistics analysis system, the correlation 
lists to be examined and then the actual bullets or cartridge cases to be examined and a report 
produced. Many ballistics laboratories examine the top twenty bullets or cartridge cases on a 
correlation list in order to have a good chance of finding the match. However, this workload put in 
the context of the number of crimes that are occurring each year clearly suggests that innovation is 
needed to reduce the workload of ballistics examiners. One of the contributions of this Thesis has 
been to suggest ideal correlation list lengths based on the sample of ammunition examined. For 
system A correlating bullets, it was suggested that the top twenty matches should be examined and 
for system B it was suggested that the top ten matches should be examined as there was no 
improvement noticed by extending the list to twenty objects. For the cartridge case firing pin 
algorithm, the results suggest that the top twenty objects should be examined for both systems. For 
the breech face algorithm, the top twenty should be examined for system A. For system B, no 
improvement was noticed beyond a list of two objects.  
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The points to make here are twofold; firstly that given a certain sample of ammunition, an ideal 
correlation list length can be calculated based on the use of a system in a particular context. The 
results for this Thesis support examining the top twenty for cartridge cases and bullets. However, as 
only one firearm type was used and the database contained 390 items, this recommendation should 
not be interpreted absolutely but more as a guideline. The results do show that by carefully 
examining data that is already being collected, recommendations can be made as to the best way to 
use technology with the specific focus on saving time and improving efficiency. It may be the case 
that laboratories routinely examine the top twenty objects but that also there has not been a 
calculation of the effectiveness of this policy for that particular laboratory. It could be the case that a 
high proportion of matches are found in the top ten in a particular laboratory under their specific 
conditions. The results of this Thesis have shown that measuring performance using existing data can 
contribute to clearly defined recommendations regarding correlation list length. This is important 
given the fact that investigations involving the use of firearms can be complex as the types of crime 
are varied (Hales, Lewis and Silverstone, 2006). There are also difficulties such as reluctance of 
victims and witnesses to cooperation with the police (Hales et al, 2006; Squires, 2008). There is also 
the added complexity in some cases of gang involvement (Vaughan et al, 1996; Bullock and Tilley, 
2002; Decker and Curry, 2002; Marshall, Webb and Tilley, 2005; Hales et al, 2006; Hayden et al, 2008 
and Hallsworth and Silverstone, 2009). These factors clearly imply that as gun crime investigations 
can be inherently difficult, any improvements to the process such as reducing the time taken to 
return evidence or intelligence to the investigating officer can be extremely valuable.  
The number of bullets or cartridge cases on a correlation list that an expert has to examine is directly 
linked to the accuracy of a system. The more accurate a system, the smaller the number of objects 
on the correlation list that need to be examined. Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a: 21) point out that an 
ideal Đoƌƌelatoƌ, ͞ǁould haǀe eaĐh positiǀe ŵatĐh at positioŶ oŶe of the hit list͟. The ƌesults of this 
Thesis provide evidence to show that both system A and system B are not accurate enough to 
correlate all the known matches in the top position on all occasions. However, some of the results 
indicate that both system A and system B are more accurate in some conditions than others. Take 
the cartridge case firing pin algorithm results as an example. The top twenty correlation list positions 
were considered and both systems found one of the two known matches on 86.36% of occasions. 
Further work improving accuracy could aim to reduce the correlation list size (finding 86.36% of 
known matches on a correlation list containing five objects for example) or alternatively improving 
the percentage success rates (finding 100% of the known matches on a correlation list of twenty 
objects for example). The important finding is that the inaccuracy of the systems on some occasions 
is directly related to the increased workload of ballistics examiners. Innovation and optimisation of 
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the technology could reduce this workload and improve the speed at which evidence can be 
returned to the investigating officer. Such improvements would not only improve the efficiency of 
ballistics examinations but also improve confidence in the forensic ballistics – especially important 
given the challenges that have been made to the discipline (Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz 2007; Edwards, 
Gatsonis and Kafadar, 2009.) The findings of this research so suggest that approaches based on 
alternative technologies are required rather than optimising current technology. One such example 
has been proposed by Xie et al (2009). It is possible that techniques such as this, may result is a 
greater amount of detail being able to be captured about a surface. In turn this increased detail may 
lead to more precise measurements and correlations. The statistics presented by Smith et al (2010) 
whilst confined to England and Wales suggest that there are a vast number of gun crimes that yield 
forensic evidence for evaluation. The benefits to police officers of more accurate technology would 
mainly concern the speed of having evidence returned that may generate investigatory leads. This is 
especially important given the difficulties of investigating crimes involving firearms. (Hales et al, 
2006; Squires, 2008) 
6.1.2 Alternative Research Methods to Quantify Gun Crime 
Squires (2008) identified the fact that there is a gap in intelligence created by crimes that are not 
reported to police in the UK. As well as creating an intelligence gap, unreported crimes result in a 
situation where it is difficult to fully quantify the number of crimes involving firearms that do occur. 
Consider the 8,208 crimes reported in 2008/09 (Smith et al, 2010). It is unknown the extent to which 
this figure is an accurate reflection of reality. Research has been conducted using other data to try 
and address this problem. Examples are those studies conducted by Pershad et al (2005), Lepik and 
Poldsam (2007), Verzeletti et al (2009) and Karlsson et al (1993). All examined medical data 
concerning gunshot wound related hospital admissions to try and ascertain the true rate of gun 
crime. Holloway and Bennett (2004) also utilised different research methods by interviewing 
offenders to try and quantify crimes involving firearms.  
By their very nature ballistics analysis systems collect a wide range of data and this has been 
demonstrated by the research in this Thesis and also by the use of a different system in the UK 
(NABIS, 2011). Some of this data are specific to the bullets and cartridge cases such as ammunition 
type, calibre and inferred firearm type. There is also ancillary data recorded by these systems such as 
case reference numbers and temporal information relating to the time and date of offences. One 
potential area for exploration could be the consideration of data stored in ballistics analysis systems 
when collating official statistics. For example, a simple count of the number of exhibits and cases on 
a national database could be compared to the national count of crimes involving firearms reported to 
the police. Intuitively it would be expected that the number would be similar but because it is 
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unknown the extent to which this happens, the numbers cannot be compared. Further research 
could be conducted using the data collected by these systems such as the ammunition type and 
calibre of recovered ballistics exhibits. This does happen in the UK (NABIS, 2011) but it is not known 
the extent to which this data is considered when compiling official statistics. Furthermore, it is not 
known the extent to which this happens outside the UK. Such research would be complementary to 
official statistics, would provide a different dimension to the official statistics and would arguably 
help address the intelligence gap created by unreported crimes identified by Squires (2008). 
6.1.3 Variance in Gun Crime between Countries and Different Solutions to the Problem 
The literature review demonstrated that the nature and characteristics of gun crime varies 
significantly between countries and sometimes within countries. Krug el al (1998) examined firearms 
deaths across thirty six countries and found that the USA had a much higher incidence of firearms 
deaths than Europe. Krug el al (1998) also found that firearms deaths tended to be fewer in number 
in the Asian nations of Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. The main point that 
Krug el al (1998) demonstrated is one of variance in gun crime rates between countries.  Further 
research such as that conducted by Agozino et al (2009) shows that different countries face different 
problems relating to gun crime.  Agozino et al (2009) examined firearms crimes in the West Indies 
and demonstrated a rise in firearms crimes over six years and also showed that firearms murders 
were less likely to be solved than other murders. This was attributed to the availability of small arms 
and also to retaliation murders. Contrast the situation in the West Indies with the situation in Canada 
as described by Sheptycki (2009) who reported the magnified perceived threat of gun crime despite 
evidence to the contrary showing a fall in gun crime. A further differentiating factor concerning the 
nature of firearms crimes was described by Campbell (2010) who found that the percentage of 
homicides committed using firearms was twice to five times higher in Ireland than in England and 
Wales. The point made by Krug el al (1998), Agozino et al (2009), Sheptycki (2009) and Campbell 
(2010) is that there is good evidence to show that the nature and characteristics of gun crime varies 
between countries. It is therefore logical to suggest that the solution to the problem and also the 
techniques, tools, and equipment needed to tackle the problem will also differ between countries. 
One area of differentiation may be the forensic equipment utilised to examine ballistics evidence.  
The USA has a high rate of crimes involving firearms. It is fair to suggest that there will be a 
correspondingly high number of ballistics exhibits submitted to laboratories for examination and that 
these exhibits will be required to be uploaded to ballistics analysis systems. In this case, it is likely 
that the main capability an installed system will need to have, will be speed of acquiring the bullets 
or cartridge cases. Accuracy will also be a concern due to the likely large size of the database. 
Contrast this with a country that has a smaller problem. It is likely that the number of ballistics 
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exhibits is smaller and also that these countries are maintaining smaller databases. Whilst accuracy is 
still important, the speed at which the objects are acquired may not be of such importance if there is 
no backlog of cases. These different requirements relating to ballistics analysis systems are a critical 
point but are often overlooked.  Research conducted in a controlled manner such as that conducted 
for this Thesis, can inform the purchasing decisions that police forces and forensic laboratories make 
regarding automated systems.  
Nutley, Davies and Tilley (2000) describe some specific interventions that can be applied to the 
evidence based procurement of ballistics analysis systems. Firstly, research findings should be 
communicated simply and clearly. This is important as procurement decisions may lie with non-
experts. Nutley, Davies and Tilley (2000) also suggest that the effectiveness of the implementation 
should be monitored. It is interesting to note that the implementation of evidence based approaches 
faces many of the same barriers as adoption of new innovative technology.  Moore (1999) described 
some of the problems relating to successful technology adoption. Some of the strategies that enable 
successful adoption such as training, the use of product champions and introducing targets to ensure 
use of the product are very similar to interventions recommended by Nutley, Davies and Tilley (2000) 
to ensure the use of evidence based approaches by police practitioners.  
There are however, two barriers to this approach created by the current situation with regards to 
ballistics analysis systems. The first is that the differences in functionality of different systems are not 
systematically known or documented preventing procurement decisions such as the ones described 
above being made. This is probably because of the difficulties of carrying out such research. These 
difficulties were documented in Chapter four and included considerations such as the time and cost 
of such research. The results of this Thesis have demonstrated that it is possible and achievable to 
document these differences between systems by conducting a controlled experiment using the same 
ammunition set. The results not only show that conducting research such as this is possible but also 
that the results yielded are valuable. It is also suggests that more research of this type should be 
undertaken prior to the procurement and installation of any new system.  
The second barrier is the lack of interoperability between systems meaning that procurement 
decisions are often taken on the basis of an entire country or region to ensure that data can be 
shared. This Thesis has demonstrated that interoperability between systems is unlikely to be realised 
without the cooperation of the manufacturers due to the disagreement between the systems 
demonstrated in the results (see bullets 2A, 3A, 4A, 13A, 14A and 21A as examples).  
The lack of documented differences between systems and lack of interoperability between systems 
unfortunately suggests that evidence based procurement is not currently happening. This is despite 
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the fact that such an approach could improve the investigation and detection of gun crime offences 
by enabling police forces to use the equipment that is best suited to their specific circumstances. 
6.1.4 Effect of Legislation  
Research for this Thesis analysed the capabilities of two systems to correlate the same sample of 
bullets and cartridge cases. This has enabled issues such as interoperability between systems to be 
considered with an evidence base. There are other functionalities of these systems which may yield 
useful data aside from the primary function of cross-correlating bullets and cartridge cases. 
Furthermore, there are many applications for this but one example could be measuring the effect of 
legislative changes. Research to date has focussed on the effect of legislation on gun related deaths 
(Ozanne-Smith et al, 2004; Niederkrotenthaler et al, 2009). There is perhaps a need to consider the 
impact that legislation has on the forensic detail of the firearms consequently being used in crimes. 
The work conducted has shown that ballistics analysis systems routinely capture forensic ballistics 
data such as calibre, ammunition type and inferred firearm type because this information is required 
by the correlation algorithms. A suggested way to measure the specific impact of legislative changes 
could be through the collection, harvesting and analysis of data stored on ballistics analysis systems. 
Warlow (2007) explained how reactivated firearms became problematic in Britain following the 
introduction of legislation banning handguns. This type of trend would have an impact on the 
forensic examinations being carried out and would be captured in the data stored on ballistics 
analysis systems. It is possible that in some cases ballistics analysis systems are storing data that has 
untapped intelligence potential regarding trends in firearm use.  
The benefits of applying this approach are that interoperable systems are not necessarily required to 
conduct the suggested analysis. Instead, the same analytical approach could be taken with the 
different data sets and the results compared to assess the similarities and differences in the data. 
One specific example would be to perform an audit of the number of bullets, cartridge cases stored 
by each country and the number of individual firearms they represent. A further task could be to 
record the make and model of firearms this sample represents. Analysing just these points could 
yield useful information on the varying ways in which the systems are being used in different 
countries and also the trends observed in firearms being used to commit crimes. This data when 
overlaid with data from other sources such as the dates of legislative changes could yield powerful 
information and intelligence. Despite some of the issues found with ballistics analysis systems by this 
research, use in this context would show that they can still yield useful intelligence through the data 
that is being collected in addition to the correlations they are primarily used for. This application of 
the technology could also be considered in the development of future systems. One such approach 
would be to ensure that automated reporting functions are included in new technologies. 
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6.1.5 Supply, Distribution and Trafficking of Firearms 
Spapens (2007) highlighted the need to understand the ways in which weapons are trafficked with 
the aim of preventing and detecting future weapon trafficking offences. Spapens (2007) also pointed 
out that understanding this problem is made more difficult by the lack of data that is available. One 
of major barriers to understanding the extent to which weapons travel is the lack of interoperability 
between ballistics analysis systems. For example, Germany uses the Evofinder system whilst the UK 
uses the IBIS-Trax 3D system. These systems are not interoperable so data cannot be shared between 
them. Unfortunately, the results of this Thesis suggest that interoperability between systems A and B 
is not possible. Logically it would seem that interoperability between other systems is also not 
possible. Certainly there is firm evidence provided by this Thesis to suggest that interoperability 
between systems A and B is not possible without the explicit cooperation of the manufacturers. 
Although there were occasions where there was agreement between the systems and even 
occasions where the same result was observed, there were also occasions where an opposite result 
was observed. An example is the result for cartridge case 8A (firing pin impression) where system A 
correlated object 8B at position 74 and object 8C at position 3. System B however correlated the 
cartridge cases in the opposite relative order, placing cartridge case 8B at position 1 and cartridge 
case 8C at position 48. This is just one example of the inconsistencies in correlation results between 
systems that suggest that interoperable systems are not possible because of fundamental differences 
in data acquisition and correlation algorithms. Arguably interoperability is one of the most important 
problems to solve because there is evidence to suggest that there are patterns in firearms supply and 
consequential use in crimes that cannot be identified due to a lack of interoperability between 
systems. 
Wintemute el al (2004) showed that a small number of retailers account for a disproportionately 
large number of guns that are used in crimes. Wintemute et al (2004) also showed that guns have a 
different time to crime
18
 that can be detected based on purchasing information. It was suggested by 
Wintemute et al (2004) that a time to crime of less than three years is suggestive of trafficking. The 
data analysed by Wintemute et al (2004) was purchase information and then information from when 
the firearm was recovered using data gathered in a single country – the United States. Replicating 
this research in Europe would be problematic because once a weapon moves to a country different 
to where it was purchased, the trail is lost. Even if the firearm was subsequently recovered, test fires 
produced by it cannot be routinely checked against databases held in countries using other systems. 
An example is Germany and the Czech Republic which share a border. Germany uses the Evofinder 
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 ͞Tiŵe to Đƌiŵe͟ is defiŶed as the tiŵe fƌoŵ ǁheŶ the ǁeapoŶ is sold to when it is recovered (Wintemute et 
al, 2004: 733). 
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system and the Czech Republic use the Balscan system. These systems are not interoperable. Bullets 
and cartridge cases have to be physically transported between countries to be compared. 
Occasionally digital images of the samples are emailed between laboratories. This practice was 
witnessed by the author during a visit to the Czech Republic Police in April 2009. The fact that this 
practice is carried out shows there are occasions where weapons are used in different countries and 
also that there is an opportunity to optimise the process of exchanging data. 
Data of the type that Wintemute et al (2004) used to identify trends in the United States is not 
readily available in some European countries. There is no systematic way of querying databases 
holding forensic ballistics information. One way to address this would be through the development of 
interoperable ballistics analysis systems and a standard data format. This approach has been 
suggested before notably by Tulleners (2001:6-ϯͿ ǁho stated, ͞Specifications could be developed 
that meet the needs of the state database. The image would then be transmitted to the state in full 
format for further processing by whatever technology the state decides to use. This standard would 
also leave the original image available for reprocessing should a new vendor with a different 
algoƌithŵ ǁaŶt to eŶteƌ this field.͟ 
6.1.6 Specialist Police Operations 
The literature review explained the role that specialist police investigations can play in tackling gun 
crime. One such example was Operation Trident in London (Metropolitan Police, 2010).  Part of the 
focus of Operation Trident is a focus on disrupting the supply and demand of firearms. Presumably 
such a remit depends upon information that is available regarding crimes that do occur and the 
firearms that are used in the commission of these crimes. Ballistics analysis systems do play a part in 
specialist operations such as Operation Trident. Trident is UK based and the UK uses a ballistics 
analysis system other than the two examined in this Thesis. However the results of this Thesis still 
have important implications for specialist operations that may be set up in future in the UK and in 
other countries. These implications are especially relevant for countries that use the ballistics 
analysis systems studied in this research. 
Spapens (2007) pointed out that there is a lack of data relating to trafficking of firearms before their 
use in crimes. This must affect specialist police operations with a remit such as that of Operation 
Trident. Arguably the linkage of crimes through forensic ballistics data may be hindered through a 
lack of accuracy of some of the current technology. This would make is difficult to know with 
absolute certainty that either there were no links in a database to a questioned bullet or cartridge 
case or alternatively that every single link had been discovered. Consider the results of this Thesis 
where one of the known matches was correlated in the top position and the other at a lower position 
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on the correlation list. One such example is the results for cartridge case 11A for the firing pin 
algorithm. Both system A and B correlated cartridge case 11B at position one. Cartridge case 11C 
however was correlated at positions 321 and 335 respectively. A result such as that for cartridge case 
11A if replicated in real casework raises the possibility of undiscovered links between crimes. This 
again is clear evidence that improvements to the technology are needed in the interests of increasing 
accuracy. 
The lack of interoperability between systems may also hinder specialist police operations such as 
Operation Trident. Suppose that an investigation suggests that weapons are being trafficked from 
continental Europe to London. There will be some countries in Europe using the same ballistics 
analysis system as London and the bullets and cartridge cases from seized weapons can be checked 
against these databases. Other countries that are using different systems will not be able to be 
checked. The important point is that the lack of interoperability between systems is the driver behind 
the actions the specialist police operation may take rather than investigatory avenues that have been 
highlighted as necessary. In practice this would mean that instead of being able to choose which 
databases are checked based on the investigation to date, the choice is dictated by the technology a 
particular country may have installed. A lack of interoperable systems also makes the gaining of an 
overall picture difficult. It may be understood that weapons are being trafficked from Country A to B 
but the movement of the weapon prior to its arrival in Country A may not be understood or known 
because the data is not available. 
6.1.7 Weapon Registration  
Feasibility studies have been carried out to assess the possibility of implementing a weapon 
registration scheme also known as a reference ballistics imaging database. This would entail all 
legally purchased firearms being test fired and the bullets and cartridge cases being acquired by a 
ballistics analysis system so that these bullets and cartridge cases are available to be correlated 
against samples collected at crime scenes. Tulleners (2001) and De Kinder (2002b) examined the 
possibility of such a scheme and this work informed a report by Lockyer (2003). The conclusion was 
that such a scheme was not possible for three reasons. Firstly, the fact that only 5% of weapons used 
in crimes are legal weapons, secondly, the prohibitive cost and thirdly the fact the technology was 
not accurate enough. The results of this Thesis do provide some evidence to support the last point 
regarding technology accuracy. The results showed that system A was able to correlate one of the 
two known match bullets in the top twenty on 86.96% of occasions and system B achieved a 
percentage success rate of 69.56%. These percentages dropped to 82.61% and 47.83% respectively 
when correlating both known matches in the top twenty. Error rates were also defined and 
calculated. The total error rate percentage was defined as any occasion where the system has not 
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achieved a perfect result and a non-matching object or objects has been presented in a higher 
position that an actual matching object or objects. If a system failed to produce any results, this 
would also be regarded as an incorrect result if the matches were present in the database. The total 
error rate percentage for bullets was 34.78% for system A and 56.52% for system B. For the cartridge 
case breech face algorithm, the percentages were 50% (system A) and 95.45% (system B). For the 
firing pin algorithm, the total error rate percentages were 81.82% (system A) and 86.36% (system B). 
The false positive error rate was defined as any occasion where a non-matching object was 
correlated in the top position above known matching objects. The bullet false positive error rates 
were 17.39% for system A and 39.13% for system B. For the cartridge case breech face algorithm the 
false positive error rate percentages were 27.27% (system A) and 45.45% (system B). For the firing 
pin algorithm, the false positive error rate percentages were 31.82% (system A) and 27.27% (system 
B). The findings regarding error rates are problematic when considering a weapon registration 
scheme. Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) demonstrated that accuracy decreased as database size 
increased. Any database housing a weapon registration scheme would be considerably larger than an 
open case file database. Consequently, the systems would need to be significantly more accurate 
than they are at present. 
A weapon registration scheme may also face legislative and ethical problems. One of the main 
differences between an open case file of ballistics exhibits and a database of exhibits from legally 
held weapons is that bullets and cartridge cases from the open case file have been collected from 
crime scenes. Exhibits in a weapon registration database would represent bullets and cartridge cases 
fired by weapons owned perfectly legally by innocent people. Presumably there would also be 
personal information stored that would connect the legally held weapons to the owners. This would 
raise questions of proportionate use of the data and result in the need for clear policies and 
procedures in place should the system suggest a cold match
19
. Given the inaccuracy of the 
technology demonstrated in this Thesis in some conditions, it is entirely likely that innocent people 
may find themselves under suspicion because of an erroneous result of a ballistics analysis system. 
Related to this point is the discussion of these results in the context of confirmation bias. Previously 
work by Kerstholt et al (2010) examined the effect of biasing information of firearms examiners but 
crucially not with ballistics analysis systems. There has not been any research examining the effect of 
biased information (the presence of non-matching objects above matching objects on a correlation 
list for example) generated by ballistics analysis systems. Arguably this issue should be addressed 
before introducing more complexity into databases of bullets and cartridge cases, and increasing the 
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 A cold match is defined as a link between ballistics objects (bullets or cartridge cases) made solely through 
the use of a ballistics analysis system. There is no other intelligence or evidence to suggest the match and it has 
only been uncovered though the correlations carried out by a ballistics analysis system. 
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resultant workload of ballistics examiners. Similar arguments were made by Cork et al (2008) and the 
results of this Thesis provide supporting evidence. 
Another difficulty relates to the fact that test fired bullets and cartridge cases from legally held 
weapons would presumably be of good quality as the test fires would be performed under controlled 
conditions. If legally held weapons were registered at the point of sale it is also likely that a large 
proportion of weapons would be new and this again would result in good quality striations on test 
fired bullets and cartridge cases. If weapon registration scheme exhibits and the open case file 
exhibits were stored in the same database, legally held weapons could erroneously be correlated 
higher than crime scene samples simply because the quality of the marks is better (Cork et al, 2008).  
If a weapon registration scheme was to be introduced, the results of this Thesis and of Tulleners 
(2001) and De Kinder (2002b) suggest that the technology firstly needs to undergo rigorous feasibility 
testing. It was described earlier in this Chapter how testing technology can reveal features that are 
applicable to some laboratories but maybe not others and how testing in a controlled environment 
would enable transparent procurement decisions to be made. The same argument applies to any 
technology underlying a weapon registration scheme and is arguably a strict prerequisite to any 
scheme. It should also be noted that there are practical differences in registering a weapon at the 
point of sale compared to the point of manufacture. It may be easy to register weapons at the point 
of manufacture. A device that captured the digital signature of a weapon could be built into the 
production line. This would enable data that is already collected such as place of manufacture and 
serial numbers to be associated with the ballistics signature. This could then follow all the legal 
transactions of the weapon and unlike serial numbers would be difficult to modify or remove. The 
benefits of registering a weapon at the point of manufacture would be that the cost could be 
partially or possibly fully covered, by the weapon manufacturer under responsible and ethical 
business practice legislation. However the one major drawback of such an approach is that it would 
not cover weapons that are already in circulation. This is where registering weapons at the point of 
sale may help as second hand weapons would be covered. This would still be problematic due to the 
vast number of legally held firearms already in circulation (Kopel and Burnett, 2003). 
However, it should be noted that despite the various discussion points relating to weapon 
registration schemes, there is a fundamental issue that prevents implementation of such a scheme. 
Technology examined to date (Tulleners, 2001; De Kinder, 2002b) and the results of this Thesis 
suggest that the technology is not accurate enough. Arguably, the only way such a scheme could be 
introduced would be if technology was improved to the extent where matches were declared with a 
much higher degree of certainty than is currently the case. It has already been suggested that 
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interoperability of different systems could be achieved if there was an underlying standard for 
matching bullets and cartridge cases upon which correlation algorithms could be built. A weapon 
registration scheme would be more realistic if new technologies had an underlying matching 
standard that enabled matches to be declared to a level of statistical significance in the same way 
matches between DNA profiles are (Cork et al, 2008). 
6.1.8 Alternative Technology that could be applied to Forensic Ballistics 
A major issue highlighted by this research has been the accuracy of both technologies examined. The 
argument has been made that the lack of a matching standard underlying the correlation algorithms 
has resulted in each manufacturer developing proprietary techniques that make interoperable 
systems very difficult to achieve despite resultant investigatory advantages. The systems examined in 
this Thesis are both based upon digital imaging and this directly affects the accuracy of the systems. 
Bullets and cartridge cases are three dimensional objects but the application of digital imagery to the 
ballistics field only enables a two dimensional representation of the objects to be captured. Arguably 
any new technology should be based on approaches that enable a fully three dimensional 
representation to be captured. Approaches have been suggested by Chu et al, (2010), Banno, (2004), 
Geradts, (1994), Field, Kelley and McCabe, (1996) and Nor Azura, Choong-Yeun and Abdul Aziz, 
(2010). An approach based on surface metrology was described by Xie et al (2009). This approach 
involves the measurement of a bullet using a stylus that touches the objects and captures the 
topographical profile of the object in three dimensions. Cork et al (2008) suggested that the 
technology does not allow measurement at sufficient detail. This point is clearly refuted by the work 
of Xie et al (2009). The application of a measurement stylus to forensic ballistics has also been 
overlooked and discounted due to the fact that there is physical contact between the stylus and the 
bullet. However, there is physical contact with bullets and cartridge cases throughout the forensic 
process currently. Examples include the handling and storage of bullets and cartridge cases. Another 
example is the marking of bullets with a diamond tipped marker prior to acquisition by IBIS Heritage 
in Israel (Argaman, Shoshani and Hocherman, 2001).  The test firing method can also affect the 
striations on the bullet yet these contacts do not seem to generate any concern. It is also likely that 
there is a trade-off between the complete data that can be gained from a bullet and minute potential 
damage that can be accounted for. The current approach is arguably equally problematic as there is 
no damage but incomplete data acquisition due to poor or inconsistent lighting issues. The contact 
between a measurement probe and the bullet could in fact be carefully managed. One approach 
might be to take a replica of the bullet using casting methods or to also capture the object using 
another non-contact technology. This would allow any damage to be recorded and explained. The 
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potential for damage is also related to the material of the ammunition with harder materials such as 
copper much less likely to be damaged than softer metals such as lead. 
The application of a contact stylus to ballistics analysis is particularly attractive because it would 
allow the inside of a barrel to be measured. Currently a bullet to bullet comparison is carried out to 
ascertain if a certain weapon fired both bullets. The ability to measure a barrel would remove a layer 
of complexity by allowing direct comparison of objects (the barrel and gun) that have come into 
contact with each other generating distinguishing marks. It is also possible that barrel measurement 
would enable a virtual bullet to be created by inverting the digital signature of the barrel. The exact 
transfer function of the barrel topography to the bullet does however require more research. 
Xie et al (2009) concluded by stating that further research is needed using a large number of bullet 
samples. The application of the methodology designed in this Thesis and the ammunition test set 
would be ideal to the technology described by Xie et al (2009). The utilisation of the sample of 
ammunition generated for this Thesis would allow the same bullet to be represented by imaging 
technology and technology based on 3D surface metrology. This would demonstrate the differences 
in approach and the additional data that can be gained by 3D measurement. The capturing of 
measurement data that is a precise representation of a bullet may also contribute to a matching 
standard. The quality of a match and any associated standard will be determined by the quality of 
the data. Technology such as that described by Xie et al (2009) has the advantage of offering 
͞Đoŵplete aŶd aĐĐuƌate ďullet suƌfaĐe topogƌaphǇ data͟ ;Xie et al, ϮϬϬϵ: ϱϮϮͿ. OŶĐe the teĐhŶologǇ 
has been assessed and feasibility proven, industrial application is possible. 
6.1.9 - Potential Barriers to Innovation 
The introduction of new technology into any organisation can problematic often due to the scale of 
changes required and the difference in working practices that may result. Other technologies used in 
crime prevention such as ANPR and CCTV have faced similar challenges and the lessons learnt can be 
applied to any future introduction of new ballistics analysis technologies. Some of these were 
described in the literature review (Henderson et al, 2004; Gill and Spriggs, 2005).  
One of the main barriers to innovation that any technology may face is the lack of interoperability 
between the new technology and the existing system it may replace. Even if new technology is 
replacing a manual system there will be a large amount of bullets and cartridge cases that will need 
to be acquired by a new system. Before the acquisition of bullets and cartridge cases started for this 
research there were considerable difficulties in organising and planning this research. This represents 
an important finding in itself because it shows that acquiring large quantities of bullets and cartridge 
cases onto any system is difficult and time consuming. An alternative approach would be to enable 
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some form of back-record conversion between the incumbent system and the new system. Again, 
the requirement for interoperable systems is present but as has been previously noted there would 
need to be cooperation from the manufacturers to enable this to happen which may be unlikely. This 
again emphasises the need to develop a standard data format that would allow the exchange of data 
between different systems.  
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6.2 –Implications 
Crimes involving firearms have a significant impact on victims and society as a whole and when they 
do occur are frequently reported in the media (BBC, 2008, BBC, 2009, BBC, 2010b). The extent of 
crimes involving firearms varies between countries (Krug et al, 1998; Agozino et al, 2009; Dauvergne 
and De Socio, 2008; Sheptycki, 2009; Campbell, 2010) and evidence suggests that the incidence of 
crimes involving firearms is linked to other factors such as availability and legal restrictions on their 
ownership and possession (Warlow, 2007). There is also evidence to suggest that crimes involving 
firearms are associated with other types of criminality such as the trade in illicit drugs (Hales et al, 
2006). The quantification of gun crime can be problematic due to the fact that victims and witnesses 
are often reluctant to come forward and forensic evidence can be difficult to obtain. Crimes involving 
firearms will often go unreported and this can result in a situation where victims and witnesses are 
not available to be interviewed and forensic evidence cannot be obtained (Squires, 2008).  
Ballistics analysis systems are often used in the investigation of gun crime especially to check for links 
between crimes through ballistics evidence. The use of such systems has led to research being 
conducted to examine the functionality and performance of these systems with the aims of providing 
recommendations on best practise and the best way to use these systems (Tulleners, 2001; De 
Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut, 2004; George, 2004a; George 2004b; Brinck, 2008; Nennsteil and 
Rahm, 2006a; Nennstiel and Rahm 2006b; Braga and Pierce, 2004; Cork et al, 2008). When this Thesis 
commenced there had not been any research conducted on any system other than the IBIS systems 
manufactured by Forensic Technology Inc. Other systems that are installed in various countries had 
not been the subject of published research.  
The conclusions and implications of this Thesis can be discussed in the context of four areas. Firstly, 
the conclusions and implications in relation to interoperable systems, secondly, factors relevant to 
the usage of the systems by ballistics experts, thirdly, the usage of the systems by police officers and 
finally issues relevant to the procurement of ballistics analysis systems.  
6.2.1 Interoperability of Ballistics Analysis Systems  
There was and continues to be no interoperability between ballistics analysis systems manufactured 
by different providers meaning that data cannot be shared between different systems. This is despite 
the fact interoperability has been suggested before notably by Tulleners (2001) and Cork et al 
(2008).Because of the problems faced by law enforcement agencies specific to gun crime, the 
suggestion was put forward that it is of vital importance to utilise all evidence that is gathered when 
crimes are reported to police. Furthermore, it was suggested that increased data sharing of forensic 
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ballistics data could generate further intelligence leads but that the lack of interoperability between 
different ballistics analysis systems was a solid barrier to realising this. 
One of the aims of the research was to input the same sample of bullets and cartridge cases to 
different systems and assess the output to ascertain the potential for interoperability. The results of 
the experiment clearly show that interoperability is a complex, difficult problem. It may be the case 
that there are two types of interoperability. Complete interoperability between systems would refer 
to the ability to freely exchange raw data between different systems and to perform correlations 
across data from different systems. Another form of interoperability could be the ability to extract 
and share the correlated data from different systems but without the ability to perform correlations 
on raw data. This would be a compromise but would at least allow the examination of objects to be 
partially performed using the systems instead of requesting the physical bullet or cartridge case. 
Agreement between systems is an important finding in the context of interoperability because 
results from systems that are the same or similar suggest that similar underlying principles within the 
systems are responsible for the results This would suggest that interoperability would be possible 
because of the underlying similarity in functionality. There were occasions where there was complete 
agreement between the systems in terms of correlation list positions of the known matching objects. 
There were also occasions where there was a lesser form of agreement between the systems where 
the correlation list positions were similar. However there were many occasions where there was 
clear disagreement between the systems. Disagreement was evident in the form of objects being 
correlated in different positions but in the same order (object B above object C for both systems) but 
also objects being correlated in the opposite order. For example there were multiple occasions 
where system A correlated object B above object C but system B produced the opposite result and 
correlated object C above object B. 
The observed variance in the correlation list positions generated by the two systems examined, show 
that whilst the physical bullets and cartridge cases were the same, the digital representations of the 
bullets and cartridge cases captured by each system were different. There were occasions where 
seemingly opposite results were generated by the systems. For example, system A correlated one 
bullet above the other and system B placed the bullets in the opposite order. The same type of result 
was observed for some cartridge cases. Such results would suggest that the correlation algorithms 
are different. It is likely that the only way in which complete interoperability of systems is possible is 
with the full cooperation of the manufacturers who would be required to share their data acquisition 
and correlation techniques with the aim of coming to a consensus based approach as to how 
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interoperability could be achieved. Due to concerns around trade secrets, intellectual property, 
patents and market share, this seems unlikely to happen.  
A compromise would be to develop a series of calibration artefacts which are known test fires that 
are shared between all manufacturers and are available to test correlation algorithms to ensure 
minimum error rates such as that proposed by Song et al (2010). This would then allow 
manufacturers to develop any correlation techniques as long as the minimum performance levels are 
specified. These so called test fires may be real physical artefacts or in fact could be digital 
synthetically generated data sets that are widely available to test software correlation algorithms. 
The development of synthetic data files for algorithm development has been established in the allied 
field of engineering micro surface metrology where the data files and their relevant characteristics 
are free to download from National Measurement Institutes such as the National Physical Laboratory 
in the UK. These data files can then be used as softgauges for algorithm development (Blunt et al, 
2008). 
To facilitate interoperability of data, a standard data format could be developed to enable the 
sharing of images and associated data between systems. In this context there would be a clear 
distinction between the automated correlation and matching functionality of the systems and the 
image viewing capability of the systems. The standard data format could sit outside of the correlation 
functionality and simply facilitate the sharing of images to allow experts to make an initial 
assessment on the similarity of a bullet or cartridge case before requesting the physical sample or 
transporting the physical sample to another laboratory which could be located anywhere. More 
importantly a standard data format could allow data to be measured on one system and then 
electronically transferred to another system from a different manufacturer but still be entered into 
the correlation database. This would undoubtedly save time and money. This approach would also 
require the cooperation of the manufacturers in terms of agreeing a standard data format to 
facilitate data exchange. All that would be required would be development of an export module to 
allow the high detail images upon which the correlations are carried out to be exported out of the 
system and inputted into a database. If this approach to interoperability was taken, the development 
of a database would also be required; storing the images and associated data such as classmarks and 
case reference numbers to allow the search and retrieval of images based on case data and 
classmark data. A similar approach has been adopted in the allied field of engineering micro surface 
measurement where all manufacturers allow data to be transferred into a common data format, .sdf 
which can be read on any surface measurement system (Blunt and Jiang, 2003).  
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A further factor related to interoperability is the fact of calibration of the measurement system. For 
the tested systems A and B, the instruments are not normally calibrated by the end user. Calibration 
is Đaƌƌied out to eŶsuƌe the ŵeasuƌeŵeŶts aƌe ͞ĐoƌƌeĐt͟ aŶd the iŶstƌuŵeŶt is Ŷot geŶeƌatiŶg 
measurement error and the measurements are fully traceable. Where instruments are used as 
standalone systems, this is not necessarily a problem as the results are all relative to each other and 
not absolute. However, if interoperability is a goal, then absolute instrument calibration will become 
a serious issue. This will especially be the case if systems move to 3D surface measurement solutions. 
The implications of the results are that full interoperability between the systems examined may not 
be possible without the cooperation of the manufacturers. The results would also suggest that 
interoperability between other systems is not possible. A more limited form of interoperability may 
be possible where data can be extracted and shared based on standard data formats. The wider 
implication is that the barrier to effective data sharing that the lack of interoperability creates, is 
likely to remain unless there is significant pressure placed on the manufacturers of the technology to 
innovate in this area. This pressure may have to come from the users of the systems or from legal 
directives ensuring that some form of standard is implemented, especially where multiple systems 
are present under one legal jurisdiction. 
The wider implication of this research concerns the fact that there is no matching standard for 
ballistics objects upon which systems and algorithms can be built. This has resulted in proprietary 
data capture and correlation algorithms that are incompatible with other proprietary data acquisition 
and correlation algorithms leading to a lack of interoperability. The results of this Thesis imply that 
further research is needed to address the lack of a matching standard so that it can be applied to 
existing and new technologies. Arguably, a route to interoperability is new technology built using a 
standard for matching as the underlying principle. It may be the case that other techniques such as 
Xie et al (2009) that allow more detailed data capture are more suited to ballistics objects than digital 
imaging and that the greater level of detail these techniques can capture will enable a matching 
standard to be developed.  
6.2.2 Usage of the system by Ballistics Experts – System Functionality 
The results of this Thesis have highlighted factors specific to the usage of the systems by ballistics 
experts. These findings concern the ways in which the systems can be used more effectively to 
enhance the value they can add to a laboratory. Secondly, however the results have implications for 
the interactions between the systems and the experts that use them.  
Users of the systems should have an understanding of the ways in which the systems work - including 
the strengths and weaknesses of a system and any caveats that must be applied to the results. These 
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factors may have an impact on the conclusions of the examiner so should be considered carefully. 
Two different error rates were defined as part of this Thesis. Both depend on an objective standpoint 
being taken – the acceptance that the results are either correct (a perfect result) or incorrect (any 
otheƌ oĐĐasioŶͿ. The fiƌst eƌƌoƌ ƌate, ͞Total Eƌƌoƌ ‘ate PeƌĐeŶtage͟ ƌefeƌs to the oĐĐasioŶs ǁheƌe the 
system produced a result that was incorrect; a perfect result was not achieved. For system A and 
bullets the error rate percentage was 34.78%. For system B, the error rate percentage was 56.52%. 
For cartridge cases, the error rate percentages for system A were 50% (breech face algorithm) and 
81.82% (firing pin impression). For system B, the error rate percentages were 95.45% (breech face 
algorithm) and 86.26% (firing pin impression). An alternative error rate percentage was also defined 
Đalled the ͞False Positiǀe Eƌƌoƌ ‘ate͟ aŶd the defiŶitioŶ of this is aŶǇ occasion where a non-matching 
object has been correlated in the top position above the known matching objects. The error rate 
percentages for system A for this definition were 17.39% (bullets), 27.27% (breech face algorithm) 
and 31.82% (firing pin algorithm). For system B, the error rate percentages were 39.13% (bullets), 
45.45% (breech face algorithm) and 27.27% (firing pin algorithm). These error rate definitions could 
be used in further research in addition to percentage success rates. The results suggest a need for 
caution and understanding when interpreting correlation lists and declaring matches. It is also 
important to understand that a system not suggesting a match does not guarantee there are no 
matching objects in the database. This should be communicated clearly to the investigating officer to 
ensure there is no underlying assumption that the questioned object definitely does not match 
previously seized and examined exhibits.  
6.2.3 Usage of the systems by Ballistics Experts – Effect of Ammunition Type  
There were occasions where one cartridge case was correlated in a relatively high position and the 
other was correlated at a much lower position. It was suggested that the ammunition type may be 
affecting the results and consequently this was investigated further. The results combined with the 
type of ammunition suggest that this is an important variable and that both systems were more 
successful at correlating cartridge cases that were the same ammunition type as the cartridge case in 
question - this probably being a material property variable. This supports the findings of previous 
research conducted by Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) and De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut (2004). 
These findings can be translated into practical recommendations such as ensuring that samples 
uploaded to ballistics analysis systems are of the same ammunition type as samples already on the 
database. This approach has been suggested by Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a) and Argaman, Shoshani 
and Hocherman (2001).There is, however, a trade-off to be made between this and ensuring the 
database is not too large. Research has suggested that the performance of ballistics analysis systems 
decreases as database size increases (Nennsteil and Rahm, 2006a). The tipping point of this trade-off 
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is not fully understood and is perhaps an avenue for further research.  The findings in relation to 
ammunition type again show that the capabilities of a system should be communicated to and clearly 
understood by the user community.  
6.2.4 Usage of the systems by Ballistics Experts – Correlation List Length 
The number of objects on the correlation list presented to the user of a system that are actually 
examined varies between laboratories and countries. Previous research has suggested correlation list 
lengths of ten objects (IBIS training manual), five objects (Silverwater and Koffman, 2000) between 
five and ten objects (Nennsteil and Rahm, 2006a) and twenty objects (Brinck, 2008).  Most 
laboratories do not examine objects that fall outside the top twenty on the correlation list. There 
were results for both systems where the known matches were either correlated outside the top 
twenty or not at all. The implication of this is that these objects would in all likelihood not be 
discovered in a real-life situation. This could lead to links between crimes not being discovered 
despite the evidence being held in the database. 
The results of the Thesis and the accompanying discussion demonstrated that there is wide variance 
in the results in terms of the specific correlation list positions of the known matching objects. 
However, the results suggested that there is an optimal correlation list length for this particular data 
set. The implications of this research are that for bullets, and system A the top twenty objects should 
be examined while for system B it is suggested that the top ten objects are examined as no increase 
in performance was observed by increasing the correlation list beyond ten objects. For cartridge 
cases, the results have produced evidence to suggest that the top twenty objects on the correlation 
list should be examined. The only exception to this is for the breech face algorithm of System B. No 
improvement in success rate was observed by extending the list beyond two objects although it 
should be noted that the success rate overall for this condition was low. The implication of the 
experimental work is that given a particular data set, ideal and realistic standards can be developed. 
Ammunition type of uploaded samples and the number of objects examined on a correlation list are 
two examples. These standards may only be applicable to a particular laboratory but may increase 
efficiency if researched and applied carefully. 
6.2.5 - Use of the systems by Ballistics Experts - Confirmation Bias and Subjectivity 
The investigation of crimes involving firearms often involves experts presenting evidence in court 
that two objects (bullets or cartridge cases) match and have therefore been fired from the same 
weapon (Nichols, 1997). There are however different working practices and procedures that form the 
process of arriving at a declared evidential match (Schwarz, 2004). For example, there may be 
occasions when a bullet has been recovered from a crime scene along with a weapon. In this case, 
the bullet will be compared with a test fired bullet from the recovered weapon to ascertain whether 
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or not the two objects match. In some cases however, a bullet or cartridge case will be recovered 
from a crime scene and there will be no weapon to compare it to. In these circumstances, it is likely 
that an automated system will be used to ascertain if the object has any matches in the database and 
consequently if any crimes may have been committed previously using the same firearm. 
In this Thesis, an automated system obtained a perfect result when both known matching objects 
were correlated in the top two positions. For the bullet condition, system A achieved a perfect result 
percentage score of 65.22% and system B achieved a perfect result percentage score of 43.48%. The 
implication of this is that when examining the results for the twenty two test objects, there were 
34.78% and 56.52% of occasions respectively when a perfect result was not achieved and objects 
that are known non matches were presented in a higher position on the correlation list that the 
actual known matching objects. This was defined as the Total Error Rate. This immediately raises the 
possibility that because there are known matching objects being presented to the user of the 
systems as being more similar than actual matching objects, confirmation bias may be inherent in the 
use of these systems.  
Kerstholt et al (2010) examined the possibility that firearms examiners may be affected by 
confirmation bias and concluded that the biased information did not affect the conclusions of the 
examiners. However, there were methodological issues with the study such as the fact there was not 
a control condition and the participants were aware they were participating in an experiment. The 
participants in the study conducted by Kerstholt et al (2010) were also only given two bullets to 
examine with no information provided about their relative similarity to another object. There has not 
been any research conducted that examines the potential for confirmation bias when an expert is 
using an automated system to generate a list of potential matches. The results obtained as part of 
this Thesis show that on some occasions, the automated systems rank non matching objects as more 
similar the actual matching objects. The extent to which this information may mislead an examiner 
into declaring a match wrongly is not understood and requires further research to ascertain the 
extent to which these false positives could bias the conclusions of firearms examiners. Arguably 
further research should be treated as a priority given the challenges the discipline is currently facing 
(Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz 2007; Edwards, Gatsonis and Kafadar, 2009).   
The results of this Thesis suggest there are implications when a cold hit is suggested. A cold hit refers 
to an occasion where a ballistics analysis system suggests a match to another object (and therefore 
another crime) in the absence of any other evidence. Caution should be applied on these occasions. 
It may be the case that upon further investigation of a cold hit, evidence is gathered to confirm the 
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link. Alternatively it may be the case that no confirmatory evidence is found. It is in these cases that 
caution should apply.  
When a match is declared based on a correlation from an automated system, in many jurisdictions, it 
may be the case that the involvement of a ballistics analysis system is not presented in court. Instead 
the ballistics evidence would be presented as a match between two objects in the experience and 
judgement of the examiner. Perhaps an implication of this research is that the process by which a 
match is arrived at should also be presented in court along with the functional intricacies of the 
ballistics analysis systems. It may also be the case that in some jurisdictions ballistics evidence is not 
admissible in the absence of other evidence whilst in other jurisdictions ballistics evidence is 
admissible in isolation. Consider a situation where a cold hit suggests a link to another case and a 
potential suspect. Upon investigation of this link, a positive DNA profile is gathered between the 
outstanding DNA profile in the current case and the suspect suggested by the cold hit. Clearly, this is 
valuable intelligence that has resulted in the detection of an offence. The results of this Thesis imply 
that in the absence of the DNA evidence, the ballistics evidence may have been questionable 
because of the potential for confirmation bias. It may be the case that the impact is negligible but the 
key point is that there is a clear lack of evidence supporting either side of the argument. This lack of 
evidence may result in the use of valuable intelligence being hindered. Research has suggested that 
ballistics experts are aware of the issue of confirmation bias (Burns, 2001). It is arguably in the 
interests of the ballistics expert community to undertake further research to demonstrate that 
evidence that has involved the use of ballistics analysis systems is reliable.  
In response to criticisms of the forensic ballistics discipline, experts often point out that they undergo 
proficiency testing (Nichols, 2007). There is however a clear difference between proficiency testing 
and confirmation bias. Proficiency testing does not involve examiners being presented with 
deliberately biased information. Neither does it necessarily involve controlled conditions so the 
impact of biasing information cannot be assessed. Proficiency testing can also involve scenarios that 
are simpler that real life cases (Schwarz, 2007). It has also been suggested that examiners perform 
better in proficiency tests that they do day-to-day (Schwarz, 2004). A further implication of the 
current research presented in this Thesis is that there is a case for developing a proficiency test that 
incorporates biasing information. This would allow the impact of the biasing information to be 
assessed.  
The results of the experimental work have clearly demonstrated that there is wide overall variance in 
the results produced by the two different systems examined – even when comparing the same 
classmark type (breech face or firing pin impression).  Whilst there was agreement and disagreement 
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between systems, perhaps more striking, were the occasions when there was disagreement between 
the systems in terms of the relative ranking of objects. For example when system A correlated one 
object above another, system B placed the same objects in the opposite relative positions. 
Objectively both results cannot be true. An objective scientific procedure would rank one object 
above another consistently. A result of this type is not altogether unsurprising however as there are 
no set standards for the identification of bullets and cartridge cases despite attempts (Bunch, 2000; 
Song et al 2009;  Chumbley, et al, 2010; Saks, 2010). The results obtained demonstrate that because 
of the lack of standards for identification and comparison, each manufacturer has devised their own 
algorithms. If the assumption that the expert is in any way influenced by the results presented by a 
system is taken to be true, then a system presenting one result and another system presenting the 
opposite result introduces some concerning issues for the discipline of forensic ballistics science.   
A further implication of this Thesis for the ballistics expert community concerns the examination, 
publication and verification of research conducted on ballistics analysis systems. Previous research 
has been conducted independently without the sole involvement of the manufacturers (Tulleners; 
2001, De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut, 2004; George, 2004a and George, 2004) whilst other 
research has involved the manufacturers of the technology (Roberge and Beauchamp, 2006; Brinck, 
2008). This Thesis has demonstrated the value of a test set of ammunition that is available for use 
with any system and is also available for independent validation. An implication is that any future 
research whether carried out independently or by a manufacturer should have all data including the 
ammunition samples available for inspection, validation and replication by other interested parties. 
This would ensure that the reliability of the findings.  
6.2.6 Use of Ballistics Analysis Systems by Police 
There are also conclusions and implications on issues relevant to policing practise. The lack of 
interoperability between different systems also results in a situation whereby the ability to pursue 
investigatory leads through ballistics data is hindered. An ideal situation would be if any database 
could be searched depending on investigatory need rather than on technology type. Spapens (2007) 
noted that there is a lack of evidence relating to the trafficking of firearms. Trafficking is by nature a 
cross border problem so arguably interoperable systems would at least enable searches to be 
performed routinely. However currently, this is dependent on the technology a particular country 
has installed. This has an impact on police investigations aimed at understanding, documenting and 
ultimately disrupting the illegal supply of firearms such as Operation Trident (Robert and Innes, 2009) 
and Operation Ceasefire (Kennedy, Braga and Piehl, 2001).  Whilst Operation Trident and Operation 
Ceasefire were focussed on relatively small geographical areas (London and Boston respectively) the 
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argument in relation to trafficking still applies because weapons did arrive in these cities from other 
locations.  
Data held on ballistics analysis systems could also be used by police operations such as Trident and 
Ceasefire even when weapons are not fired. Take for example a situation where a gun is used to 
threaten a victim and whilst the weapon is not fired, the victim may recall the weapon in detail. This 
description may lead a ballistics examiner to conclude the weapon was of a particular make or 
model. Searches could then be performed using an automated system as these systems are more 
likely to have details on weapons more accurately described that police crime reporting systems. This 
is because information recorded on ballistics analysis in entered by domain experts whereas the 
crime report will often be completed by a police expert. Searches such as this when combined with 
other intelligence may result in a list of potential linked crimes and suspects. Whilst this approach in 
a relatively small geographical area such as a city may not be problematic, extending this search to 
other countries may prove difficult because of the lack of interoperability between systems.  
A further implication of this is that data routinely captured by ballistics analysis systems could be 
used to generate intelligence on firearm trends and crime types. A similar approach has been applied 
in the UK (Hannam, 2010). This Thesis has provided evidence to suggest that the trends observed in 
firearms usage can be identified in the data captured by ballistics analysis systems because details 
regarding calibre, ammunition and other defining features are required by correlation algorithms. 
This data could be assessed without the need for interoperable systems and then compared between 
systems to identify patterns in firearms use.  Data could also be used to complement official statistics 
providing a fuller picture as to the extent of gun crime. This approach would have a positive impact 
on the police investigation of gun crime as it would enable a greater understanding of the problem. 
This type of data would complement research conducted previously such as that by Smith et al, 
(2010), Wintemute et al, (2004) and Warlow, (1997).  
Research conducted examining the nature and characteristics of crimes involving firearms have 
demonstrated the high impact these crimes have both on the victim and the wider community 
(Pershad et al, 2005; Cutts, Bridle and Bleetman, 2006). Crimes involving firearms can also be difficult 
to investigate due to the fact that gangs and other forms of criminality are often involved (Vaughan 
et al, 1996; Bullock and Tilley, 2002; Decker and Curry, 2002; Marshall, Webb and Tilley, 2005; Hales 
et al, 2006; Hayden et al, 2008 and Hallsworth and Silverstone, 2009). Consequently, any 
improvements to the forensic ballistics discipline that lead to evidence and intelligence being 
returned to the investigating officer faster could help the investigation of gun crime. The implication 
of the research conducted for this Thesis is that through the examination of ballistics analysis 
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systems and the consequential understanding of the functionality and usage of these systems, 
recommendations can be made and applied that may reduce the time taken to return information 
for the investigating officer.  
6.2.7 Procurement of Ballistics Analysis Systems  
The nature and characteristics of gun crime varies dramatically between and sometimes within 
countries (Krug el al, 1998; Agozino et al, 2009; Dauvergne and De Socio, 2008; Sheptycki, 2009; 
Campbell, 2010). It is therefore logical to suggest that there should be varying responses to gun 
crime in terms of resources, tools, forensic equipment and policies. This has been demonstrated by 
specialist police operations targeting gun crime notably Operation Ceasefire in Boston (Kennedy, 
Braga and Piehl, 2001) and Los Angeles (Gonzales, Henke and Hart, 2005), and Operation Trident in 
London (Robert and Innes, 2009).  A further point of variance in the response to gun crime may be 
the specification of the ballistics analysis system installed in a particular country or city. Previous 
research has shown that automated ballistics analysis systems can have a significant impact (Braga 
and Pierce, 2004). As different locations have different types of problems, some features of 
particular technologies will be particularly relevant with others not so. This Thesis has provided good 
evidence that these features of different technologies can be documented and understood. 
Furthermore a coherent argument has been made to use data gathered from research such as that 
conducted in this Thesis to inform procurement decisions relating to ballistics analysis systems. 
Arguably, the lack of research examining ballistics analysis systems impacts on procurement 
decisions. Before research for this Thesis commenced, there had only been research conducted on 
systems provided by one manufacturer (Tulleners, 2001; De Kinder, Tulleners and Thiebaut, 2004; 
George, 2004a; George 2004b; Brinck, 2008; Nennsteil and Rahm, 2006a; Nennstiel and Rahm 2006b; 
Braga and Pierce, 2004; Cork et al, 2008). The implication of no interoperability between different 
systems is that procurement decisions are often a political decision taken by non-ballistics experts. 
The disadvantages of political procurement decisions have been highlighted with other technologies 
notably CCTV (Fay, 1998). Often a decision may be taken for an entire country to enable a national 
database to be implemented. The lack of interoperability between different systems means that 
laboratories cannot choose a system most suited to their specific needs and access data from 
another system type in a different city or region. The implication of the research conducted in this 
Thesis is that whilst research such as this can highlight differences in functionality, the lack of 
interoperability creates a barrier to truly effective procurement decisions. This is likely to become a 
more significant issue because of recent alternative techniques and systems that have been 
suggested (Xie et al, 2009; Chu et al, 2010; Nor Azura, Choong-Yeun and Abdul Aziz; 2010; Barrett, 
Tajbakhsh and Warren, 2011). 
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Consider a laboratory that has a small workload. They may be content to procure a cheaper system 
that takes longer to acquire samples. Conversely a laboratory that has a high workload may prefer to 
install a more expensive system that acquires samples faster.  Another example relating to the 
accuracy of systems could be a country with a large number of objects that would require a high level 
of accuracy due to the large number of objects in the database and the number of correlations that 
need to be performed. Contrast this with a country with a smaller number of objects. Accuracy may 
be of less importance because the correlation lists are smaller due to the smaller database size. The 
lack of time constraints also mean that more objects can be physically examined. In this scenario the 
ballistics analysis system may be used more as an audit system and a backup rather than the primary 
tool for generating investigatory leads. The critical point in that despite there being evidence to show 
differences between countries (Krug et al, 1998; Agozino et al, 2009; Sheptycki, 2009; Campbell, 
2010) and a coherent argument made concerning different systems being suitable in different 
circumstances, the lack of research comparatively analysing ballistics analysis systems means that 
these logical decisions cannot be made easily and routinely. 
Considering the differences within a single country, consolidates the argument further. Take Country 
A as an example. All the ballistics analysis systems installed in this country are provided by a single 
manufacturer, are linked to a single national database but are significantly expensive. The time taken 
to acquire a bullet is relatively fast at approximately ten minutes. If a bullet is acquired by a system in 
City A it will correlated against bullets acquired in City B and City C. There are currently three cities 
where ballistics analysis systems are installed in Country A. There is a known backlog of bullets and 
cartridge cases to be acquired to the national database of Country A. The three cities were chosen to 
house ballistics analysis systems as these were the cities with the highest rates of gun crime.  
There are other locations in Country A such as City D where gun crime does occur but in lower 
frequencies. It may be the case that the purchase of a ballistics analysis system cannot be justified on 
cost grounds because it is so expensive. However, a significantly cheaper system could be justified 
because it would enable the smaller number of locally recovered bullets and cartridge cases to be 
acquired and analysed without submission to the three main centres. The cheaper system may take 
twenty minutes instead of ten minutes to acquire a bullet but this is acceptable because this 
particular location does not have a backlog of bullets and cartridge cases.  In this situation the 
cheaper system would enable the acquisition and correlation of locally recovered bullets and 
cartridge cases providing intelligence concerning potential local links between crimes to the 
investigating officer faster.  
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A further implication of the results relates to procurement decisions and the type of object a 
laboratory may examine (bullets or cartridge cases). Considering the success rate of finding one out 
of the two known matches on a correlation list of twenty objects, system A achieved a bullet success 
rate of 86.96%. System B achieved a success rate of 69.56%. The success rates for the cartridge case 
firing pin impression were the same for both systems at 86.36%. These results imply that success 
rates combined with other factors such as the cost of the systems and acquisition time are powerful 
information to a person or organisation making a procurement decision. In the above described 
example, a laboratory that conducts very few bullet examinations might opt for a cheaper system 
that performs less well with bullets but is equal to the more expensive system that performs to a 
similar level with cartridge cases
20
. The above scenario could be considered an adaptation of 
evidence-based policy implementation described by Bullock and Tilley (2009) and Tilley (2010). A 
rigorous scientific and evidence based approach to technology adoption and installation has ensured 
success with other technologies such as CCTV (Waples and Gill, 2006; Welsh and Farrington, 2009; 
Farrington et al, 2007 and Waples, Gill and Fisher, 2009) and ANPR (Henderson et al, 2004). It can be 
argued that in the forensic ballistics arena the application of an evidence based approach as to the 
most appropriate technology to procure is lacking. 
6.2.8 Summary of Conclusions and Implications 
To conclude, the findings of this Thesis can be grouped into four areas. The first concerns 
interoperability. The results of this Thesis provide evidence suggesting that interoperability is not 
possible between the ballistics analysis systems examined because the variance in the results is 
simply too great. In order to progress towards interoperability, arguably the manufacturers of the 
technology will need to be engaged. A limited form of interoperability may be possible focussing on 
sharing data rather than cross correlating between data from different technologies.  
The second set of findings concerns the usage of the systems by ballistics experts and 
recommendations can be made regarding the usage of them. In particular, the findings concerning 
correlation list length and ammunition type can be applied to the real-life usage of these systems. 
The results of this Thesis raise the issue of confirmation bias in the discipline of forensic ballistics. The 
results indicated that there were multiple occasions where non-matching objects were being ranked 
as more similar than known matching objects. It is not known the extent to which the presence of 
these objects may affect the conclusions of an examiner. It is also clear that the lack of a matching 
standard has resulted in manufacturers of the systems devising proprietary algorithms and 
                                                          
20
 It should be noted that the example described here is not representative of the true cost of system A and 
system B. It merely serves as an example of the types of decisions that could be made if this approach was 
taken. 
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correlation techniques. Arguably, optimisation of technology is interlinked with the creation of a 
matching standard. It may be the case that technology based on principles alternative to digital 
imaging is required. 
The third set of findings relate to the ways in which the results from such systems are used by police 
officers. The data also suggests that the lack of accuracy of the systems could potentially negatively 
impact on the police investigation of gun crime by increasing the time taken to return evidence and 
intelligence back to the investigating officer. An examination of the two systems also demonstrated 
the implications for policing practise particularly in relation to understanding the supply and 
distribution of firearms. This is relevant for specialist operations that aim to disrupt this supply. Some 
of the inaccuracies of the technology combined with a lack of interoperability mean that 
understanding a complete picture of the problem is difficult. Consequently it is difficult to apply 
effective interventions. 
The fourth set of findings relate to procurement of systems, system specification and the most 
appropriate response to gun crime. Particular features relating to a system may be more appropriate 
for a particular manifestation of gun crime in a particular location. This Thesis has demonstrated that 
valuable data can be gathered by assessing a system and this should be used to inform procurement 
decisions. Such an approach would increase the potential for ballistics analysis systems to have a 
positive impact on the police investigation of gun crime and increase the monetary value of these 
systems to law enforcement.  
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6.3 - Contributions to the Field 
Previous research concerning ballistics analysis systems had at the time of writing been based on 
technology provided by one supplier and had utilised a variety of methods to examine the 
technologies from different standpoints. Although previous research had been conducted examining 
the same technology, there was considerable difficulty comparing the output research conducted 
under different conditions. This was acknowledged by Nennstiel and Rahm (2006a:18) who stated;  
 
͞EǆteŶsiǀe IBI“ iŶstruŵeŶt tests haǀe ďeeŶ ĐoŶduĐted iŶ the past ǁith differeŶt goals iŶ 
connection with these and other studies. Their results, standing alone, however, are difficult 
to compare with each other. A systematic summary is lacking to determine which parameters 
have an influence on the success or error rate, respectively, during the operation of the IBIS 
sǇsteŵ.͟ 
 
Nennsteil and Rahm (2006a and 2006b) addressed this issue through the design of a study to enable 
the description of the different parameters that affect the success and error rate for the IBIS systems. 
This Thesis has extended this research through the design of a methodology to enable the 
assessment of ballistics analysis technologies regardless of manufacturer or underlying technological 
principles. Before this Thesis commenced, there had never been any published research conducted 
globally with ballistics analysis technologies other than IBIS Heritage and IBIS Trax 3D. There had also 
never been a comparative assessment of more than one technology using the same set of 
ammunition. The Thesis has also produced a measureable contribution to knowledge as the test set 
of ammunition was designed to enable future research to be conducted and then discussed 
alongside the research already conducted for this Thesis. Furthermore, a multidisciplinary approach 
has been taken to the research, placing the forensic process discussed firmly in the context of wider 
policing issues. This has enabled the results to be relevant in terms of real life policing situations 
relating to the investigation of gun crime. 
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6.4 - Methodological Reflections 
The methodology employed in this Thesis was complicated to design and implement. After analysing 
the results and with the benefit of hindsight there are, however, some elements which could have 
been completed differently. One of the findings concerned the type of ammunition and that the 
systems were more likely to correlate ammunition of the same type as the object in question above 
ammunition of a different type. With this point in mind, it may have been more appropriate had the 
database contained objects that were all of the same ammunition type. However the test fires were 
performed by various individuals located in various laboratories across Europe. When designing the 
methodology it was not considered practical to impose a tight restriction on the ammunition type. 
Instead the focus was on generating a large enough experimental sample.  The bullets that were 
generated for the experimental sample were sent to the author without any indication of the 
ammunition type. It would have been better if there had been an instruction given to the person 
conducting the test firing to record the ammunition type used. However, the usage of different 
ammunition types does reflect the differing ammunition that would be present in an open case file. 
A potentially contentious point relating to the employed methodology is the choice of operator for 
each system. It was recognised in the methodology and in the discussion of the results that the 
different operators of each system could have contributed towards the observed variance in the 
results. However steps were taken in an attempt to limit the impact of the operator mainly by placing 
responsibility for the choice of operator with each manufacturer. Observed variance was also greater 
in both cartridge case conditions than in the bullet condition despite the fact that there is more input 
required from the operator and consequently potential for differentiation when inputting bullets. 
The choice of operator is a key variable and the methodology can theoretically be applied to any 
system. Therefore it is arguably an advantage of the experimental design that the operator of each 
system should be different but chosen by the manufacturer. It is doubtful that there is a suitably 
qualified person who could have operated both systems examined in this Thesis. If other 
manufacturers participate in similar research in future, using this methodology, there will be even 
less scope for a single person to undertake object entry on each system. The choice of a different 
operator chosen by each manufacturer ensures repeatability of the experiment that would not be 
possible should the operator choice be restricted to a single person across all examined systems.  
In an ideal world, every company that manufactures ballistics analysis technology would have 
participated and each manufacturer was indeed approached with this aim in mind when the research 
for the Thesis commenced. However, it became clear very early in the research process that not 
every manufacturer would take part. The main concern was around the confidentiality of the results 
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and any potential commercial impact the results may have on sales. The negotiations with the 
various manufacturers were at times difficult and protracted. However, as identified in the 
methodology, an experiment of this nature had not been carried out before with one of the main 
reasons being the logistical difficulties. As time progressed reluctance on the part of the 
manufacturers to participate meant that there was a very real possibility that none of the 
manufacturers would participate. Fortunately a compromise was reached with the two companies 
that did eventually participate. The compromise included confidentiality agreements and an 
agreement to not identify which system was which in the Thesis.  
There were also various logistical difficulties that arose simply because of the nature of the 
experimental research, the main one being the cost of participating in such an experiment. None of 
the manufacturers of this equipment were located near to the site where the experiment took place 
so the systems had to be transported to Germany where the laboratory was located. An operator of 
each system also had to be provided by each manufacturer again at the cost of the manufacturer. 
The time taken to upload the sample of cartridge cases and bullets was lengthy taking between one 
and six weeks. Obviously the presence of the author was required at various times as the experiment 
was taking place and this resulted in multiple trips to Germany. However, one of the main aims of 
the experiment was to control as many variables as possible and it was therefore decided that the 
location would remain the same for each company. The author is extremely grateful to the two 
companies that participated in the experiment as the Thesis would have taken a dramatically 
different shape without their help, cooperation and guidance.  
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6.5 - Future Research 
As has previously been noted, an experiment of this type has not been carried out before therefore 
there is scope for further research. The most obvious area for furthering the research in this Thesis is 
to conduct the experiment with the other technology providers. Whilst they were all visited as part 
of the current research, on demonstrating the results and benefits of the experiment to date, it is 
possible that the other manufacturers may be keen to participate in future. Such research would 
enable a greater understanding of the other systems available and whether or not interoperability is 
possible between the systems that did not take part. It would be of great benefit to the forensic 
ballistics community if the market leading technology could be examined using the test set of 
ammunition generated for this Thesis. A way to facilitate this might be to adapt the methodology to 
enable the safe transportation of the test set of ammunition to different locations. Alternatively an 
end user could allow access to equipment providing they could allow enough time for access. 
The results and discussion highlighted the fact that the systems examined in the current research are 
not completely accurate and have high error rates in some circumstances. There is therefore a need 
to look at other areas of technology and science away from digital imaging where new developments 
in the forensic ballistics field are occurring. A new system has been developed by Xie et al (2009) 
based on surface metrology. It would be of great interest to conduct the experiment described in this 
Thesis with new technologies. It is also probable that the results from such an experiment could 
contribute to the debate on a matching standard. As they capture objects in three dimensions this 
would allow a much greater level of detail to be gained.  
The results obtained from this Thesis and from previous research suggest that the application of 
ballistics imaging technology to weapon registration schemes is not feasible as the technology does 
not perform to a high enough standard. A possible area for further research could be the application 
of new technologies such as those developed by Barrett, Tajbakhsh and Warren (2011) and Xie et al 
(2009) to a weapon registration scheme. A pre-requisite would, however, be an understanding of the 
capabilities of any system.  
The results also indicated that there were occasions where false positives were presented to the 
user. It would of great interest to design and conduct an experiment similar to that carried out by 
Kerstholt et al (2010) on confirmation bias to ascertain the extent to which the results generated by 
automated systems affect the conclusions of examiners.  
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The results suggested that the only way in which complete interoperability would be possible would 
be with the full cooperation of the manufacturers. Further research could take the form of a working 
group set up to address this specific question. 
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Appendix 1 – Full Results 
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A.1 – Results for Known Match Bullets 
This Appendix presents the full results that were obtained from the experimental research described 
in detail in Chapter four. The results for the bullet comparison are presented first followed by the 
results for the cartridge case condition. The results are also colour coded throughout. Blue signifies 
system A and red signifies system B. It is important to note that correlation scores are referred to but 
these scores are not traditional correlation coefficients and they are not measures of statistical 
significance. Instead these correlation scores are generated by the proprietary algorithms of each 
system. These scores are then used to generate the correlation lists and rank the objects and are 
therefore relative to each system. 
For the bullet comparison, each test weapon has three bullets in the database. For example, test 
index 1A has two matching objects in the database – 1B and 1C. Object 1B is the known matching 
bullets number 1 (KM1) and object 1C is the known matching bullet number 2 (KM2). The correlation 
list for object 1A was examined to ascertain where objects 1B and 1C were found. This was repeated 
for each of the 23 test objects (objects 1A through to object 23A). 
Table A-1 shows the correlation list position and the correlation scores for the 23 test objects in the 
bullet condition. This table shows the results for system A and system B and presents the raw data. 
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Table A-1: Bullet Results Matrix for System A and System B 
KNOWN MATCH 1 
 
KNOWN MATCH 2 
 
Test 
Index  
Known 
Match 
Object 
(1) 
System  
A 
Position 
(KM1) 
System B 
Position 
(KM2) 
System 
A Corr 
Score 
(KM1) 
System B 
Corr 
Score 
(KM1) 
Known 
Match 
Object 
(2) 
System  
A 
Position 
(KM2)  
System  
B 
Position 
(KM2) 
System A 
Corr 
Score 
(KM2) 
System 
B Corr 
Score 
(KM2) 
1A 1B 1 1 0.6589 0.337 1C 2 
 
0.4234 
 
2A 2B 2 1 0.4891 0.078 2C 1 8 0.5274 0.003 
3A 3B 1 2 0.5357 0.354 3C 2 1 0.5119 0.622 
4A 4B 2 1 0.5031 0.698 4C 1 2 0.5618 0.302 
5A 5B 1 1 0.7504 0.448 5C 2 2 0.7014 0.427 
6A 6B 2 2 0.5511 0.026 6C 1 1 0.5571 0.061 
7A 7B 1 1 0.6619 0.043 7C 2 
 
0.4566 
 
8A 8B 2 2 0.6568 0.456 8C 1 1 0.7044 0.487 
9A 9B 1 1 0.777 0.385 9C 2 2 0.7416 0.038 
10A 10B 
    
10C 
    
11A 11B 1 1 0.7162 0.561 11C 2 2 0.6709 0.333 
12A 12B 1 
 
0.3935 
 
12C 17 
 
0.3098 
 
13A 13B 1 
 
0.617 
 
13C 2 3 0.4037 0.041 
14A 14B 1 
 
0.7087 
 
14C 2 8 0.5837 0.018 
15A 15B 2 
 
0.4722 
 
15C 20 
 
0.3897 
 
16A 16B 1 1 0.6912 0.665 16C 2 2 0.6074 0.538 
17A 17B 57 
 
0.3418 
 
17C 107 
 
0.3255 
 
18A 18B 1 1 0.6983 0.331 18C 2 2 0.5936 0.169 
19A 19B 1 
 
0.5298 
 
19C 6 
 
0.4246 
 
20A 20B 78 
 
0.3424 
 
20C 
    
21A 21B 6 
 
0.4057 
 
21C 11 10 0.3966 0.018 
22A 22B 2 2 0.7855 1 22C 1 1 0.8258 1 
23A 23B 1 
 
0.4694 
 
23C 37 
 
0.373 
 
 
Object 1A – System A achieved a perfect result correlating object 1B in position 1 and object 1C in 
position 2. System B also correlated object 1B in position 1 but did not correlate object 1C.  The 
correlation list produced by system B for object 1A consisted of 17 objects so this could be regarded 
as the system suggesting that 16 objects are more similar than object 1C which was not correlated at 
all.  
Object 2A – System A achieved a perfect result correlating object 2B in position 2 and object 2C in 
position 1. System B correlated object 2B in position 1 and object 2C in position 8. This result shows 
that system B has presented 6 objects that do not match the test object in a higher position on the 
correlation list than the actual matching object 2C.  System A correlated object 2B in a lower position 
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(number 2) than object 2C (number 1). The opposite result has been found for system B which found 
object 2B in a higher position (number 2) than object 2C (number 8) . 
Object 3A – System A achieved a perfect result as did system B but the results are of interest because 
the objects are placed in different positions for each system. Object 3B has been placed in position 1 
for system A and position 2 for system B. Object 3C has been placed in position 2 for system A and 
position 1 for system B.  
Object 4A – System A achieved a perfect result as did system B but as was the case with object 3A, 
the actual objects are placed in different positions for each system. Object 4B has been placed in 
position 2 for system A and position 1 for system B. Object 4C has been placed in position 1 for 
system A and position 2 for system B.  
Object 5A – System A achieved a perfect result as did system B and the objects were correlated in 
the same relative positions.  
Object 6A – System A achieved a perfect result as did system B and the objects were correlated in 
the same relative positions.  
Object 7A – System A achieved a perfect result whilst system B correlated object 7B in position 1 
whilst object 7C has not been correlated at all. The total correlation list length produced by system B 
for object 7A consisted of 14 objects. This could be interpreted as the system suggesting that 13 
objects are more similar than object 7C which has not been correlated at all.  
Object 8A – System A achieved a perfect result as did system B and the objects were correlated in 
the same relative positions.  
Object 9A – System A achieved a perfect result as did system B and the objects were correlated in 
the same relative positions.  
Object 10A – Neither system managed to produce a result for object 10A. Not only were the known 
matching objects not correlated but both systems did not produce a correlation list at all.  
Object 11A – System A achieved a perfect result as did system B and the objects were correlated in 
the same relative positions.  
Object 12A – System A correlated object 12B in position 1 whilst object 12C was correlated in the 
seventeenth position. This result shows that system A presented 15 non matching objects as being 
more similar than actual matching object 12C. System B correlated neither object. System B only 
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returned a correlation list containing a single object for test object 12A suggesting that the system 
has returned a single non-matching object as a suggested match.  
Object 13A – System A achieved a perfect result correlating both known matches in positions 1 and 2 
(object 13B in position 1 and object 13C in position 2). System B did not correlate object 13B whilst 
object 13C has been correlated in position number 3. This result is interesting because object 13C has 
been correlated by system B in a higher position on the correlation list than object 13B.  There were 
two non-matching objects that were also presented above object 13C. The correlation list produced 
by system B for object 13A consisted of 9 objects meaning that below the third position, 6 objects 
were correlated as being more similar than object 13B which was not correlated at all.  
Object 14A – System A achieved a perfect result. System B did not correlate object 14B whilst object 
14C has been correlated by system B in position number 8.  This result is similar to that for object 
13A because object 14C has been correlated in a relatively high position on the correlation list but 
there are seven non-matching objects above the actual matching object 14C that have also been 
presented. The total correlation list length for object 14A consisted of 15 objects so 7 objects have 
been correlated as being more similar to the test object than the actual matching object (14B) which 
does not appear on the list.  
Object 15A – System A has correlated object 15B in position number 2 whilst object 15C has been 
correlated in position 20. For system A, eighteen objects that did not match the object under 
examination were presented as more similar that the actual matching objects. System B has not 
managed to correlate either matching object. The correlation list produced for system A for object 
15A consisted of 11 objects so the system has presented 11 non-matching objects as being more 
similar than the actual matching objects. System A presented 18 objects higher than object 15C that 
did not match test object 15A. The other key point is that system A correlated object 15B in position 
2 meaning that a single non-matching object was presented in the number 1 position.  
Object 16A – System A achieved a perfect result as did system B and the objects were correlated in 
the same relative positions. 
Object 17A –System A has found both matching objects (17B at position 57 and 17C at position 107) 
system B has not found either match. The key differentiating point between the systems for object 
17A is that system A has presented 105 objects as being more similar than the matching objects 
whilst the total correlation list presented by system B consisted of just four objects.  
Object 18A – System A achieved a perfect result as did system B and the objects were correlated in 
the same relative positions. 
207 
 
Object 19A – System A has correlated object 19B in position number 1 whilst object 19C has been 
correlated in position 6 meaning that 4 non matching objects are considered to be more similar than 
the actual match. System B has not managed to correlate either matching object. System B however 
produced a correlation list only containing only 3 non-matching objects.  
Object 20A – The result for object 20A is of interest because it is the only occasion where system A 
has correlated only one of the matching objects. System A has correlated object 20B at position 78 
and has not correlated object 20C. Seventy seven objects non matching objects have been presented 
by system A as being more similar than actual matching object 20B. The total correlation list length 
for object 20A was 186 objects; therefore as object 20C is not on the list at all, the remaining 108 
objects on the list below 78
th
 position can also be regarded as non matches that have been 
correlated higher than the actual matching object 20C as object 20C does not appear on the list at all. 
System B has correlated neither object. System B however produced a correlation list consisting of 
only 10 objects.  
Object 21A – System A has correlated object 21B (in position 6) higher than object 21C (in position 
11) whilst system B has correlated object 21C (in position 10) higher than object 21B (not correlated) 
System A has suggested 9 non-matching objects as being more similar to the actual matching objects 
whilst system B has suggested 16 non-matching objects that are more similar than the actual 
matching objects. 
Object 22A – System A achieved a perfect result as did system B and the objects were correlated in 
the same positions. 
Object 23A - System A has correlated object 23B in position number 1 whilst object 23C has been 
correlated in position 37. System A presented 35 non-matching objects higher than object 23C that 
did not match test object 23A. System B has not managed to correlate either matching object but 
produced a correlation list containing only 10 non-matching objects. 
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A.2 – Results for Known Match Cartridge Cases (Breech Face Algorithm) 
This section of the Appendix presents the cartridge case results. For the cartridge case condition, 
each test weapon has three cartridge cases in the database. For example, test object index 1A has 
two matching objects in the database – 1B and 1C. Object 1B is the known matching cartridge case 
number 1 (KM1) and object 1C is the known matching cartridge case number 2 (KM2). The 
correlation list for object 1A was examined to ascertain where objects 1B and 1C were found. This 
was repeated for each of the 22 test objects (objects 1A through to object 22A).  
Both systems have two different algorithms that can be used to correlate cartridge cases. The first 
algorithm examines the breech face impression and the second algorithm examines the firing pin 
impression. The results are presented separately for each algorithm.  
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Table A-2: Cartridge Case Results Matrix for System A and System B (Breech Face Impression) 
 
 
KNOWN MATCH 1 
 
KNOWN MATCH 2 
 
Test 
Index  
Known 
Match 
Object 
(1) 
Sys A 
P  
KM1 
BF 
Sys B 
P 
KM1 
BF 
Sys A  
Corr Score 
KM1 
BF 
Sys B  
Corr 
Score 
KM1  
BF 
Known 
Match 
Object 
(2) 
Sys A  
P 
KM2 
BF 
Sys B 
P  
KM2  
BF2 
Sys A 
Corr 
Score 
KM2  
BF 
Sys B  
Corr 
Score  
KM2 
BF 
1A 1B 1 1 0.620172 0.8495 1C 2 2 0.591714 0.8366 
2A 2B 1 1 0.629938 1.0 2C 2 44 0.615198 0.7225 
3A 3B 1 1 0.60322 0.8367 3C 2 202 0.449516 0.5248 
4A 4B 34 363 0.32166 0.2283 4C 45 33 0.308553 0.5648 
5A 5B 1 13 0.426917 0.5149 5C 10 217 0.354803 0.4002 
6A 6B 1 47 0.417563 0.4084 6C 95 1 0.214954 0.5784 
7A 7B 2 268 0.429603 0.3434 7C 13 109 0.392569 0.5652 
8A 8B 5 220 0.365545 0.3986 8C 31 8 0.309789 0.4990 
9A 9B 1 7 0.541665 0.7629 9C 4 357 0.505989 0.2132 
10A 10B 2 114 0.569955 0.5567 10C 1 1 0.630732 0.8055 
11A 11B 3 1 0.469856 0.8136 11C 2 84 0.479072 0.6283 
12A 12B 1 1 0.732799 0.8474 12C 2 81 0.661799 0.5658 
13A 13B 1 1 0.796735 1.0 13C 2 197 0.574716 0.4963 
14A 14B 1 9 0.601495 0.5360 14C 2 42 0.47512 0.4848 
15A 15B 1 1 0.504967 0.6821 15C 2 78 0.432609 0.5832 
16A 16B 2 163 0.45568 0.4780 16C 1 223 0.521828 0.3737 
17A 17B 2 2 0.466728 0.6473 17C 1 141 0.478355 0.5291 
18A 18B 5 2 0.399786 0.6372 18C 139 234 0.298924 0.4381 
19A 19B 116 75 0.263188 0.4476 19C 181 277 0.235416 0.3726 
20A 20B 1 1 0.530526 0.7027 20C 2 235 0.488823 0.4131 
21A 21B 168 1 0.235401 0.8513 21C 1 33 0.418723 0.6247 
22A 22B 157 1 0.31078 0.9321 22C 1 28 0.581979 0.6485 
 
Object 1A – System A produced a perfect result as did system B. Both objects were correlated in the 
same relative positions. 
 
Object 2A – System A correlated object 2B in the number one position as did system B. However 
system A correlated object 2C in the number two position whilst system correlated object 2C in 
position 44. This means that for the actual matching object 1C, 42 non-matching objects have been 
presented as being more similar.  
Object 3A – System A correlated object 3B in the number one position as did system B. However 
system A correlated object 3C in the number two position whilst system B correlated object 3C in 
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position 202 meaning for actual matching object 1C, 200 non-matching objects have been presented 
as being more similar.   
Object 4A – System A correlated both objects in low positions on the correlation list, object 4B in 
position 34 and object 4C in position 45 meaning that system A has presented 33 objects as being 
more similar than the actual matching object 4B and 43 objects that are ranked as more similar that 
actual matching object 4C. System B also correlated both objects in low position but object 4C was 
correlated in a higher position (33) than object 4B (363) meaning that meaning that for System B 
object 4B has 361 non-matching objects ranked as more similar above it and object 4C has 32 non-
matching objects ranked as more similar placed about it.  
Object 5A – System A correlated object 5B in the top position and object 5C in position 10 meaning 
that for this object system A has suggested that 9 objects are more similar than the actual matching 
object. System B correlated the objects in the same relative order, (5B above 5C) but at different 
positions. 5B was correlated at position 13 whilst object 5C was correlated at position 217 meaning 
that object 5B, 12 non-matching objects have been considered to be more similar while for object 5C, 
215  non-matching objects have been considered to be more similar.  
Object 6A – System A has correlated object 6B in the top position and object 6C in position 95 
meaning that system A has suggested that 93 objects are more similar than the actual matching 
object 6C. The result is the opposite for system B – object 6B has been correlated in position 47 
meaning that 46 non-matching objects have been placed in a higher position than the actual 
matching object. System B has correlated object 6C in the top position.  
Object 7A – System A has correlated object 7B in position two whilst object 7C has been correlated 
at position thirteen. This suggests that system A has correlated 11 objects as being more similar as 
the actual matching object 7C and has ranked a non-matching object in position one – higher than 
actual matching object 7B. System B however has correlated both objects in low positions and object 
7C has been correlated at position 109, higher than object 7B which was correlated at position 268. 
This means that for object 7B, 266 non-matching objects have been ranked as being more similar 
than the actual matching object and for object 7C, 108 non-matching objects have been correlated as 
being more similar. Again this result demonstrates the differences between both systems even 
though they are both ranking objects based on the breech face impression. It is likely that system A 
managed the variance of the marks more successfully than system B. 
Object 8A – System A has correlated object 8B at position 5 whilst object 8C has been correlated at 
position 31 meaning that 4 non matching objects have been correlated in higher positions that 
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known matching object 8B and 29 non-matching objects have been correlated in higher positions 
that known matching object 8C. System B has produced an opposite result. Object 8B has been 
correlated at position 220 whilst object 8C has been correlated at position 8 meaning that for object 
8B, 218 non-matching objects have been placed higher than the actual matching object and for 
object 8C, 7 non-matching objects have been placed higher than the actual matching object. This 
result is similar to those for objects 4A, 6A and 7A in that it adds evidence to support the idea that 
the markings alone are not the only determining factor in the performance of the systems. 
Object 9A – System A has correlated object 9B at position one and object 9C at position four. This 
shows that system A has correlated 3 non-matching objects in higher positions that the actual 
matching object.  System B has correlated object 9B at position seven and object 9C at position 357 
meaning that for object 9B, 6 non-matching objects have been placed in a higher position than the 
actual matching objects whilst for object 9C, 355 non-matching objects have been placed in a higher 
position than the actual matching object.  
Object 10A – Both systems have correlated object 10C at position one. Object 10B has been 
correlated at position two by system A whilst system has correlated object 10B at position 114 on the 
list meaning that for object 10B, 112 non-matching objects were correlated in a higher position than 
the actual matching object.  
Object 11A – System A has correlated object 11B at position three and object 11C at position two. 
This result is unique thus far because it is the only occasion where the known matches have 
appeared at position 2 and 3 with a non-matching object in position 1. System B has correlated 
object 11B at position one whilst object 11C has been correlated at position 84 meaning that for this 
particular object, 82 non-matching objects were placed higher than the actual matching object. This 
result is of interest because there is disagreement between the systems in terms of relative ranking 
of the known matching objects. System A has placed object 11C (position 2) higher than object 11B 
(position 3). System B has produced a different result in that object 11C (position 84) was placed 
lower than object 11B (position 1).  
Object 12A – Both system A and system B have correlated object 12B in the top position. System A 
has correlated object 12C in position 2 achieving a perfect result whilst system B has correlated 
object 12C in position 81 meaning that for this particular object, 79 non-matching objects were 
placed higher than the actual matching object.  
Object 13A – Both system A and system B have correlated object 13B in position one. System A has 
correlated object 13C in position two achieving a perfect result whilst system B has correlated object 
212 
 
13C in position 197 meaning that 195 non-matching objects were correlated in a higher position than 
actual matching object 13C.  
Object 14A – System A has achieved a perfect result correlating object 14B at position one and object 
14C at position two. System B has correlated object 14B at position 9 and object 14C at position 42. 
For object 14B, 8 non-matching objects were correlated in a higher position than the actual matching 
object and for object 14C 40 non-matching objects were correlated in a higher position than the 
actual matching object.  
Object 15A – System A has achieved a perfect result correlating object 15B at position one and object 
15C at position two. System B has also correlated object 15B at position one but has correlated 
object 15C at position 78 meaning that for object 15C, 76 non-matching objects were correlated in a 
higher position than the actual matching object.  
Object 16A – System A has achieved a perfect result correlating object 16C at position 1 and object 
16B at position two. System B has correlated both objects in very low positions but has placed the 
objects in opposite order to system A. System B has correlated object 16C at position 223, lower than 
object 16B correlated at position 163. For object 16B, 162 non-matching objects were placed higher 
than the actual matching object and for object 16C, 221 non-matching objects were ranked higher 
than the actual matching object.  
Object 17A – System A has achieved a perfect result correlating object 17C at position one whilst 
object 17B was correlated at position 2. System B has correlated the objects in opposite relative 
order. Object 17B was also correlated at position 2 but object 17C was correlated much lower on the 
correlation list at position 141.This means that a single non-matching object has been correlated 
above the actual matching object 17B and a key point is the similarity between the test object and 
the non-matching object placed in the number one position.  For 17C, 139 non-matching objects 
have been correlated above the actual match. 
Object 18A – System A has correlated object 18B at position 5 but correlation object 18C at position 
139. This shows that system A has correlated four non-matching objects in positions higher than the 
actual matching object 18B and 137 non-matching objects ion higher positions than the actual 
matching object 18C. System B correlated object 18B at position two whilst object 18C was 
correlated at position 234. This means that for object 18B a single non-matching object was placed 
higher than the actual matching object. For object 18C, 233 non-matching objects were placed higher 
than the actual matching object.  
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Object 19A – System A has correlated object 19B at position 116 and object 19C at position 181. This 
means that system A has correlated 115 non-matching objects in a higher position that actual 
matching object 19B and 179 non-matching objects at a higher position than actual matching object 
19C. System B has correlated object 19B at position 75 whilst object 19C was correlated at position 
277 meaning that for object 19B, 74 non-matching objects were correlated above the actual match 
whilst for object 19C, 275 non-matching objects were placed above the actual matching object.  
Object 20A – System A has achieved a perfect result correlating object 20B at position one and object 
20C at position two. System B has also correlated object 20B at position one whilst object 20C has 
been correlated at position 235 meaning that 233 non-matching objects were placed higher than the 
actual matching objects.  
 Object 21A – System A has correlated object 21B at position 168 but has found object 21C in the 
number 1 position. 166 non-matching objects have ranked as more similar than the actual matching 
object. System B has correlated object 21B in the top position whilst object 21C was correlated in 
position 33. This means that for object 21C, 31 non-matching objects were placed higher than the 
actual matching object.  
Object 22A –System A correlated object 22C in the top position and object 22B was found at position 
157. This shows that system A has ranked 155 non-matching objects as being more similar than the 
actual matching object. System B correlated Object 22B in the top position whilst object 22C was 
correlated at position 28. This means that for object 22C, 26 non-matching objects were placed 
above the actual matching object.  
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A.3 – Results for Known Match Cartridge Cases (Firing Pin Algorithm) 
This section presents an analysis of the firing pin algorithm results for systems A and B. Table A-3 
presents the correlation list positions and the correlation scores for each system. 
Table A-3: Results Comparison Matrix for System A and System B - Cartridge Cases (Firing Pin 
Algorithm) 
 
 
KNOWN MATCH 1 
 
KNOWN MATCH 2 
 
Test 
Index  
Known 
Match 
Object 
(1) 
Sys A 
P 
KM1 
FP 
Sys B P 
KM1 
FP 
 
Sys A 
Corr Score  
KM1 FP 
Sys B  
Corr Score 
KM1 FP 
Known 
Match 
Object 
(2) 
Sys A P  
KM2  
FP 
Sys B P 
KM2 
FP 
Sys A  
Corr Score 
KM2 FP 
Sys B  
Corr 
Score 
KM2 FP 
1A 1B 1 1 0.787411 0.643 1C 183 192 0.489746 0.184 
2A 2B 3 1 0.549386 0.296 2C 57 166 0.509026 0.171 
3A 3B 1 1 0.71997 0.542 3C 176 60 0.482933 0.256 
4A 4B 9 4 0.510582 0.209 4C 1 1 0.686069 0.317 
5A 5B 98 257 0.489731 0.113 5C 109 212 0.486473 0.12 
6A 6B 1 1 0.617563 0.362 6C 6 2 0.546326 0.253 
7A 7B 35 14 0.47229 0.136 7C 23 18 0.486313 0.129 
8A 8B 74 1 0.496544 0.235 8C 3 48 0.5383 0.166 
9A 9B 180 3 0.505035 0.284 9C 1 1 0.683223 0.455 
10A 10B 49 13 0.50518 0.206 10C 1 1 0.679835 0.542 
11A 11B 1 1 0.68996 0.498 11C 321 335 0.44638 0.098 
12A 12B 1 1 0.66408 0.502 12C 315 345 0.438643 0.098 
13A 13B 1 1 0.820897 0.774 13C 221 8 0.466964 0.247 
14A 14B 1 1 0.810986 0.605 14C 287 359 0.448272 0.091 
15A 15B 1 1 0.783375 0.538 15C 199 150 0.454856 0.141 
16A 16B 1 1 0.645411 0.438 16C 2 2 0.596086 0.374 
17A 17B 2 1 0.591348 0.294 17C 1 10 0.624086 0.192 
18A 18B 1 8 0.668215 0.335 18C 2 11 0.626055 0.33 
19A 19B 67 63 0.484314 0.156 19C 41 66 0.491379 0.154 
20A 20B 1 1 0.771572 0.539 20C 2 2 0.634203 0.458 
21A 21B 7 2 0.53994 0.386 21C 11 6 0.531968 0.319 
22A 22B 12 32 0.521057 0.194 22C 82 176 0.483268 0.132 
 
Object 1A – Both system A and system B have correlated object 1B in the top position. There is also 
an agreement of sorts between the systems because they both placed object 1C at low positions, 
System A at position 183 and system B at 192. This means that System A presented 181 non-
matching objects as being more similar to actual matching object 1C. System B placed 190 non-
matching objects above the actual matching object.  
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Object 2A – System A has correlated object 2B at position 3 and object 2C at position 57. This means 
that for the actual matching object 2B, two non-matches have been presented as more similar and 
for object 2C, 55 non-matching objects have been presented as more similar. System B has 
correlated object 2B at position one and object 2C at position 166 meaning that system B suggested 
164 non-matching objects as being more similar than the actual matching object.  
Object 3A – The result for object 3A is similar to that for object 2A. Both systems have correlated 
object 3B in position one. System A has placed object 3C at position 176. This shows that for object 
3C, system A has suggested 174 non-matching objects as being more similar to the known match. 
System B has placed object 3C at position 60 meaning that system B suggested 58 non-matches as 
being more similar than the actual matching object.  
Object 4A – Both systems have placed object 4C at position one. System A has placed object 4B at 
position 9 meaning that system A has placed 8 non-matches as being more similar than the known 
matching object. System B has placed object 4B at position 4 suggesting three non-matching objects 
as being more similar that actual matching object 4B.  
Object 5A – Both systems have correlated both objects in low positions. System A has correlated 
object 5B in position 98 and object 5C in position 109. This result shows that system A has suggested 
that 97 non matching objects are more similar than the known matching object 5B and that 107 non-
matching objects are more similar than known matching object 5C. System B has correlated the 
objects in opposite relative positions – object 5B was correlated at position 257 lower than object 5C 
which was correlated at position 212. This shows that for object 5C, system B suggested 211 non-
matching objects as being more similar than the actual matching object whilst for object 5B, 255 
matching objects were suggested as being more similar.   
Object 6A – Both systems have correlated object 6B at position one on the correlation list. System A 
has correlated object 6C at position 6 meaning that system A has correlated 4 non-matching objects 
as being more similar than the actual matching object. System B has achieved a perfect result and 
has correlated object 6C at position two.  
Object 7A – System A correlated object 7B at position 35 lower than object 7C which system A 
correlated at position 23. . This result shows that system A has correlated 33 non-matching objects 
above known match object 7B and 22 non-match objects above matching object 7B. System B ranked 
the objects in the opposite order placing object 7B highest at position 14 whilst object 7C was placed 
at position 18. For object 7B 13 non-matching objects have been ranked in higher positions and for 
object 7C, 16 non-matching objects have been suggested as being more similar.  
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Object 8A – System A correlated object 8B in position 74 and object 8C in position three. System A 
has therefore suggested that two non-matching objects are more similar than matching object 7C 
and 72 objects are more similar than object 8B. System B however, correlated the objects in opposite 
ranking order – object 8B was correlated in top position and object 8C was correlated in position 48. 
This means that system B suggested 46 non-matching objects as being more similar than actual 
matching object 8C.   
Object 9A – Both system A and system B have correlated object 9C in the top position. System B has 
correlated object 9B in position three whilst system A has correlated object 9B in position 180. This 
shows that system has suggested 178 non-matching objects as being more similar than the actual 
matching object (9B) and system B has suggested that a single non-matching object is more similar 
than object 9B.   
Object 10A – Both system A and system B have placed object 10C in the top position. System A has 
placed object 10B in position 49 and system B has placed object 10B in position 13. This shows that 
system A has correlated 47 non-matching objects in higher positions than actual matching object 10B 
and system B correlated 11 non-matching objects in higher positions than the actual matching 
object. Whilst there is agreement between the systems with regards to object 10C, system B has 
placed object 10B in a higher position than system A. 
Object 11A - Both systems have correlated object 11B in position 1 and both systems have correlated 
object 11C in a very low position on the list. Object 11C appears at position 321 for system A and 
position 335 for system B. This means that that system A has suggested 319 non-matching objects 
that are more similar than the actual matching object and system B has suggested 333 non-matching 
objects as being more similar than matching object 11C.  
Object 12A – This result is very similar to that obtained for object 11A in that the results for each 
system are not identical but they are very similar. Both systems have correlated object 12B in 
position one and both systems have correlated object 12C in a very low position on the list. Object 
12C has been correlated at position 315 for system A and position 345 for system B. Therefore 
system A has suggested 313 non-matching objects that are more similar to the actual matching 
object and has suggested 343 non-matching objects as being more similar than matching object 12C.  
Object 13A – Both systems have correlated object 13B at position one whilst system A has correlated 
object 13C at position 221 and system B has correlated object 13C at position 8. This shows that 
system A has suggested 219 non-matching objects that are more similar than the actual matching 
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object whilst system B has suggested 6 non-matching objects as being more similar than the actual 
matching object.  
Object 14A – Both systems have correlated object 14B in the top position and object 14C in much 
lower position on the correlation lists. System A correlated object 14C at position 287 meaning that 
system A has suggested 285 non-matching objects as being more similar than actual matching object 
14A. System B has correlated object 14C at position 359 meaning that system B suggested 357 non-
matching objects as being more similar than matching object 14C.   
Object 15A –Object 15B has been correlated in the top position by both systems whilst the other 
object appears at a much lower position on the correlation lists. System A correlated object 15C at 
position 199 meaning system A has correlated 197 non-matching object as being more similar than 
the actual matching object. System B correlated the same object at position 150 meaning that 
system B suggested 148 non-matching objects as being more similar to the actual matching object 
15C.  
Object 16A – Both systems A and B achieved a perfect result and the objects are in the same relative 
positions. 
Object 17A – System A has achieved a perfect result placing object 17C at position 1 and object 17B 
at position 2. System B has correlated a known match in position one but object 17B – opposite to 
system A. System B has placed object 17C at position 10. This still means that system B has correlated 
8 non-matching objects as being more similar than the actual matching object.   
Object 18A – System A has achieved a perfect result correlating object 18B at position 1 and object 
18C at position 1. System B has correlated object 17B at position 8 and object 17C at position 11. 
Therefore system B suggested that 7 non-matching objects are more similar than actual matching 
object 18B and suggested that 9 non-matching objects are more similar than actual matching object 
18C. 
Object 19A – System A has correlated object 19B at position 67 and object 19C at position 41. System 
A has suggested that 40 non-matching objects are more similar than known matching object 19C and 
65 non-matching objects are more similar than known matching object 19B. System B has produced 
the opposite result in terms of relative correlation list positions – object 19B was correlated at 
position 63 whilst object 19C was correlated at position 66. System B has therefore suggested that 62 
non-matching objects were more similar than actual matching object 19B and has suggested that 64 
non-matching objects were more similar than actual matching object 19C.  
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Object 20A – Both systems A and B achieved a perfect result and the objects are in the same relative 
positions. 
Object 21A – System A has correlated object 21B at position 7 and object 21C at position 11. This 
means that for object 21B, system has suggested 6 non-matching objects as being more similar than 
the known match and for object 21C, 9 non-matches have been suggested as being more similar. 
System B has correlated object 21B at position 2 and object 21C at position 6. Therefore system B has 
correlated a non-matching object in the top position. For object 21C, 4 non-matching objects have 
been correlated higher positions that the actual matching object.   
Object 22A - System A has placed object 22B at position 12 and object 22C at position 82. This means 
that system A has suggested 11 non-matching objects as being more similar that the actual matching 
object 22B and 80 non-matching objects as being more similar than object 22C. System has placed 
object 22B at position 32 and object 22C at position 176.  System B has therefore suggested that 31 
non-matches were more similar than object 22B and also suggested that 174 non-matching objects 
were more similar than actual matching object 22C 
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